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Reflections on the Quarter

Senator Fulbright: Myths and Initiatives

SENATOR J. William Fulbright's speech on foreign policy myths and initiatives, delivered on the floor of the Senate on March 24, has become a focal point for foreign policy debate in this country. The Senator's powerful position as Chairman of the Foreign Relations Committee, his reputation for thoughtful reappraisals of difficult policy problems coupled with his eloquent prose style, give weight to his pronouncements even when they are of a far smaller dimension than those made on this occasion. Fulbright's speech could presage major changes in U.S. foreign policy.

Fulbright criticizes the United States for its "moralistic" rather than "empirical" judgments in foreign policy. He calls for greater recognition of the fact that neither the United States nor the Soviet Union is omnipotent. Moreover, he suggests that Americans should cease to equate means with ends in foreign policy. Instead, they should evolve long-range objectives, and should develop the means appropriate to attain them. He deems such advice especially appropriate for a U.S. policy which seeks to exacerbate divisions within the communist world.

According to Fulbright, the United States has not put disputes among communist nations to its own best advantage because policies formulated in Washington are based upon outdated and sometimes totally irrational analyses. For example, he points out that we tend to view Soviet gambits into the Free World—trade initiatives, airline franchises, new consulates—as efforts to subvert noncommunist nations. Yet when the U.S. government tries similar actions behind the Iron Curtain, U.S. policymakers are accused of "giving aid and comfort to the enemy and . . . innumerable other categories of idiocy and immorality." He argues for more intelligent assessments by the citizenry in order to support more daring moves by the President and his Administration.

An effective foreign policy, Fulbright maintains, avoids the excesses of overcaution and "concerns itself more with innovations abroad than with conciliation [of political forces] at home." Fulbright urges Americans to think about the "unthinkable in our foreign policy."

Such arguments lend considerable weight to Fulbright's policy critique. Few will disagree with his pleas for bold initiatives in foreign policy. Yet both his assumptions and his analyses raise important questions. Fulbright believes that events in recent years have profoundly altered East-West relations. In his estimation, the

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Cuban missile crisis permitted the United States to convince the Soviets that "aggression" and "adventure" are too dangerous. Undoubtedly, the import of the Cuban missile crisis did not escape Premier Khrushchev: the United States was prepared, if necessary, to use its nuclear might to thwart Soviet policy. The Soviet Union, however, may have learned another lesson: if Moscow is to prevail in future confrontations with the United States, the communists must possess a military arsenal which enables them to face down a challenge similar to that posed by the Kennedy Administration in October 1962. Hence, the Soviets—while avoiding further showdowns with the militarily stronger United States—may continue to strive for scientific-technological breakthroughs which will provide them with new military capabilities.

Nevertheless, it is Fulbright's contention that the nuclear test ban treaty symbolizes the willingness of both sides to forgo "any bid for a military or political breakthrough." The United States, for its part, has long sought surcease from the struggle with the communist world. The United States would gladly divert its efforts from the development of new weaponry in exchange for assurances that the Soviet Union was also prepared to do so. Hence, U.S. willingness to sign the nuclear test ban treaty. The Soviet Union, for purposes of its own, may also desire a *détente* with the United States in order to resolve pressing internal problems as well as to improve relations among communist states. However, it does not follow that the Soviets have abandoned "total victory." There is little evidence showing that communist leadership has altered its basic policies. Thus U.S. policymakers should be wary of mistaking tactical changes for fundamental transformations in communist policy.

In his speech Fulbright examines problems confronting the United States in several key areas of the world. He commends the Administration for its assistance to South Vietnam in the struggle against the Viet Cong. Ironically, it is the Senator's analysis of U.S.-Cuban relations which has evoked the most comment. Fulbright's view that Castro represents only a nuisance to the United States and that means disproportionate to the objective would be required for his removal is questionable. Senator Fulbright recognizes the danger posed by Cuban communism to other Latin American countries as illustrated in the recent Venezuelan crisis. He feels that established procedures within the OAS should suffice to cope with such dangers. Furthermore, he warns against permitting preoccupation with the Cuban problem to divert U.S. attention from the important task of promoting social and economic progress throughout the rest of the continent in such programs as the Alliance for Progress. Still, the relative success or failure of such endeavors may, to some extent, depend upon the revolutionary activities of Cuban communists as they attempt to subvert other Latin

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American governments. Unlike Fulbright, Premier Castro appears to regard his country both as an integral part of the communist world and as a base for communist subversion in Latin America, notwithstanding the increasing difficulties encountered, so it seems, by the Soviet Union and Cuba in their relations with each other.

At present, Cuba may need a respite in order to devote her full energies to the task of economic development. Despite communist efforts to make Cuba an economic showcase in Latin America, the Cuban economy has steadily deteriorated. In part, this is due to the failure of the Soviet Union to live up to its trade obligations as well as to the growing disillusionment of workers with Castro's economic program. Nevertheless, Fulbright has urged the United States to abandon its embargo upon trade with Cuba. According to Fulbright, this policy has failed as a U.S. weapon. Senator Fulbright argues that it has failed because it has not brought down the Castro regime, and because it does not have the support of U.S. allies. However, the blockade alone was never intended to destroy the Castro regime. If the blockade has not resulted in the regime's collapse, neither has it proven conducive to stability in Cuba.

Partly as a result of the blockade, Cuba faces economic problems the solution of which will tax the energies of the Castro regime and impose new economic burdens on the Soviet Union. A U.S. offer to lift trade restrictions against Cuba might assist Castro in resolving these problems and might provide his hard-pressed regime with the time necessary to strengthen its position. Instead, the United States might best promote its own long-term objectives by continuing its economic pressure against Cuba and by efforts to assure the removal of remaining Soviet forces from the island. Furthermore, the United States could promote efforts by the OAS to guard against communist encroachment in the hemisphere. Even though these efforts may not prove sufficient to ensure Castro's downfall, it is less likely that a resumption of U.S. trade will produce this result.

Government officials will have to take account of European reactions to Fulbright's speech. The cohesiveness of the Atlantic Alliance depends to a considerable degree upon U.S. leadership. By and large, the United States failed to provide adequate leadership when it was still possible to transform the alliance into a wider union. Although there is increasing concern as to the durability of the alliance, the United States continues to pursue policies that can hardly be expected to strengthen transatlantic bonds. If the European allies now behave as if the threat of aggression has all but disappeared and thus the alliance need no longer command the sacrifices which once seemed necessary, some of the statements and hints emanating from Washington have no doubt confirmed that erroneous impression. For every myth dissipated, a new one has been conjured up, and not all

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the ideas we and our allies are now invited to disown are myths. Communism remains the principal enemy of the West. If we, the strongest among the allies, falter, can we be surprised if our European allies fail in their allegiance to the idea of a united West?

Senator Fulbright's analysis of U.S. foreign policy is likely to provoke debate not only between, but within, the political parties. Such discussion is essential to the operation of the American political system. However, U.S. policymakers must see to it that the Soviets will not interpret deliberation as a sign of indecision and weakness, and thus be tempted to undertake actions calculated to enhance communist power.

The Panama Incident

On January 9 some U.S. students in the Canal Zone raised the U.S. flag and resisted efforts to remove it. The Panamanian press seized upon the incident and reported that the U.S. students had opposed the flying of the Panamanian flag in the Zone alongside the Stars and Stripes. When several hundred Panamanian students entered the Zone on the afternoon of the 9th to raise the Panama flag, a riot broke out. The all-Panamanian Zonian police units at the scene succeeded in forcing the students to withdraw to the Republic without bloodshed. However, that evening and throughout the night mobs numbering in the thousands stormed through Panama City; entering the Canal Zone, they destroyed automobiles, burned buildings with Molotov cocktails and fired upon both the Zonian police and U.S. Army reinforcements. Gunfire from the Republic of Panama into the Zone wounded several American soldiers; in addition, more than a score of Panamanians were killed, some by the rioters rather than the police. The Johnson Administration had come face-to-face with its first foreign policy crisis.

Some Panamanians have long sought revision of the 1903 Treaty which gave the United States permanent control of the five miles of territory on either side of the Canal. Nevertheless, not until 1959 did the United States agree to fly Panama's flag alongside that of the United States in recognition of Panama's titular sovereignty over the Canal Zone. Thus, in January when U.S. students in the high school at Balboa raised the Stars and Stripes at the school, they disobeyed an order which forbade the flying of either the U.S. or Panamanian flag alone.

The communists quickly exploited this unfortunate incident. Fabian Velarde, the Information Chief for the Panamanian presidential office, called for an end to the crisis on January 15, after his government learned that "subversive elements" had introduced a "large quantity of weapons." President Chiari, however, chose to minimize the communists' role in the riots.

Panama has benefited from the Canal, which provides more than 11,000 jobs—many of considerable responsibility—for Panamanians. In

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addition, at least $75 million annually flows into the economy of Panama from the operation of the Canal, including more than $32 million in wages and salaries and nearly $23 million in U.S. purchases of Panamanian goods and services. Yet few Panamanian politicians are convinced that Panama receives just benefits from its most important "natural resource," geographical location. These skeptics harbor three principal grievances against the United States:

Some Panamanians believe their country's share of the annual tolls is inadequate. The Canal, with its six outdated and overworked locks, the need for expensive piloting throughout the entire course, and numerous other costly features, is expensive to operate. Although the Canal's gross income approaches $60 million annually, the company usually loses money. Thus the funds which Panama receives from tolls rarely come out of profits; they are from U.S. governmental appropriations. Moreover, Canal tolls have not been raised since 1914. Yet Panamanians complain bitterly about the company's gross income of $60 million compared with their modest compensation of $1.9 million.

Panamanian nationalists want to eliminate the clause in the treaty which permits the United States to operate the Canal in perpetuity.

Finally, many Panamanians insist that U.S. citizens living in the Canal Zone have established a foreign enclave bisecting their nation. Although the average per capita income of Panamanians barely totals $400 a year, U.S. citizens in the Canal Zone enjoy a standard of living approximating that of the United States.

These Panamanian grievances are complicated by the facts of political life in the Republic. A relatively small group wields political power; the Presidency has passed from one to another representative of some forty ruling families which have enjoyed marked success in shifting popular dissatisfaction from themselves to Washington. U.S. operation of the Canal, always a useful scapegoat, provided an especially attractive target in 1964, an election year in Panama.

The current crisis has again raised the question of the value of the Canal to the United States. Even though the Canal would probably be rendered useless in a nuclear war, its military value to the United States remains considerable in smaller-scale Cold War conflicts. During the Korean War, for example, large amounts of supplies flowed from the Eastern Seaboard of the United States through the Canal to the Pacific. When the Cuban missile crisis erupted in 1962, U.S. Marine units were brought through the Canal to the Caribbean. South Vietnam currently receives supplies through the Canal. Future conflicts are likely to illustrate the Canal's continuing military importance to the Free World.

In addition, the Canal has become increasingly important to the economy of the United States. It forms the largest single trade route

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from the U.S. East Coast to Asia. In 1963 nearly twenty million tons of cargo moved through the Canal, a major portion consisting of coal, coke and scrap metal for Japan. Overland routes would increase costs considerably, and shipment through the Strait of Magellan would multiply them many times. Moreover, the Canal is of no less economic consequence to Latin American countries: shipments between the United States and Peru, Ecuador, Chile and Colombia form its second largest trade flow.

During OAS deliberations on the Panama dispute, the United States insisted that it had only agreed to "discuss" all matters, while the Panamanians declared that the 1903 Treaty would have to be "renegotiated." Assistant Secretary of State for American Affairs Thomas C. Mann was sent to Panama with Edward Martin, the former Assistant Secretary, and Secretary of the Army Cyrus Vance to conduct the discussions. In addition, a committee at the highest level was formed to consider the various problems at issue —problems which might have been anticipated and headed off if the United States had had an ambassador in Panama. The U.S. had not appointed a successor to Ambassador Farland, who resigned in the summer of 1963.

The Panamanian incident has revived discussion about the building of a new canal. The United States should consider such an undertaking. In the last decade, Canal traffic has almost doubled to nearly 12,000 transits a year. Consequently, some ships encounter delays because of the limited locks and docking facilities. Increases during the decade ahead will undoubtedly create a major transit problem. Moreover, the largest aircraft carriers in the U.S. Navy and some of the world's great tankers cannot pass through the Canal.

A sea level canal could take more traffic and might be less vulnerable to attack. Furthermore, should a new canal be built through some nation other than Panama, the United States would have an alternative route between the Atlantic and Pacific Oceans. Atomic explosives, provided the other signatories of the test ban treaty agree to their use, could reduce both the cost and the construction time of the project. Suitable OAS financing and control of a new canal could serve the long-run interests of both the United States and its hemispheric neighbors. Pending the construction of a second waterway, however, discussion of U.S. withdrawal from the Panama Canal Zone appears premature as long as the passage of shipping through this waterway is vital to Western security.

Aftermath of British Withdrawal: Africa, Cyprus

On May 23, 1963 the heads of state and government of thirty-two African nations, meeting in Addis Ababa, signed the Charter of the Organization of African Unity (OAU). Recent events throughout the African continent illustrate the

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lack of consensus among the OAU members as to the appropriate policy to be adopted on such matters as decolonization and the relationship between Pan-African and regional groupings. To some extent, however, the Addis Ababa Conference succeeded in healing the breach between the Monrovia and Casablanca groups, divided on policies toward Southern Rhodesia, South Africa, Mozambique and Angola.

The OAU may be expected to exert increasing pressure upon Great Britain to resolve the question of independence for Southern Rhodesia in favor of the native population rather than the white settlers of that British colony. At a conference held in Lagos, February 24-29, 1964, the OAU Foreign Ministers adopted a resolution calling upon Britain to forestall a declaration of unilateral independence, lest OAU members sever their relations with London. The delegates to the Lagos meeting appealed to African states to urge Britain to grant Southern Rhodesia a constitution which would include greater representation of the non-white people.

Mozambique, Angola and South Africa are likely to receive greater attention from the OAU. This organization's Committee of Nine is evaluating the revolutionary groups in each country and is preparing to back the faction most likely to succeed in overthrowing the existing regimes. However, the Organization has not enlisted necessary financial support, nor has it acquired the arms needed to achieve its objectives. For example, Ghana, one of the most militant spokesmen for the Pan-African movement, has not yet paid her assessment to the Committee of Nine.

Any forecast of the probable accomplishments of this new institution is fraught with uncertainty. The leaders of the newly-independent states are likely to be preoccupied with domestic problems in the immediate future. Before a sense of national cohesion has been established, multilateral cooperation may lie beyond the capabilities of African states.

The numerous revolts and coups which have broken out in Africa illustrate the internal problems confronting African leaders. Armies mutinied in Dahomey, Togo, Kenya, Tanganyika and Uganda. In Congo (Brazzaville), the army put down a popular revolt. Plots were discovered against the governments of Senegal, Chad, Cameroon, Morocco and the Ivory Coast. Clashes have occurred involving Somalia, Ethiopia and Kenya. Algeria and Morocco maintain an uneasy truce in their border dispute. Watusi tribesmen have been massacred in bloody fighting between Rwanda and Burundi. No region of the African continent has escaped the threat of revolution and instability.

Such events give substance to the notion that freedom from alien rule cannot be equated with stability or progress in Africa. In some cases, colonial powers did not provide sufficient instruction in the operation of a modern society. Had

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European powers not acceded to demands for decolonization, they might have strengthened the forces of communism to whom the nationalists could have turned for help. Yet the price of independence has sometimes included declining standards of public administration, lower guarantees of personal freedom and tendencies toward one-party rule.

Africa has become another area in which the Soviet Union and China find themselves in competition for new friends, prestige and influence. Peking hopes to wean Nasser from his allegiance to the Soviet Union. The Egyptians, however, remain dependent upon aid from the USSR and the United States. Communist China, with her grave domestic economic problems, cannot hope to compete economically for the loyalty of African nations. The Chinese, therefore, have injected the issue of race into relations between communist states and Africa. The Soviet Union was recently embarrassed by the murder of a Ghanaian student in Moscow. African students have not adjusted readily to life in Soviet universities. They resent arbitrary changes in their courses of study, and have experienced racial discrimination. Thus, African student riots in Moscow gave Chou En-lai, on his visit to Africa, the opportunity to bracket the Soviets with other whites as oppressors of dark-skinned peoples.

African leaders have been both chagrined and compromised by the need to call in British troops to restore order. The gap has widened between rulers and those groups who strive for a more rapid and radical approach to the solution of economic, social and political problems. The Chinese communists therefore may have won additional followers. They appear to be concentrating their efforts upon gaining mass support, while the Soviets still court the "bourgeois-nationalist" leaders of newly-independent states.

The returns from Chou En-lai's trip to Africa are as yet incomplete. He attempted to emphasize those features of policy which were conciliatory; yet he also emphasized that China would continue to assist all "oppressed" peoples in their revolutionary struggles. African leaders may find this policy incompatible with their own efforts to promote neutrality and nonalignment as well as to achieve "Africanization" of their countries' political and economic life.

Despite their differences, Communist China and the Soviet Union continued their efforts in the early months of 1964 to enhance their position vis-à-vis the new states of Africa. Communists reportedly have infiltrated the group of young Ghanaians responsible for editorial policy in the theoretical organ of the ruling Convention People's Party, *The Spark*. In Kenya, Prime Minister Kenyatta's Home Minister, Mr. Oginga Odinga, has allegedly expressed sympathies with Communist China. Kenyatta objected to Odinga's attempt to blame domestic unrest upon Britain.

Furthermore, the communists

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sought to tighten their control over Zanzibar. The new government directed all British personnel to leave the island by the end of April and ordered the removal of the U.S. tracking station for Project Mercury. East European, Soviet and Chinese communist technicians and civil servants began to arrive in large numbers. The communists apparently hope to make Zanzibar a showcase of economic development, a base for political penetration into East Africa, and a training center for guerrilla operations. Until April, policymaking in the "people's republic" appeared to be increasingly in the hands of the left-wing Minister of External Affairs and Defense, Sheik Aboul Rahman Mohammed, better known as Babu. Evidence of a possible link between Babu and Oscar Kambona, Tanganyika's Defense Minister, probably caused some anxious moments for Julius Nyerere, President of Tanganyika, although he was quick to express his appreciation for the loyalty of his Defense Minister during the January army mutiny. Fortunately, the danger posed by Zanzibar to East Africa was not lost on Nyerere. While Babu was away from Zanzibar, Nyerere and Zanzibar's President Karume announced the formation of a federation of their two countries, thus apparently thwarting, at least temporarily, the possibility of a communist takeover of the island.

African nationalist leaders should have learned at least one lesson from the Zanzibar episode. At its outset, the coup had but few active participants—but they were well organized and trained. John Okello, the self-styled field marshal of the Zanzibar revolt now in exile in Uganda, received guerrilla warfare training in Cuba. Such instruction undoubtedly eased the task of ousting the former ruler, the pro-British sultan, and his regime. It might behoove African leaders to be wary of this form of outside intervention in African affairs.

Opportunities for further communist activity exist in Burundi, which lies in the heart of Africa. Approximately 20,000 Watusi tribesmen have been massacred in reprisals carried out by the Bahutu leaders. The Chinese communists apparently have provided both arms and encouragement to the exiled Watusi King Kigeri, in Kenya. In this way China exacerbates tensions between Rwanda and Burundi, making them more susceptible to an eventual takeover. However, no African state, except Burundi, has raised a voice of protest in the United Nations about this situation. Should a regime sympathetic to Communist China gain control in Burundi, Peking would be within striking distance of the Congo, where Chinese-trained agents are leading the revolt in Kwilu province. Apparently the communists are intent upon developing a capability for using internal dissension and tribal disputes to further their own ends.

If nothing else, the British intervention in Tanganyika, Kenya and Uganda, and also in Cyprus and

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Aden, has illustrated that Britain will be caught up in the affairs of former dependencies for some time to come. More important, however, is the effect such British action may have upon the Conservative Party in the general election scheduled for October. There had been speculation that Prime Minister Sir Alec Douglas-Home would be less sympathetic than his predecessor to the "winds of change" sweeping Africa. Doubtful of the African capacity for self-government and skeptical about the usefulness of the United Nations in resolving African problems, the Prime Minister's views appeared likely to bring him into conflict with other members of his party.

In fact, some Britons have even questioned the necessity for maintaining a British military presence in the Arabian Peninsula. Yet Britain still needs oil from the Middle East. Except for the Maldive Islands in the Indian Ocean, Aden remains the last British base between Cyprus and Singapore. Security interests led Britain to encourage the creation in 1959 of the Federation of Southern Arabia, which grew to include eleven of the twenty-five Aden protectorate states, although the Yemenis and Arab nationalists vigorously registered their opposition. There is still opposition in Aden Colony to the Federation, despite the fact that Aden joined in 1963. Aden fears that its political and economic standards will be reduced to the level of the more backward former protectorates.

The issue of internal security has also arisen in Aden. The attempted assassination of the British High Commissioner, Sir Kennedy Trevaskis, convinced the British of Yemeni complicity. This attack resulted in the deportation of some 300 Yemenis and the arrest in January of the leaders of the People's Socialist Party and the Trades Union Congress. Provoked by Yemeni raids across the border, the British bombed the fort at Harib on March 28. Apparently this action did not have the unanimous support of the British Cabinet. Britain later accepted the offer of the UN Security Council to use its good offices to settle the dispute. This shift in policy may be interpreted as a victory for Foreign Secretary Butler over Duncan Sandys, Secretary for Commonwealth Relations. Butler opposed the bombing of the fort, fearing the effect it might have upon the impending negotiations of Britain and the United States with Libya concerning the future of their bases in that country.

Britain now must decide what type of force will be necessary to guard against a recurrence of unrest in Cyprus and East Africa. Britain has urged the creation of a Commonwealth "fire brigade," one version of which calls for participation by all Commonwealth countries while another confines membership to the African states. At the emergency OAU conference held February 12-14 in Dar es Salaam, East African leaders expressed their reluctance to accept either version. Instead, the delegates sought their own solution to

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the problem of retraining troops and security forces to prevent disorder. Nyerere, especially sensitive to the charge that he may be responsible for importing the Cold War into Africa, criticized President Nkrumah's plans for creating a Pan-African force which might also assist in fomenting revolutionary efforts in the remaining colonial territories. Most delegates to the Dar es Salaam meeting preferred to make their own arrangements for defense and internal security.

The most tangible result of this emergency conference was the creation of a Sub-committee of Twelve, which approved Nyerere's plan for eventually replacing British troops with Africans. Thus far only Nigeria has offered a contingent to aid in the retraining of Tanganyikan forces. Whatever solution is finally reached, Britain may not be able to maintain troops in widely scattered former colonial territories *without* reducing her NATO commitment, unless she reintroduces conscription, an unpopular idea in an election year.

The issue of conscription may have influenced British policy toward the crisis in Cyprus. Britain intervened because she feared a Greco-Turkish war on NATO's southeastern flank. After attempts were made to solve the problem by tripartite discussions and by consultations within NATO, the UN Security Council took up the Cyprus question. Since the signing of the Zurich and London Agreements more than four years ago, Greek and Turkish Cypriots have been engaged in a progressively bitter struggle. The Turkish Cypriots have fought for full implementation of the constitutional provisions which guarantee them 40 per cent of the posts in both the civil service and the 5,000-man army. Since 1961, however, President Makarios has become increasingly dissatisfied with the ability of the Turkish minority to block the government's financial and taxation policies by preventing the collection of customs and taxes.

In December, the Turkish Cypriots requested that Premier Inonu of Turkey warn President Makarios of the sanctity of the treaties establishing the Constitution. Angry at such interference, the President offered to negotiate a new constitution with the Turkish Cypriot leaders. Vice-President Kutchuk, the leader of the Turkish Cypriot community, submitted the constitutional amendments proposed by President Makarios to the Turkish government which, in turn, refused them. On December 21, fighting broke out between the two factions. President Makarios asked the Security Council to discuss the problem after Turkish submarines and destroyers were seen "speeding towards Cyprus." It is Turkey's contention that, under the provisions of the 1959 Treaty of Guarantee, she retains the right to intervene unilaterally in Cyprus. However, Cyprus maintains that Turkish intervention would contravene the Charter of the United Nations, which upholds the principle of noninterference in the affairs of sovereign states. Cyprus argues that the treaty was imposed on her

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as a colonial territory. Britain, Greece and Turkey are empowered to take action to re-establish the state of affairs created by the treaty. The Greek Cypriots, however, maintain that this provision does not embrace military intervention or, if it does, only with the prior consent of the Security Council.

With the arrival of troops from Canada and other UN member-states, British officials have begun to view the situation with a mixture of relief and anxiety. They have passed ultimate control over the operation to the United Nations. But the function of the UN force is still uncertain and a matter of controversy among the parties. According to President Makarios, the force is to assist in restoring his government's authority by supporting the "security forces" of the government against the Turkish rebels. The latter demand complete separation of the two communities by partition, while some Greeks strive for *enosis,* or union between Cyprus and Greece. The dispute has brought Turkey and Greece to the brink of war and has weakened the defenses of the Atlantic Alliance.

The communists undoubtedly are looking for ways to exploit the Cyprus situation in order to stir up trouble in the eastern Mediterranean. Communists occupy key positions in several local governments and in the trade union movement of Cyprus. The Soviets have sought to court President Makarios and his government. Premier Khrushchev and the acting foreign minister of Cyprus held conferences at a Black Sea resort. Should the Soviets undertake to support the Greek Cypriot cause, the United States and Britain might face the difficult task of choosing between two NATO allies, Greece and Turkey.

Problems which have arisen in the aftermath of the European withdrawal from colonial territories point up the necessity for Western action to maintain order and preserve freedom in new states. Otherwise more countries may face the ominous prospect of civil strife and possible communist infiltration. If events of the first quarter of 1964 provide a guide to the future, the military establishments of the West must contain units which can be dispatched quickly to troubled areas. The armies of newly-independent countries need training in internal security and counterinsurgency operations. Otherwise, the new states may lose the independence which they have so recently gained.

A New Strategy for Southeast Asia

The Johnson Administration announced on March 17 an increase in military and economic aid to South Vietnam. The U.S. government hopes to reverse the trend of events there and to influence the actions of the leaders of Cambodia, Burma and Thailand, as well as persons in South Vietnam, who presently doubt the credibility of the American commitment to contain communism in Southeast Asia. The neutral Southeast Asian gov-

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ernments have increased their cooperation with Communist China, not so much through free choice but in the belief that such a course of action is necessary. In their estimation a weakening of the U.S. position has altered the balance of power in China's favor. The views expressed by influential Americans that U.S. abandonment of Southeast Asian interests would not jeopardize Free World security have added to the apprehensions of those who doubt the ability of the United States to thwart communist aggression in South Vietnam.

Increased U.S. aid to South Vietnam may not persuade Burma or Cambodia that a more effective struggle will be waged against the Viet Cong. Instead, the leaders of these two countries may become all the more aware of Washington's reluctance to take appropriate action against North Vietnam, from whose territory the Viet Cong are supplied. In order to restore the confidence of our allies and of the neutrals who depend on our support in Southeast Asia, and to cope with the immediate danger of subversion and indirect aggression in Laos and South Vietnam, as well as the emerging threat of communist insurgency in northeast Thailand, the United States must reassess the requirements of containment in this region.

To meet the challenges posed by guerrilla warfare, the Kennedy Administration, in 1961, sought to give U.S. military strategy a more flexible capability. Based upon the premise that the Soviet Union was likely to foment guerrilla wars, the United States sought to increase its capabilities for counter-guerrilla operations and to develop counter-insurgency forces. Despite the fact that U.S. strength in these forces has increased more than sixfold, the communists still use guerrilla warfare to subvert the governmental authority of the new nations in Southeast Asia. Thus it might be useful to examine present U.S. strategy in order to decide whether or not additional policy changes might be in order.

Walt W. Rostow, Counsellor of the State Department, speaking at the U.S. Army Special Warfare School at Fort Bragg on June 28, 1961, declared that communist operations in Vietnam involved a "systematic program of assassination . . . in which the principal victims are the health, agriculture, and education officers in the Vietnam villages." Against this threat, "independence cannot be maintained by military measures alone. Modern societies must be built, and we are prepared to help build them." It was to be the purpose of U.S. assistance to help create the conditions in which such a conflict could be won. The American objective was "to protect the independence of the revolutionary process now going forward" in underdeveloped countries. Rostow expressed U.S. determination "to help destroy this international disease; that is guerrilla war designed, initiated, supplied, and led from outside an independent nation."

Although this is a praiseworthy objective, it is inadequate as a

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strategy for winning a war. Economic theories do not answer the question of how to defeat a guerrilla force. At present, the United States faces a choice among a number of unpalatable alternatives. It is questionable whether it will be possible to safeguard South Vietnam from further communist encroachment if the Administration chooses to defer consideration of greater involvement until after November. Hopefully, the March decision might increase the effectiveness of present counterinsurgency operations. It is argued that perhaps later, under more favorable conditions, diversionary actions might be launched against North Vietnam. Undoubtedly, this would require a larger U.S. contingent of troops in South Vietnam. In this case the United States would be unable to carry out the planned withdrawal of troops from South Vietnam.

If the Administration believes that modernization and economic growth are essential conditions for the successful prosecution of the war effort, its policies have not always been tailored to attain these goals. In order to overcome the pressures exerted upon the Vietnamese economy by such factors as a high population growth rate and the necessity of financing the counterinsurgency effort, the Vietnamese government has had to divert a part of its available manpower from domestic production to the military effort. It has been estimated that nearly $500 million per year is needed. Yet actual U.S. loans and grants have amounted to considerably less. During 1961-62, for example, the United States provided $290 million to Vietnam; in 1962-63, its aid was decreased to only $91 million. In the atmosphere of renewed confidence created by General Khanh's accession to power, the United States has once again raised its contribution to the $500 million regarded as necessary. Such fluctuations in aid are not helpful in creating conditions of stability necessary for economic growth. Moreover, the gap between the conception and execution of U.S. policy becomes even more evident if one compares the amount of aid per capita sent to Vietnam with that sent to Poland and Yugoslavia. Finally, if present plans to mobilize an additional 50,000 counterinsurgents are to reach fruition, the extra $50 million needed will place even more stress upon the hard-pressed economy and the Vietnamese people.

So long as communist infiltration is successful, the Vietnamese population will continue to be demoralized and terrorized. It is debatable that American promises and increased economic aid will be enough to restore their morale. The Vietnamese peasants must be convinced that their sacrifices are not in vain. To accomplish this task, the U.S. and Vietnamese governments might have to carry the war into North Vietnamese territory.

A guerrilla war cannot be won through a defensive strategy. Mao Tse-tung has warned that guerrilla war is not an "independent form of warfare," but must develop into "mobile warfare." Moreover, one of the objectives of such warfare is to "transform itself into regular

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warfare." The last few months have brought American and South Vietnamese forces into contact with Viet Cong forces fighting from fixed positions and often in batallion strength. These encounters represent a departure from the classic rules of guerrilla warfare which assume that a guerrilla force "hits and runs." Thus, evidence already exists that the Viet Cong adhere to the principle of expansion from guerrilla to regular war. The more guerrilla forces are successful in guerrilla operations, the more likely becomes escalation to regular warfare. Hence American strategists may soon be faced with a new dimension to the problem: how to win the guerrilla war and how to prevent its escalation into "mobile warfare." A mere continuation of present strategy may prove a futile answer to this question.

There are several psychological and political measures which U.S. leaders might take to regain control of the situation in Southeast Asia and increase the confidence of the region's leaders in the U.S. commitment. They include: 1) a "little lift" to rotate units into Thailand, thereby underlining the U.S. intention to protect Thailand and preserve Laotian neutrality; 2) covert military aid to the forces of Souvanna Phouma and Phoumi Nosavan in Laos in order to remove some of the pressure from South Vietnam and strengthen Thailand's morale and security; 3) a demonstration of U.S. determination to support Cambodia's independence by offering to guarantee her borders against external aggression, subject to her observance of genuine neutrality; 4) increased support for Malaysia against Indonesia's hostility—provided that the United States can obtain substantial active British support in South Vietnam—combined with more intensive efforts to increase understanding with army leaders in Indonesia; 5) promotion of closer cooperation among the nations of Southeast Asia, particularly through the provision of economic aid for projects to be undertaken jointly, together with measures that will offer the participating countries better access to U.S. markets. Should these measures meet with little success, the United States might find it necessary to consider new military steps.

Finally, serious thought might be given to the possibility of increasing pressure upon the Hanoi government by exacerbating its problems of food supply. Despite the fact that North Vietnam produces more rice than South Vietnam, it has traditionally had to import rice from the South. With this source cut off by the war, Communist China has become the chief supplier. Faced with its own shortage of food, however, China can ill afford to provide the estimated one million tons annually required by the North Vietnamese. In the fall of 1963, Hanoi approached Australia as a possible source of wheat, but failed to conclude a deal due to its lack of hard currency. Moreover, the North Vietnamese government faces the prospect of increasing water shortages in the rice-producing areas and has started evacua-

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tions into the highlands—a policy unpopular with the peasants. This situation creates a potential theater for offensive guerrilla operations. Guerrilla bands from South Vietnam could proceed gradually to reduce rice production. If the Hanoi regime found itself unable to provide the basic food requirements of its citizens, it might become more willing to end its attack upon South Vietnam. To hasten the collapse of the communist government, the United States or South Vietnam might announce its willingness to supply the necessary food and to aid in agricultural reform after the cessation of insurgency warfare against Saigon.

In sum, U.S. strategy should not place unreasonable demands for political performance upon governments facing the compounded military problems of externally-supported communist insurgency. The United States should obtain assurance that allies in Southeast Asia will undertake vigorous efforts to promote closer economic and military cooperation among themselves. Such a strategy might serve the interests of all Southeast Asian countries while also promoting the security of the remainder of the Free World.

Internal Crisis at the United Nations

The United Nations is likely to face a new internal crisis during the Nineteenth General Assembly, scheduled to convene in November. At the heart of the problem is the determination of new states in Africa and Asia to remove the obstacles—legal, procedural and traditional—which prevent them from assuming a dominant position in the international organization. Moreover, the United Nations must resolve the difficult problem of financing its peace-keeping activities if it is to maintain effective machinery for restoring order in trouble spots around the globe.

Since the admission, in large numbers, of newly independent countries, the United Nations has been increasingly concerned not with the question of peace and security but with the question of removing the last vestiges of Western imperialism. This problem also will doubtless occupy the delegates to the next General Assembly. During the last Assembly the Afro-Asian group sought to advance its position by the revision of the composition of the General Committee and by attempts to amend the Charter.

The present financial crisis of the United Nations may be traced to the Congo operation when some states refused to accept the cost of this operation as a regular budget item. For the last few years, the Soviet Union, France, Belgium, the United Arab Republic, and some financially hard-pressed countries of Latin America have refused to pay that part of their assessments which defray the costs of peace-keeping operations. The consequent shortage of funds has hampered the Congo mission and caused a delay of several weeks before the Secretary-General succeeded in organizing a force to send to Cyprus.

The International Court of Justice, in an advisory opinion, supported the right of the General

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Assembly to assess all members for the support of military operations. But the Soviet Union's refusal to accept this obligation makes it unlikely that the General Assembly will levy any future assessments for peace-keeping functions. Even though the General Assembly endorsed the Court's advisory opinion, the Soviet bloc continues to refuse to pay its assessed contributions. By its adamant stand the Soviet Union may have achieved, in effect, the power to block all General Assembly recommendations calling for expenditures for military action. At best, future UN financing for any similar action would be left to the United States, Britain and Western Europe.

In early 1964, the Soviet Union and other communist bloc countries were two years in arrears. Although they continued their regular payments, they deducted their contributions for military forces. At the next session, therefore, the General Assembly must decide whether all countries owing two years' contributions should lose their vote in the General Assembly, as stipulated in Article 14 of the Charter. Much will depend upon the interpretation of the new President of the Assembly, who could rule either that all states in arrears automatically lose their vote, or that a two-thirds majority vote of the Assembly is needed to make the decision to suspend voting privileges. In the latter case it would be difficult to muster the required majority.

Whatever the outcome, the United Nations faces the danger of being reduced to an ineffectual debating group. Since 1945 the United Nations has performed useful peace-keeping functions. Its failure as a peace-keeping organization would undoubtedly impose additional military obligations upon the United States and its European allies.

The attitude of the majority of states toward colonialism presents the second major problem for the United Nations—and the United States. In 1950, when South Korea was invaded, nations with considerable experience in international affairs formed a majority in the United Nations. By and large, these states agreed upon the necessity for international action to halt aggression. Today, however, the General Assembly contains a majority of newly independent or small states. As Secretary of State Rusk has suggested, states representing 10 per cent of the world's population and contributing 5 per cent of the UN assessment could muster not only a simple but even a two-thirds majority in the General Assembly. While these states do not vote as a bloc—and some of the smaller states such as Luxembourg, Iceland and Costa Rica have specific commitments to the West—others have combined to change the internal structure and procedures of the United Nations.

The United States has sought to shift discussions from the Security Council to the General Assembly in order to avert a Soviet veto on important resolutions. In the Assembly a number of key positions in the General Committee, and among committee chairmen and

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others, have normally been held by West European and Latin American states, thus preventing any hasty action in favor of the Soviet Union or its satellites.

In the Eighteenth Session of the General Assembly this long-established tradition of giving key positions to the more powerful and developed states was changed. A resolution altering the membership of the General Committee is likely to bring it under the control of the Afro-Asian group. In the new Committee composed of the President, 17 Vice-Presidents and 7 committee chairmen, the statutory geographical distribution will be as follows: 10 members from the Afro-Asian group, 2 from Eastern Europe, 3 or 4 from Western Europe, 4 or 5 from Latin America, and 5 from the permanent members of the Security Council. Thus, the United States will be forced to seek the support of Afro-Asian countries in order to carry out any proposal opposed by the Soviet Union.

However, the new majority of the United Nations went even further and passed two amendments to the UN Charter. These amendments will come into force only if they are ratified "in accordance with their respective constitutional processes by two-thirds of the members of the United Nations, including all the permanent members of the Security Council." The first amendment would enlarge the Security Council from 11 to 15 members, including 5 from Africa and Asia, 2 from Latin America, 2 from Western Europe, and 1 from Eastern Europe, in addition to the 5 permanent members. The majority necessary for decisions in the Council would be increased from 7 to 9. The second amendment would increase the membership of the Economic and Social Council from 18 to 27. Despite the negative votes of the communist countries and France, and the abstentions of the United States and the United Kingdom, overwhelming majorities adopted both amendments.

The United States should prepare to assist the United Nations to resolve some of the problems likely to confront it during the next General Assembly session. The United States could make resources available to the UN in anticipation of emergencies in which the organization's peacekeeping machinery is needed. Moreover, small powers might be encouraged to provide stand-by forces for use by the United Nations and some discretionary powers to the Secretary General in emergencies. Finally, the more experienced members should undertake to guide the newer members toward constructive solutions of remaining colonial problems. Otherwise, the United Nations may face the prospect that the United States will increasingly pursue its interests outside the international organization.

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NATO'S NUCLEAR PROBLEMS: CONTROL OR CONSULTATION

by Frederick W. Mulley

AT the time of the Suez crisis, the Countess of Avon (then Lady Eden) remarked that she thought the Canal was flowing right through the middle of her drawing room. Although happily the problem of nuclear weapons in NATO has not yet reached such dramatic proportions, those concerned with NATO and the Atlantic Community may well feel that the question of nuclear management within the Alliance has acquired a permanent place in their brief cases. In recent years all discussion about the defense of the West, whether diplomatic or academic, has centered around the control and provision of NATO's nuclear armory.

Ironically, the argument has only an indirect bearing on defense. Taken as a whole, NATO has more than enough nuclear capability—perhaps too much. The essence of the problem is that 95 per cent of NATO's nuclear striking power is in the hands of one NATO member, the United States, and that the U.S. nuclear force is just as much a national force as the emergent French *force de dissuasion,* i.e., it is subject only to the control of its president. But indirectly the nuclear conflict and the consequent breakdown of communications within the Alliance threaten the defense of the West in the gravest possible way. The survival of NATO itself is in question, and the breakup of the Alliance would present the Soviet Union with its greatest political and military success since 1945.

I

It is, perhaps, not a mere coincidence that the major issues today are to be found in the conflicts within the Atlantic Alliance and the communist bloc. Since 1949 there have been significant shifts of power on both sides of the Iron Curtain. Western Europe, exhausted by World War II, was content to depend completely on the United States to counter the Soviet threat of armed aggression or political expansion in Europe. The Soviet Union

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was in undisputed control of the communist world. Whereas the main objective of Foreign Minister Ernest Bevin in working for the creation of NATO was to ensure an American presence and commitment in Europe, today there are powerful voices urging Europe to acquire her own nuclear weapons so as to be able to act independently of the United States. Similarly, China poses a daily challenge to the leadership of Chairman Khrushchev.

Within Europe there have also been important changes in the balance of power. Whereas France once sought British support as a counterweight to West Germany and the European Defense Community failed because Britain declined to give the guarantees required, President de Gaulle now refuses the belated British effort to join the European Club and the Franco-German Treaty poses a new complication for NATO policy.

There has, moreover, been a change in relations between NATO and the Soviet Union. The stability of Europe in recent years and the reduced tension have dissipated the wide consensus formerly existing within NATO on the nature of the threat. Although NATO has an equally vital role to play in bringing about disarmament, as in building up the strength of the West, there is little or no agreement among the Allies on either the objectives to be attained or the policies to be pursued. The Alliance built to withstand Marshal Stalin's consistent truculence seems able only to founder in the face of Khrushchev's more rational behavior.

However, the crucial failure of the Alliance has been its inability to reshape its policies to take full account of the strategic re-thinking imposed by the breaking of the U.S. nuclear monopoly. Under President Kennedy the U.S. government abandoned the doctrine of massive retaliation, credible before the sputnik but clearly untenable when any decision to employ nuclear weapons must be made in the knowledge that nuclear retaliation against cities in the United States is a virtual certainty. President Kennedy also demonstrated in the Cuban crisis of 1962 that he was prepared to run nuclear risks where a supreme American interest was involved. In short, the nuclear management problem of NATO consists of the doubts held by many Europeans as to the willingness of the United States to take similar risks for a vital European interest.

It is patently true that all the conflicts which beset NATO are not contained in the nuclear issue. But this must be resolved

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before we can come to grips with the others. The major concern of the European powers is with the issue of status within the Alliance. France is determined to become a nuclear power in order to attain a position of pre-eminence within NATO. West Germany is anxious, not to become a nuclear power, but to participate in nuclear policy, to demonstrate that she is an equal member of the Alliance, and to get rid of what she feels are discriminatory clauses in the modified Brussels Treaty, which permit only conditional German rearmament and which apply to her alone. The internal British political argument about nuclear independence is also in essence an argument about status in the world and the Alliance.

Although this problem of leadership and relationships within NATO should have been obvious several years ago, it is only in the last year that it seems to have been recognized fully in Washington. No one in Europe had taken very seriously the offer of Christian Herter, in the last days of the Eisenhower Administration, to consider the provision of a multilateral sea-based MRBM force. The recognition of the problem marks a great step forward. However, the proposals for a multilateral sea-based Polaris force in surface ships (MLF) suggest imperfect appreciation of the situation in Europe and also confusion about what is the real issue.

II

Before examining the merits of the MLF, it seems desirable to try to clarify the nuclear requirements of NATO strategy and to assess how far the conflicting military and political needs can be reconciled.

NATO needs to be able to respond with nuclear weapons in two quite different situations. First, there must be a means of immediate retaliation to an all-out nuclear attack against either NATO missiles and air bases or our cities. Secondly, it may be necessary to use either nuclear battlefield weapons or tactical nuclear interdiction to prevent the defeat of our conventional forces. This dual capability, and particularly the credibility of the strategic response, constitutes the current nuclear deterrent and provides the nuclear strategy to replace the cruder doctrine of massive retaliation, valid only in the period of American atomic monopoly. In each case, of course, there must be adequate conventional forces to deter what the Germans aptly call "salami" tactics, attempts to seize a small piece of NATO territory in the

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belief that the United States will not risk a nuclear war for so marginal a NATO interest.

To ensure an effective response to these two contingencies a unified control and command structure is desirable, but it need not be the same one in each case since the time factor is different. The all-out strategic response demands a decision in thirty minutes or less, and it is hard to see how it can be taken by more than one man. It is equally difficult to see who could or should discharge this heavy responsibility other than the President of the United States. On the other hand, the decision to raise the stakes to the nuclear level in a period of tension or conventional fighting permits of consultation, since a longer time span is bound to be involved. Just as there were consultations in the Berlin crisis to determine whether or not the Wall should be knocked down in the early stages of its construction, there would undoubtedly be consultation preceding an order to use tactical nuclear weapons in Europe. It would surely be advantageous to provide machinery within NATO for the joint exercise of this decision-making power rather than to depend upon *ad hoc* arrangements if a crisis comes.

The strategic decision does not permit any prior consultation, but the President of the United States, if called upon to decide today, would not do so in a vacuum. He would make his decision within a framework of rules of engagement or guidelines established after careful deliberation within his Administration. It is clear that the other Allies cannot participate in making this decision in the few minutes available. However, they can and should participate in the prior formulation of rules of engagement against which the President would weigh the evidence should he ever face the awful decision of unleashing the vast nuclear power of the West.

This aspect of the nuclear decision-making process is—despite the fact that it occupies almost all the public discussion—the least likely contingency we have to face. We must remain prepared to meet an all-out nuclear surprise attack in order to sustain the nuclear deterrent, but, happily, such an attack seems extremely remote. The greatest danger of nuclear war comes from the risks of nuclear escalation, and it is unfortunate that our preoccupation with the less relevant issue of strategic nuclear policy has prevented discussion of what seems to me the real question facing NATO: the role and command of tactical nuclear forces.

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This confusion underlines the controversy about the MLF which has been proposed, among other reasons, as a means of providing an MRBM capability for Europe. It is argued, and this is one argument in favor of the MLF that I accept completely, that the sea-based Polaris force is preferable to land-based MRBM's. However, I challenge the need to have MRBM's in Europe if it is intended to use them as a force distinct from the strategic retaliatory force which already exists. Surely no one would suggest that Europe-based weapons with high-yield warheads and a range of 2,500 miles could be triggered without invoking the same Soviet retaliatory response as the use of SAC bombers or ICBM's would invoke.

This controversy over NATO strategy stems from the request made several years ago by General Norstad for MRBM's to replace the manned bombers in his Allied Tactical Air Forces (ATAF) because he regarded the bombers as obsolete and unable to carry out the tasks allotted to them. It seems reasonable for Norstad to have asked for MRBM's in this context since the same principle of replacement has been applied to the strategic retaliatory forces. His request further underlined the fact that among the missions of the ATAF substantial emphasis is put upon participation in the nuclear strike plan. While it is proper for a commander to seek the weapons he deems necessary to discharge his missions, no one seems to have questioned whether these tasks should be assigned to SACEUR or to tactical air forces. The role of tactical air forces does not appear to have been re-examined in the light of the changed military and political situation resulting from nuclear parity and mutual deterrence.

On military grounds, there is an overwhelming case for giving top priority in the initial stages of a conflict to the destruction of the enemy's tactical air forces and to interdiction attacks well behind his lines to prevent his reserves and supplies from reaching the battle area. These are the most useful operations that air forces can perform by way of support of ground troops. Air superiority in the theater of operations can best be won by striking the enemy's air bases. For all these purposes, nuclear weapons are unquestionably the most effective and efficient. Conventional bombs would require the commitment and loss of vastly more aircraft to discharge the same tasks. But while this approach fitted the concept of a generalized nuclear war, it does not match the political requirements of avoiding nuclear escalation and attempt-

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ing to compel a "pause" in a limited war situation.

If the tactical air forces are to engage in nuclear interdiction on enemy airfields or lines of communication as soon as any hostilities begin—as military considerations would dictate—there is little point in seeking to restrain the ground forces from immediate resort to nuclear weapons. The use of nuclear weapons on targets well behind the enemy lines would surely invite immediate nuclear retaliation and remove the possibility of averting, through political action, a general nuclear war. It is infeasible to label one's weapons with tags designed to assure the enemy that their use is not intended to raise the stakes beyond the level of nuclear interdiction.

It is true, of course, that in existing circumstances nuclear weapons would not be used without the express authority of SACEUR; and the fact that the air forces are well removed from the immediate area of probable hostilities makes the implementation of political control easier than with ground forces. But the increasing provision of nuclear capability—long-range bombers and missiles —to the ATAF poses the question as to their intended mission in the event of hostilities.

Although the manned aircraft is an ideal dual-purpose weapon (unlike missiles and certain atomic artillery) and is equally capable of either a conventional or nuclear role, there would be grave doubts about committing the tactical air forces wholly to conventional interdiction since the expected losses of aircraft and personnel would mean that these forces would be unable to undertake their nuclear missions at a later stage should these become necessary. Most of the existing aircraft in the ATAF are not suitable for providing close support to the ground forces and, in any case, this is considered a costly and inefficient use of air power.

There is thus urgent need to reassess the role of the ATAF. Of all the nuclear problems confronting the Alliance, this poses the biggest dilemma and the greatest conflict between military requirements on the one hand and the need for political control and the avoidance of nuclear escalation on the other. The proper course would seem to lie in taking away from the ATAF all targets which properly belong to the nuclear strike plans and giving them to the strategic forces—ICBM's, Polaris or SAC bombers. Command of the ATAF should then be coordinated, under SACEUR, with command of the battlefield atomic artillery, the rules of engage-

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ment and political control in each case being worked out by the NATO Council.

It follows that there is no case for any separate force of MRBM's in Europe. If there is a need to provide a counterforce deterrent to the Soviet MRBM's which threaten Western Europe, this must properly be entrusted to the strategic retaliatory forces. It would be very dangerous for any NATO weapons targeted against Soviet MRBM's to be subject to a different chain of command or control system from the rest of the retaliatory forces. If it is difficult to fit tactical aircraft into a realistic NATO strategy in Europe, it is impossible to find a place for MRBM's.

III

Nuclear policy, to make sense from the viewpoint of the Alliance as a whole, as distinct from any prestige or bargaining power it may confer upon an individual country, should contribute to the military capability to deter at both strategic and tactical levels or add to the political cohesion of NATO by eliminating dangers of proliferation, providing greater participation for member countries in forming Alliance strategy, or making a meaningful contribution toward a stronger Atlantic Community. The sponsors of the MLF, the proposed multilateral sea-borne force of Polaris missiles on mixed-manned ships, undoubtedly put the plan forward in the sincere belief that it would meet some, or perhaps all, of the above objectives. However, there is grave danger that such a plan would exacerbate rather than solve current problems. It is, of course, a welcome development that thinking is addressed to the right question, but to be helpful it must also produce the right answer. The MLF does not do this in either the military or political field.

There is, indeed, little need to argue at length the military case against the proposals. Its advocates rapidly concede that the military utility of the MLF is marginal. One imagines that the plan would quickly be rejected after scrutiny by cost effectiveness analysts in the Pentagon and that the current period of experiment will not change this basic assessment. This argument against the MLF is strengthened when it is realized that any costs incurred by European participants in setting up such a force are bound to reduce other defense expenditures. There is already adequate provision of nuclear weapons—mainly American—to discharge the nuclear requirements of NATO. The substantial cost of the MLF

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to its participants is certain to reduce the determination and ability of European members to strengthen and modernize their conventional forces for which a much greater priority exists.

It is feasible to create a multilateral force and there is no doubt that the problems of mixed-manning have been exaggerated. In the same way the vulnerability of a surface fleet has been overstated, since it would be extremely difficult to keep track of all the Polaris-armed ships all the time. Nevertheless, the military case would be stronger if the weapons were to be carried by submarines, although clearly the problems of cost and management would be greatly increased.

The concept of mixed-manning is commendable but, of course, it is not new. Already there is an element of this in the Allied Tactical Air Forces, and it would be easier to extend this principle by having mixed nationality squadrons than by setting up a new force. Elsewhere[1] I have suggested that the principle should be applied to the difficult question of organizing battlefield atomic artillery units in Europe. In both cases the problem of the American custodian personnel would be less acute if they could be incorporated as part of mixed nationality units subject to the control of the NATO Council.

But in the case of the MLF the mixed-manning principle and collective ownership can be only of symbolic value. This is because the whole argument is not about ownership but about *control* and the major weakness of the MLF approach stems from confusing the question of physical possession of nuclear weapons with the question of control over their use. This distinction is clearly recognized in the existing national nuclear forces by procedures to ensure that it is the political head of government and not the military commanders who exercises control. Surely it cannot be intended to breach this vital principle of political control in the MLF. Thus part ownership of the hardware will not confer any participation in control, and conversely it is possible to have a share in control without any ownership of the actual missiles.

Several Americans have asked me why there has been so much reference in British discussion of the proposals to the nationality of the cooks in these ships. Apart from the importance of seeing that this problem of logistics is suitably solved, there is also the thought that the theme of the next generation of "Fail-Safe"

[1] *The Politics of Western Defense* (New York: Praeger, 1962).

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fiction may be the cook who poisons the rest of the crew in order to get control of the missile.

IV

If there are no direct military advantages to be gained on balance from the MLF, the whole case for pursuing these proposals rests on how far the creation of such a force will contribute to the solution of the political differences which have arisen within NATO—differences which threaten indirectly its military strength by destroying its unity of purpose to deter aggression and promote disarmament.

It is indisputable that there has been a serious division in NATO between the nuclear and non-nuclear members. This has resulted in the feeling that there are first- and second-class members of the Alliance with a consequent weakening of its cohesion. In addition, since the advent of Soviet nuclear capability there have been growing doubts about American willingness to expose U.S. cities to nuclear attack for essentially European interests, e.g. Berlin as well as Cuba.

So far both the nuclear weapons and the nuclear strategy of NATO have been almost exclusively provided by the United States with the minor participation of the United Kingdom. The basic requirement is to substitute a joint political control over the nuclear strategy of the Alliance. In other words, the whole Alliance must be able to participate in nuclear policy making and in the framing of the principles to be applied by the President of the United States in exercising his grave responsibility to authorize the use of nuclear weapons. This is not the same thing as a shared decision on the actual question of nuclear action—the time factor renders this impossible for the case of strategic retaliation.

The prime purpose of the MLF is to head off the possibility that the Federal Republic of Germany might seek to acquire her own nuclear weapons or might be tempted to take part in a joint Franco-German force. It is further aimed at isolating President de Gaulle within Europe. It is only secondarily concerned with avoiding the dangers of nuclear proliferation and does not address itself to the general issue of control of all nuclear weapons within the Alliance.

The timing of the publication of the MLF plan was most unfortunate. The fact that it was announced at the time of the refusal of British admission to the European Economic Community and the signing of the Franco-German Treaty prompts one

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to suspect that wise counsels had previously suppressed it but that Washington had not been able to keep its head after the shock of these two bitter blows to its foreign policies.

There is no evidence to suggest that there was any significant demand in West Germany for participation in nuclear affairs on the basis of owning a share of the strategic retaliatory forces, or for the acquisition of an independent capability. Such demand as there had been, from Herr Strauss for example, concerned Germany's desire to have a bigger say in the use of battlefield atomic weapons. Equally, there was no desire, as reaction to the Franco-German Treaty soon indicated, to allow this treaty to weaken German adherence to NATO and the Atlantic Community by joining the French in any independent military policies. In any event it is inconceivable that President de Gaulle would have countenanced any share of control over his incipient *force de dissuasion* since to do so would have cut at the roots of the philosophy on which it is based—that a nation must retain control of its own destiny.

Indeed, the first German reactions to the MLF were unenthusiastic, and their approval was based upon the belief that the U.S. administration was keen to have such a force. Thus the absurd paradox: the United States only proposed the force because they thought the Germans wanted something like it, and the Germans only accepted it to please the administration in Washington, at a time when they were especially anxious to demonstrate that the Franco-German Treaty did not represent a change of policy. The MLF proposals were launched, it must be remembered, with a lot of hard selling and diplomatic arm-twisting by a corps of peripatetic persuaders.

However, the lengthy discussion and debate over the MLF has created in West Germany an appetite to participate in the ownership of strategic nuclear forces and thus have it recognized that the discrimination against her has ended. Nevertheless, most Germans, including the Social Democrats, prefer the objective of sharing in the nuclear policy making of the whole Alliance to the uncertain benefits of the MLF. Some have, in fact, explained that their support for the MLF is conditional on its being an interim step toward the larger objective. They recognize that even if a satisfactory control procedure were worked out for MLF missiles, this would cover only about 5 per cent of the West's nuclear armory. Significant control over so insignificant a part

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of the nuclear forces could not be an acceptable substitute for real participation in nuclear policy and decisions affecting the Alliance as a whole.

But, since the enthusiastic response to the proposals in some European quarters has led many Americans to believe the MLF would or should satisfy European aspirations for nuclear equality in NATO, there would probably be less willingness to proceed further on the road—sign-posted at Athens and Ottawa—toward effective participation. After the difficulties encountered in launching the MLF, there would be understandable impatience in Washington were this issue raised again. The reply would probably be: "Run away and play with the MLF and leave the serious nuclear business to us."

It seems also to be implied that the MLF is a substitute for any formal surrender of American national sovereignty—which is a precondition for any effective plan for European participation in NATO nuclear policy. Such surrender would be more apparent than real since any scheme would almost certainly leave the ultimate decision with the President of the United States. If the United States is willing, and there are indications that opinion is moving in this direction, to assign some of her nuclear forces to NATO, it would seem better that this be done directly rather than as part of the MLF scheme.

It is true that membership in the MLF would provide the countries concerned with a background of nuclear information and permit them to make a more realistic appraisal of nuclear problems than many can do now. But if the purpose is to provide a seminar on nuclear strategy, this could be done with less expensive visual aids and working models than the MLF demands.

The major defect of the MLF is its failure to resolve the problem of control of nuclear weapons, which is the core of all the nuclear difficulties within NATO. There is still no indication of how the command system of the MLF itself will be organized and there is a strong probability that, if the force is ever created, disputation about its control will intensify instead of reduce the friction within the Alliance. Even if an agreed and satisfactory control system can be evolved for the MLF, this will not greatly assist in the development of a control system for the other nationally commanded nuclear forces which comprise the vast majority of NATO nuclear weapons.

The crucial issue is whether the MLF will be subject to an

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American veto and, by electronic devices or other procedures, require the approval of the President before the missiles can be fired. On military grounds it would seem essential for the MLF Polaris missiles to be part of a unified command system. British opposition to the plan will be even stronger if serious thought is given to removing the American veto, and many Germans would be alarmed at the prospect. It would seem also extremely unlikely, even if the administration were willing to surrender the veto, that such a proposal would have the backing of Congress. The plan seems so far to have been studiously kept away from the Capitol.[2]

On the other hand, if the American veto is retained, what will the MLF participants have got for their money—except the good will of some sections of the State Department? There will have been no change in the status quo as regards effective participation in framing nuclear strategy or in consultation within the Alliance. Therefore, it is very likely that unless the U.S. veto is surrendered under pressure—and Congress might be expected to look askance at such a proposal—the feeling will grow that the members have been hoaxed and deceived. The outcome is almost certain to make the state of mutual confidence in NATO worse rather than better.

There would, of course, be justification for the resentments aroused. Although there is no official public promise that the American veto would be eliminated, there have been many such hints[3]; and there is no doubt that, to a man, all the enthusiasts for the MLF in Europe support it so strongly because they believe that Washington will give up the veto. Many, in fact, anticipate that it would be only a matter of time before the MLF was detached completely from American influence, and they see the project as a good way of obtaining a credible independent European nuclear force "on the cheap." It is then argued that the existence of a European nuclear force would serve as an instrument to create a federal structure or political community in Europe in order to control it. And while some federalists are equally favorable to the concept of an Atlantic Community, there are others who are strongly motivated in the opposite direction. They want an independent Europe, with its own nuclear

[2]The first Congressional briefing seems to have been given to the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy on May 7, 1964.

[3]President Johnson (then Vice President) said at Brussels on November 8, 1963: "Evolution of this missile fleet toward European control, as Europe marches toward unity, is by no means excluded."

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weapons, so that it can break away from the domination of the United States.

What would be the consequences of evolving a majority vote or other system of control which would take the MLF out of the existing nuclear command structure? First, it would have the effect of setting up another independent nuclear force and thus would be contrary to one of the cardinal objectives of the MLF, namely, to avert nuclear proliferation. Secondly, it might well stimulate the forces in Europe which, on the principles of the dumbbell theory, desire a strong Europe in order to divide rather than unite the Atlantic nations. Thirdly, while this writer strongly favors the political unification of Western Europe, nuclear weapons cannot be a sound basis on which to erect such a union. Some shotgun weddings may have produced happy marriages but they can hardly be prescribed for successful matrimony.

The impact of the MLF on the course of further disarmament agreements and upon East-West relations must also be considered. The Soviets have clearly shown their hostility to it. Not long ago this fact would have been considered by many in the West as sufficient evidence to justify the proposal, but surely this day has passed. It is not surprising, perhaps, that the Soviets find it difficult to understand why we should go to so much trouble to create a force with little or no military value and which does not change the status quo as regards the American veto over NATO's nuclear weapons. Instead they recall that the original plans for German rearmament were based upon the European Defense Community and that the final result was very different. It seems likely that the establishment of the MLF would make progress in disarmament more difficult. If the Soviets countered with an MLF of their own, the balance would be very much to our disadvantage.

Thus, far from being a panacea for all the ills of the Western world as its advocates claim, there is at least a strong chance that the MLF, in whichever way it develops, will run counter to one or more important objectives of American foreign policy. If the veto is retained, the basic friction in NATO remains and could well be intensified. If the veto is given up, abetting nuclear proliferation, political and military unity of purpose in the Alliance would also be endangered. In either case, the consequences of the MLF could be prejudicial to further progress toward disarmament.

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The idea which began as a "gimmick" has become a "cause" in the minds of some of its enthusiastic supporters. This single-minded pursuit of the objective is the strongest force propelling the MLF. I hope the "non-believers" will also acquire some passion in their opposition.

V

It is fairly said that those who do not accept the premises of the MLF are under an obligation to put forward alternative proposals to meet the clear and urgent need for a revision of nuclear strategy and arrangements for consultation in the Alliance.

It is essential to distinguish between control and consultation on the one hand and between the requirements of strategic deterrence and of tactical nuclear weapons on the other. Too often the discussion becomes confused because control of nuclear policy is treated as a single entity.

Immediate response and the power to survive a first strike are the essential requirements of the credibility of the strategic retaliatory forces, and obviously the ultimate decision to use them must rest with one man. No matter whether these forces are all-American or divided among the Allies on a national or multilateral basis, there is a general understanding that this responsibility must be delegated to the President of the United States. But there is an immense difference between his acting as a delegate of the NATO Council and his assuming these responsibilities in his national capacity. It implies that there are no national or independent forces and that at least the U.S. nuclear forces allocated to the defense of NATO are assigned to the Alliance. There can be no effective system without the surrender of some national sovereignty, and the United States must surrender a little *de jure* national sovereignty in order to persuade Europeans that it was wise for them to have given up a lot.

It also means that, although they cannot be consulted in the short time probably available, the Allies will have the fullest opportunity to participate in the formulation of nuclear strategy and can contribute to the background or "consensus" against which the President would make his decision.

The Allies have also a legitimate right to participate in nuclear technology because of its importance for civilian application. Equally, the United States is entitled to ask that the burden of providing the nuclear armory of NATO be shared. These two objectives can be met by allowing European countries to undertake some of the contract work, both research and development

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and production, for future missile programs. For example, in the Polaris program some 1,700 sub-contractors were involved. Could not a proportion of these contracts be placed in Europe and financed by the respective governments? President de Gaulle makes a great play of the technological advantages which accrue to a country bold enough to produce its own nuclear weapons, and the MLF provides no answer.

It is along these lines that a British Labour Government would seek a revision of current NATO policy and, of course, we recognize the need to surrender Britain's own claim to be an independent nuclear power.

In the case of tactical nuclear weapons there is a different time scale, since it is essential, in any event, that NATO have sufficient conventional strength to avoid immediate or early resort to nuclear weapons in response to conventional aggression. It would seem practicable and desirable, therefore, to devise machinery within the NATO Council to provide for consultation and proper control over the use of tactical weapons. Such machinery might well involve an Executive body, with rotating membership and perhaps weighted voting. Many similar ideas have been offered. However, if consultation is to be effective, there must also be consultation about the machinery for it, and it seems therefore inadvisable to devise in advance a precise procedure. The principle of "mixed-manning" could also be extended in the ATAF and applied to the atomic artillery units.[4]

It is, unhappily, true that France is unlikely to be willing to participate in these developments. But she is certain not to join the MLF or anything like it. It is also a mistake to seek to isolate President de Gaulle as the MLF proposals do. France's geographical and ideological position in Europe give her such strength that she is unlikely to be bullied into any change of policy. We must go on without France, although always offering her the chance to join in if she wishes. The opportunity to join the kind of consultations suggested above might prove a greater temptation to Paris than any alternative proposals so far produced.

In the long run I believe effective consultation could meet all the aspirations of Europeans for participation in NATO strategy. The above proposals are more likely to meet those aspirations than is the offer of a share in the control of an insignificant part of the Western nuclear armory, as proposed in the MLF plan.

[4]These proposals are more fully developed in *The Politics of Western Defense;* see especially Chapters VII and XIII.

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MAO TSE-TUNG AND PEACEFUL COEXISTENCE*

by Tang Tsou

ON December 30, 1963, in an interview on the French government-owned television network, Chou En-lai expressed his belief that "a world war opposing the Communist camp against the imperialist camp is not inevitable."[1] But he went on to say that the risk of war remained because of the U.S. policy of "war and aggression." On the question of Sino-American relations, he declared that China sought a solution to differences with the United States; "in the first place a solution to the question of the retreat of American armed forces from Taiwan and the Taiwan Strait by peaceful means without recourse to force or threat of force." Some Western observers and news media immediately seized upon these remarks as an indication that Communist China was changing her position on the fateful question of the inevitability of war.

Actually, Chou merely reaffirmed the long-standing position of the Peking regime, and reiterated the views embodied in the 1957 Moscow Declaration of Communist Parties and the 1960 Statement—documents on which the Communist Party of China has established its line of "no retreat" and bases its counterattacks on the CPSU in the dispute over ideology and revolutionary strategy. While Chou's tour of Africa and Europe was a significant diplomatic foray, his remarks on the inevitability of war signify no change in the doctrinal position of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP). The superficial impression to the contrary merely reflects the widespread ignorance in the West about Communist China—in particular, the Chinese position on the question of war and peace.

This ignorance and misunderstanding have been deepened by the Soviet propaganda drive which seeks to depict Communist

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[1] *New York Times*, December 31, 1963, p. 1.

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Chinese leaders as madmen or maniacs bent on promoting world revolution through nuclear war. Whatever the motive behind this propaganda drive, it has had the effect of creating a Western image of a Soviet Union striving desperately to restrain the Chinese from precipitating a nuclear war. It has led some Western officials and scholars to think that Khrushchev's primary motive in seeking a *détente* with the West has been to counter the Chinese threat to the survival of mankind and to preserve the Soviet Union's economic achievements which would be destroyed in a nuclear holocaust. It has created the feeling that perhaps the United States should inject itself into the Sino-Soviet dispute on the side of the Soviet Union, or make concessions to Khrushchev merely because these concessions would strengthen his hand against Mao Tse-tung.

This reading of the Soviet motive is of doubtful validity: The Sino-Soviet dispute is not the primary motive for the Soviet search for a *détente* with the West. On the contrary, the Soviet search for a *détente* was itself the basic cause of the Sino-Soviet dispute. If the Soviet Union had not sought a *détente* with the West in opposition to China's view on revolutionary strategy and at the expense of China's interests, the dispute would not have arisen, or at least it would not have been intensified to such an extent. The Soviet Union seeks and has been seeking a *détente* because Moscow has already pushed its sphere of influence as far as it can by the use of force or threat of force. If this was not obvious to everyone in the mid-1950's, there can be no doubt on this point today. Furthermore, the Soviet Union had scored great gains in the period of cooperation with the United States during the Second World War. It is now possible, psychologically and politically, for the Kremlin to make a few minor concessions to the United States in order to obtain a *détente*. By means of the *détente* the Soviet Union apparently hopes to consolidate its shaky control over Eastern Europe, preferably through a formal Western recognition of the status quo there; to resolve its many difficult economic problems through the reallocation of resources, expansion of trade with the West and the negotiation of loans from the West; to weaken the Western alliance; and finally to create a better political atmosphere for the strengthening of communist parties in the NATO countries. This search for a *détente* led to the Sino-Soviet dispute. Seeking to make the best of a presumably

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unwelcome development, Khrushchev has managed to turn the dispute into an asset in his dealings with the West.

The United States rightly welcomes a *détente* with the Soviet Union provided that this development does not endanger American interests. From the point of view of the West, the Soviet policy of *détente* and peaceful coexistence is to be preferred to Chinese militancy. Soviet hesitancy to support the rebels in Algeria and South Vietnam was preferable to the more aggressive policy of the Chinese. Soviet pressure on Berlin has been successfully resisted, but the guerrilla warfare waged by the Viet Cong confronts the United States with serious and perhaps insurmountable problems. Yet, for all his talk about peaceful coexistence, Khrushchev surreptitiously placed missiles with nuclear capabilities in Cuba, not for the avowed purpose of defending Cuba against an imminent American invasion, but for the principal aim of overcoming quickly and inexpensively a world-wide strategic inferiority—in order, as Castro said, to "reinforce the Socialist camp the world over."[2] Mao, for all his verbal militancy, showed extreme caution in the Quemoy crisis of 1958, avoiding the use of his air force to bomb the island, taking care that his artillery fire and torpedo boats would not hit U.S. ships, and then declaring a unilateral cease-fire on alternate days.

The Soviet Union, a nuclear superpower which has not hesitated to back up its diplomatic moves in the past with the threat to use nuclear weapons, poses a grave and ever present threat to the security of the United States. This threat would become even more grave and immediate if Washington, under the pressure of a major confrontation with the Kremlin—e.g., a crisis comparable to the Cuban missile showdown—should weaken in its resolution to employ whatever weapons and degree of force are necessary to meet the Soviet challenge. By contrast, the threat posed by Communist China takes the form of a series of minor local military actions and subversive activities which, over a fairly long period of time, might undermine America's position in the underdeveloped areas. Mao is adapting his revolutionary strategy of encircling the cities from the countryside to his struggle against "American imperialism." He is trying to encircle the developed countries from the underdeveloped areas. Mao's threat is serious because, up to the present period, the United States has not been able to work out a successful political-military coun-

[2] *Ibid.*, December 12, 1962, p. 1.

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terstrategy, as the events in South Vietnam forcefully remind us every day. But Mao's strategy does not call for the use of nuclear weapons to promote revolution. It envisages a long series of protracted local military conflicts. The protracted nature of Mao's program gives the United States time to work out a counterstrategy, if we are resourceful enough.

II

The first prerequisite for working out this counterstrategy is to understand Mao's military-political strategy, including his doctrines of peaceful coexistence and the inevitability of war. In our attempt to understand Mao, we should not rely unduly upon Soviet interpretations. Let us recall that during the Pacific War, U.S. officials and newspapermen developed the thesis that the Chinese communists were "agrarian reformers," sincere democrats, and the like. In so doing, they were trying to understand Chinese communism in American terms. They were also influenced by Stalin's remark that the Chinese communists were "margarine communists."[3] At that time, Stalin was sincere in advocating the establishment of a coalition government in China. In order to give the United States a good reason to support the formation of a coalition government, the Soviet leaders insincerely voiced the view that the Chinese communists were not dedicated communists. Today, Khrushchev may very well be sincere in his search for a *détente* with the West. But he distorts Peking's views on war and peace so as to discredit the Chinese in the eyes of the nonaligned countries and to convince the United States that it should make concessions to him.

In order to make an objective analysis of Mao's views on war and peace, one must first of all understand Mao's views in his own terms. This is no easy task. For unlike political theorists in the West, Mao has not published any systematic writing on the questions of peaceful coexistence and the inevitability of war. But in the recent debate with Moscow, Peking has published a series of statements which provide a glimpse of Mao's views. Furthermore, Peking has published many of Mao's writings from the period between 1926 and 1949 which discuss the question of war and peace with the Nationalist Party. If one reads the

[3]Herbert Feis, *The China Tangle* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1953), p. 140. For an analysis of the American image of Chinese communism, see Tang Tsou, *America's Failure in China* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1963), Chapter VI.

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recent statements from Peking in the light of Mao's earlier writings, and examines the latter in the light of the current political-military situation confronting Communist China, one can reach an understanding of Mao's view of these questions. Although not a truly original thinker, Mao is a careful and meticulous writer whose works deserve thorough analysis. Moreover, his present views on the revolutionary strategy of the world communist movement have been shaped largely by his experience in the Chinese revolution. No one can claim to understand Mao's thought on international relations unless he has a firm grasp of Chinese history from 1919 to 1949.

What are Mao's views on the questions of the inevitability of war and peaceful coexistence? How do they differ from Khrushchev's? In what sense do they agree with Khrushchev's? What is the source of the Sino-Soviet dispute? The basic and the original source of the Sino-Soviet conflict is a dispute over revolutionary strategy for the world communist movement. Naturally, this dispute involves both questions of ideology and national interests. But the world revolutionary strategy proposed by Peking is less influenced by China's national interest than by its revolutionary experience. It is, as a matter of fact, a direct projection to the international arena of Mao's political-military strategy in the struggle with Generalissimo Chiang in the Chinese revolution. In the present debate over the questions of peaceful coexistence and the inevitability of war, the Chinese arguments follow closely Mao's analysis of strategy and tactics in the period between 1937 and 1945, when an anti-Japanese united front existed between the Chinese Communist Party and the Nationalist Party. Mao's policy was to uphold the united front, or in other words, "peaceful coexistence" with Chiang, as a shield behind which he pushed forward his program of armed struggle against the Kuomintang.

By 1937 Mao had developed a strategy of surrounding the cities from the countryside, because the Kuomintang's hold on the cities was firm and incontestable while its control over the countryside was weak and vulnerable. It is a new version of this strategy which Mao proposes to use to defeat the United States. Mao realizes that the power of the West in the developed areas cannot be challenged successfully for the time being, but he believes its position in the underdeveloped areas is weak and vulnerable. His strategy calls for the world communist movement to concentrate its energy and resources on the underdeveloped

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areas of Asia, Africa and Latin America in order to promote national liberation movements and revolutionary civil wars. Soviet leaders have had little experience and aptitude for this sort of warfare. Their attention is centered on Eastern and Western Europe and the United States. They attach less importance to the underdeveloped areas as an arena of struggle.

This controversy over priorities and the relative importance of the various parts of the world has taken the form of a debate over "the main contradictions of our time," and where these contradictions are concentrated. Soviet leaders charge that the CCP has put forward a "new theory." They assert:

> According to this new theory the main contradiction of our time is . . . contradiction not between socialism and imperialism, but between the national liberation movement and imperialism. The decisive force in the struggle against imperialism . . . is not the world system of socialism, not the struggle of the international working class, but again the national liberation movement.[4]

In rebuttal, the Chinese argue that

> Of course the contradiction between the socialist and capitalist camps is undoubtedly very sharp, but Marxist-Leninists must not regard the contradictions in the world as consisting solely and simply of the contradiction between the two camps. . . . The fundamental contradictions in the contemporary world are the contradictions between the socialist camp and the imperialist camp, the contradiction between the proletariat and the bourgeoisie in the capitalist countries [so far so good from the Soviet point of view, but the Chinese add these other things], the contradiction between the oppressed nations and imperialism, and the contradictions among the imperialist countries and among the monopoly capitalist groups.

Moreover, the Chinese add (and this is the significant point):

> . . . the various types of contradictions in the contemporary world are *concentrated* in the vast areas of Asia, Africa, and Latin America; these are the most *vulnerable* areas under imperialist rule and the storm centers of world revolution dealing direct blows at imperialism. . . . In a sense, therefore, the whole cause of the international proletarian revolution *hinges* on the outcome of the revolutionary struggles of the people of these areas, who constitute the overwhelming majority of the world's population. . . . Today the national liberation revolutions in Asia, Africa, and Latin America are the *most important forces* dealing imperialism direct blows.[5]

This theory of the concentration of contradictions in the underdeveloped areas echoes Stalin's explanation of the success of the

[4] *Peking Review*, October 25, 1963, p. 10.
[5] *Ibid.*, June 21, 1963, pp. 7, 9. (Italics added.)

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October Revolution. According to Stalin, although Russia was not a highly developed industrial society, all the contradictions in the era of imperialism found concentrated expression in Russia. Russia was the weakest link of imperialism.

The interpretation that Mao's global strategy is a direct projection of his strategy developed in the Chinese civil war—of surrounding the cities from the countryside—is further substantiated by a recent resolution of the Indonesian Communist Party. It is generally agreed that the Indonesian Communist Party has been moving ever closer to the Chinese position in the current dispute. The fact that extracts of this resolution were reproduced in the *Peking Review* indicates that these statements reflect the views of the CCP, or at least received its approval. After affirming that the contradiction between the oppressed nations and imperialism is "the major one," and after repudiating the idea that " 'Europe is the centre' [of the world revolutionary storm], as maintained by certain persons," the resolution declares:

> The plenum attaches great importance to the conclusion of the political report that from a world-wide viewpoint, Asia, Africa, and Latin America represent the *countryside* of the world, while Europe and North America are its *cities;* that in order to win the victory of world revolution, the world proletariat must assign an important place to revolutions in Asia, Africa and Latin America, that is to say, to the revolution in the *countryside* of the world.[6]

Mao, of course, also sees the prospect that the arena of struggle will shift from the underdeveloped areas to the developed areas, just as the arena of struggle shifted from the countryside to the cities in the final phase of the Chinese revolution. An article by the editorial departments of the *People's Daily* and the *Red Flag,* commenting on the open letter of the Central Committee of the CPSU, declared:

> The center of world contradictions, of world political struggles, is not fixed but shifts with changes in the international struggles and the revolutionary situation. We believe that, with the development of the contradiction and struggle between the proletariat and the bourgeoisie in Western Europe and North America, the momentous day of battle will arrive in these homes of capitalism and heartlands of imperialism. When that day comes, Western Europe and North America will undoubtedly become the center of world political struggles, of world contradictions.

This statement can best be understood in the light of Mao's belief

[6] *Ibid.,* March 27, 1964, p. 17. This was the Resolution of the Second Plenum of the Central Committee of the Indonesian Communist Party concerning the political report of the Political Bureau. (Italics added.)

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that by waging national liberation wars and revolutionary civil wars in the underdeveloped areas, the revolutionary peoples are actually helping the proletariat in their struggle against the bourgeoisie.

Since Mao's global strategy is to encircle the developed areas from the underdeveloped areas, he must promote and support national liberation wars and revolutionary civil wars. The military-political strategy which Mao developed during the Chinese civil war and the Sino-Japanese War can be readily applied to these wars. The strategy of fighting guerrilla and mobile warfare with popular support does not depend for its success on modern weapons or vast financial resources, which the Communist Chinese lack. It depends rather on an ability to turn the nationalism of the colonial or anti-colonial countries, and the nationalism of the newly-independent countries, against the Western powers. It relies on exploiting the political instability, economic chaos and social turmoil in these countries, manipulating the grievances of the oppressed classes, mobilizing the masses for political-military actions, organizing them into structured groups, offering them political leadership, and guiding them with a "correct" political-military strategy. This expertise which the Chinese acquired in twenty years of struggle can be passed along through the training of new cadres.

The Chinese strongly emphasize that national liberation wars and revolutionary civil wars are just wars. These wars are unavoidable. It is the duty of communist parties to give them all necessary support. Mao therefore upholds the doctrine of the inevitability of war insofar as this is applied to these two kinds of war. "Revolutions are not possible without wars of national liberation or revolutionary civil war. To say otherwise is opposed to revolutionary wars and to revolution."[7]

III

Until January 1961, Khrushchev's thesis was, to use Burin's succinct summary, that "the absence of war will not slow down the world revolutionary process, that in the future revolution will be possible without war."[8] He probably believed that a world communist victory could and would be achieved through non-military forms of struggle. Khrushchev certainly feared that armed

[7] *Ibid.*, June 21, 1963, p. 13.
[8] Frederic S. Burin, "The Communist Doctrine of the Inevitability of War," *American Political Science Review*, June 1963, p. 352.

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struggle, including revolutionary civil wars and national liberation wars, would escalate into a nuclear war. In the spring of 1960, official Soviet statements contained a few hints suggesting that it would be undesirable for revolutionary struggles to be carried on so vigorously as to lead to a danger of world war.[9] Under attack by the Chinese, however, Soviet leaders conceded a point. In January 1961, Khrushchev declared that national liberation wars are unavoidable. He said: "Liberation wars will continue as long as imperialism exists; wars of this kind are revolutionary wars. Such wars are not only justified, they are inevitable, for the colonialists do not freely bestow independence on peoples."[10]

This concession did not halt the polemics. To carry out his global strategy, Mao must energetically support national liberation wars and revolutionary civil wars—despite the danger that these wars could escalate into a major confrontation or local war between the two camps, and even into a world war. Although they accept the inevitability of national liberation wars, Soviet leaders are more cautious than the Chinese in supporting them. In the ideological debate, Khrushchev's formulation on the avoidability of local wars seems to be one means by which he seeks to escape from the dilemma between his desire to support national liberation wars and his fear of a military confrontation with the West. Khrushchev stated that " 'local wars' in our time are very dangerous," and "we will work hard . . . to put out the sparks that may set off the flames of war."[11] Khrushchev's formulations seem to suggest that he will support national liberation wars only so long as these wars do not lead to a local war between the two camps. Khrushchev's reluctance to support revolutionary civil wars and national liberation wars was shown in Algeria, the Congo and even Vietnam.

The Chinese believe that Khrushchev's formula on the avoidability of local war is essentially "an attempt to oppose revolution in the name of safeguarding peace."[12] They use the following argument against Khrushchev:

In recent years, certain persons have been spreading the argument that a single spark from a war of national liberation or from a revolutionary

[9]Harry Gelman, "Russia, China, and the Underdeveloped Areas," *Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science,* September 1963, p. 132.
[10]G. F. Hudson, *et al., The Sino-Soviet Dispute* (New York: Praeger, 1961), pp. 211-213.
[11]Quoted in a Chinese statement, *Peking Review,* October 25, 1963, p. 9.
[12]*Ibid.*

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people's war will lead to a world conflagration destroying the whole of mankind . . . contrary to what these persons say, the wars of national liberation and the revolutionary people's wars that have occurred since World War II have not led to world war. . . . The victory of these revolutionary wars has directly weakened the forces of imperialism and greatly strengthened the forces which prevent the imperialists from launching a world war and which defend world peace.[13]

Mao's revolutionary strategy of encircling the developed countries from the underdeveloped areas does not call for a world war or a nuclear war between the United States and the Soviet Union. Far from proclaiming the inevitability of war between the two camps, the Chinese communists have consistently discounted the danger of a world war.[14] As far back as 1946, when there was talk of a war between the Soviet Union and the United States, Mao minimized this possibility. He indicated his belief to Anna Louise Strong that "the U.S. and the Soviet Union are separated by a vast zone which includes many capitalist, colonial and semi-colonial countries in Europe, Asia and Africa. . . . Before the U.S. reactionaries have subjugated these countries, an attack on the Soviet Union is out of the question."[15] By this remark, Mao meant that the immediate political-military struggle between the two camps would not take the form of a war between the United States and the Soviet Union but rather a struggle to control the intermediate zones. This appraisal of U.S. intentions reflected his own concept of global strategy against the United States. Mao uses the formula of the avoidability of world war to justify his strategy of pushing national liberation wars and revolutionary civil wars in the underdeveloped areas. Again, he is projecting his past experience to the present. He reasons as follows: In spite of the fear of "certain people" over the outbreak of a third world war, the Chinese communists fought and defeated the Nationalists in the period from 1946 to 1949. There is no reason why revolutionary wars in other underdeveloped areas against imperialists and their lackeys cannot be won even though there is again talk of a world war. To bolster his argument for militancy, Mao stresses the theme that by struggling against the

[13] *Ibid.*, June 21, 1963, p. 14.
[14] Burin, *loc. cit.*, p. 348; *Peking Review*, November 2, 1963, pp. 9-10.
[15] Mao Tse-tung, *Selected Works* (Peking: Foreign Languages Press, 1961), p. 196. Yu Chao-li asserted: "The real and direct contradictions of the world since the war are not contradictions between the Soviet Union and the U.S. The Soviet Union and the U.S. can and are actually coexisting peacefully. The imperialist reactionary cliques are only using the rumor that war may break out at any moment as a smokescreen to hide their schemes to control the world and apply pressure on their own people." *Red Flag*, March 30, 1960.

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imperialists, the working classes and the forces of peace can prevent the imperialists from launching a world war.

IV

But Mao has a very complicated mind: what he says is not always exactly what he means. In spite of his professed belief in the possibility of avoiding a world war, Mao is aware of the fact that intensified struggle may increase the danger of a world war. Thus he argues that

> while pointing to the possibility of preventing a new world war, we must also call attention to the possibility that imperialism may unleash a world war. Only by pointing to both possibilities, pursuing correct policies and preparing for both eventualities can we effectively mobilize the masses to wage struggle in defense of world peace. Only thus will the socialist countries and people and other peace-loving countries and people not be caught unawares and utterly unprepared should imperialism force a world war on the people.[16]

In calling attention to this possibility, Mao is undoubtedly influenced by his experience with the April 12, 1927 coup staged by Chiang, which caught the Chinese communists totally unprepared. He must also have remembered that his careful preparations for the outbreak of large-scale civil war in the 1940's helped him to win the civil war when it finally erupted in 1946. At the present juncture, however, Mao's statement is designed to prepare the communists psychologically for any eventuality and to demonstrate to the imperialists his dauntless courage, rather than as contingency planning for a world war of which there are no visible signs.

Having admitted the possibility of a nuclear world war, Mao is concerned that the fear of a nuclear holocaust may lead to capitulation, or at least inhibit revolutionary actions in the underdeveloped areas. He apparently believes that he can dispel this fear by proclaiming the survival and triumph of the socialist system after the nuclear catastrophe. He also feels that by loudly proclaiming this view, he will also make it less likely that the United States will launch a nuclear war. It is in this context that he talks about half of mankind dying in a nuclear war, and the other half remaining to build socialism on the ruins of a world destroyed by a war launched by the imperialists.

> If the imperialists dare to launch nuclear war and plunge mankind into such an unprecedented disaster, what should the international

[16] *Peking Review*, November 23, 1963, p. 10.

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> proletariat do? It is perfectly clear that there are two alternatives, either to resist imperialism firmly and bury it, or to be afraid of sacrifice and to capitulate. But some people believe that if nuclear war breaks out all mankind will perish. In reality, such talk amounts to saying there is no alternative to capitulation in the face of imperialist nuclear blackmail. Directing himself to this pessimistic and capitulationist talk, Comrade Mao Tse-tung pointed out that mankind will definitely not be destroyed even if the imperialists insist on a nuclear war with the possible sacrifice of hundreds of millions of people and impose it on mankind. The future of mankind will nevertheless be a bright one.[17]

In other words, Mao has gone much further than Herman Kahn in thinking the unthinkable. He has made the unthinkable thinkable by picturing the unthinkable as a bright future for socialism.

For all the talk about building a bright future on the ruins of a nuclear war, Mao does not think of nuclear weapons as offensive weapons. Peking has gone on record in opposition to a first strike: "A socialist country absolutely must not be the first to use nuclear weapons, nor should it in any circumstances play with them or engage in nuclear blackmail and nuclear gambling."[18] This last assertion is obviously an allusion to the Cuban affair. Nuclear weapons cannot be used to support people's revolutionary struggles or national liberation wars. Nor should a socialist country use them first against an imperialist country which wages a conventional war of aggression.[19] China wants to manufacture nuclear weapons as "the means of resisting U.S. nuclear blackmail."[20]

V

What, then, of the other side of the coin, that is, peaceful coexistence? To reconstruct Mao's views, we must again look at his revolutionary strategy, particularly during the period between 1937 and 1946. Mao's strategy throughout the whole period of the Chinese revolution was to encircle the city from the countryside. This strategy unfolded in three different phases during which the relations between the Kuomintang (KMT) and the CCP underwent important changes. During the first phase, the

[17] *Ibid.*, July 26, 1963, p. 27. In November 1957 at the Moscow meeting of communist parties, Mao said: "The question has to be considered for the worst. The Political Bureau of our Party has held several sessions to discuss this question. . . . if the worst came to the worst and half of mankind died, the other half would remain while imperialism would be razed to the ground and the whole world would become socialist; in a number of years there would be 2,700 million people again and definitely more." *Ibid.*, September 6, 1963, p. 10.

[18] *Ibid.*, November 23, 1963, p. 12.

[19] *Ibid.*, p. 13.

[20] *Ibid.*, September 6, 1963, p. 9.

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CCP fought an all-out civil war with the KMT. When the CCP faced the possibility of total defeat, it sought peaceful coexistence with the KMT by proposing to form an anti-Japanese united front with the Nationalists.

During the second phase from 1937 to 1945, a united front (read for the term "united front," "peaceful coexistence") existed between the KMT and the CCP. During this period of united front or peaceful coexistence with the KMT, the Chinese communists also sought to form a broad united front *against* the KMT. Under the protection of the policy of maintaining a united front with the KMT, the communists rapidly pushed forward their strategy of encircling the city from the countryside by expanding their control in the rural areas behind the Japanese lines. They fought many limited local military engagements against KMT forces while maintaining the policy of united front and negotiating with the KMT. This strategy was based on several judgments made by Mao. First, so long as the Sino-Japanese War continued, the united front (i.e., peaceful coexistence) could be maintained, and there would not be an all-out civil war. Second, united front meant not only unity with the KMT but also struggle against it. Struggle against the KMT was, Mao argued, one way to maintain the united front: the KMT could be deterred from breaking the united front by the growing strength of the CCP and by the use of this strength in waging a limited struggle against the KMT. Third, the main form of the struggle against the KMT during this period should be peaceful political struggle in the sense that the CCP should not take any action which would lead to the outbreak of a general war, and that the CCP should strive to maintain the united front. But peaceful political struggle did not preclude armed struggle on a limited scale. Fourth, if an all-out civil conflict should occur, the Chinese communists could win a protracted war. Peking's present policy of peaceful coexistence bears a close resemblance to Mao's tactics of the united front during this period.

During the third phase from 1946 to 1949, the CCP won a revolutionary civil war against the KMT.

Mao's experience with the united front with the KMT has clearly influenced Peking's doctrine of peaceful coexistence as well as other questions in her debate with Moscow. It should be emphasized that, while Peking's statements on peaceful coexistence are made more frequently in discussing Peking's relations

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with the nonaligned countries than in discussing Sino-American relations, Mao does not completely reject the possibility of peaceful coexistence with the West, or even with the United States. But he does not envisage peaceful coexistence as a lasting state of affairs—just as he did not conceive of the united front with the KMT as anything more than a useful short-term policy. In this, his position is not so different from Khrushchev's as is commonly supposed. For Khrushchev has declared his intention to bury the capitalist system, and there cannot be peaceful coexistence between the corpse and those who bury it. The dispute arose with regard to the method of burying the West. In his pronouncements, Khrushchev emphasizes peaceful competition and economic progress, but in his actions he is not above making such military moves as placing missiles in Cuba, designed to improve the Soviet position in the balance of military power.

Mao emphasizes armed struggle in the underdeveloped areas to encircle the United States, but he is very cautious about taking any military action which might precipitate a direct confrontation with the United States. Despite his caution, Mao does not want peaceful coexistence to hinder in any way the development of revolutionary struggles in Asia, Africa and Latin America. Thus, Peking repeatedly has proclaimed that there cannot be peaceful coexistence between oppressed nations and oppressor nations, and that the condition for the success achieved by the national liberation movements after World War II was not peaceful coexistence between the two camps—as the Soviets maintain—but revolutionary struggle on the part of the oppressed peoples. After January 1961, when Khrushchev conceded that national liberation wars are inevitable, the Soviet and Chinese positions drew closer to each other. Moscow specifically denies Peking's charge that peaceful coexistence, according to Khrushchev's formula, applies to the relations between oppressed nations and oppressor nations. But Peking has challenged the Soviet prescription that the general line of the political program of the communist movement should be peaceful coexistence. For Mao fears that this formulation would inhibit revolutionary struggles. Peaceful coexistence with the West should not rule out armed struggles in the underdeveloped areas, which constitute a form of struggle against the United States, just as the united front with the KMT did not rule out local military clashes in the countryside.

In Mao's view, peaceful coexistence not only does not preclude

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conflict but it can be maintained only by waging struggle against the imperialists, just as the united front with the KMT not only did not preclude conflict, but could be maintained only by waging struggle. In this struggle, Peking's policy is

> to unite all the forces that can be united in order to form a broad united front against U.S. imperialism and its lackeys. . . . It is possible for the socialist countries to *compel* one imperialist country or another to establish some sort of peaceful coexistence with them by relying on their own growing strength, the expansion of the revolutionary forces of the peoples, the united front with the nationalist countries and the struggle of all the peace-loving people, and by utilizing the internal contradiction of imperialism.[21]

In maintaining peaceful coexistence with the imperialist countries, it is necessary to enter into negotiations with them. "But it is absolutely impermissible to pin hopes for world peace on negotiations, spread illusions about them and thereby paralyze the fighting will of the peoples, as Khrushchev has done."[22] Sometimes it is necessary for the socialist countries to reach compromises with the imperialists. But "necessary compromises between the socialist countries and the imperialist countries do not require the oppressed peoples and nations to follow suit and compromise with imperialism and its lackeys."[23]

Peking continues to stress Lenin's view that the coexistence of socialism side by side with imperialism "for a long time is unthinkable," and that "one or the other must triumph in the end." Presumably, this triumph would come about after the communists had gradually won over the underdeveloped areas and then carried the struggle to the developed areas by promoting conflict between the proletariat and monopoly capital. To implement Mao's strategy it is not necessary to rely on a world war or a nuclear war. But it is imperative, from Mao's viewpoint, that the imperialists be deterred from launching a nuclear war. It is equally imperative that the communists not be paralyzed by the fear of nuclear war and thus fail to support national liberation wars and revolutionary civil wars.

VI

If this analysis of Mao's strategy is correct, then Mao poses a threat to the United States in that he advocates the promotion of

[21] *Ibid.*, December 20, 1963, p. 10. (Italics added.)
[22] *Ibid.*, September 22, 1963, p. 15.
[23] *Ibid.*, June 21, 1963, p. 15.

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world revolution not through nuclear war or through the precipitation of a nuclear war between the United States and the Soviet Union, but rather through a global strategy which exploits what he believes to be the most vulnerable chink in America's global armor. In South Vietnam, Washington has failed so far to devise a political-military program which can defeat the armed struggle waged by the Viet Cong, who have adopted Mao's political and military strategy. If the United States and South Vietnam can win the war against the Viet Cong, they will have demonstrated to Mao that his strategy can be countered. Repeated success in coping with Mao's strategy will induce second thoughts in Peking—if not in the mind of Mao, then in the minds of other Chinese leaders. Mao's strategic concepts, a vital part of Mao's thought and prestige, will in time be eroded. This is a more desirable, though more difficult, way of intervening in the Sino-Soviet dispute than to make concessions to Khrushchev in the expectation that these concessions might strengthen his hand against Mao. If the Chinese are forced to abandon or modify Mao's strategic doctrine, some form of peaceful coexistence as we understand it in the West may eventually become the basis of relations between the United States and Communist China, and between the communists and the West.

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LATIN AMERICA AND THE ATLANTIC TRIANGLE*

by Joseph W. Reidy

THE closer integration of the West is the keystone of U.S. grand strategy. During the decade following World War II, this broad strategy had as its principal goal the strengthening of Western Europe. After achieving this goal during the course of the 1950's, the United States then directed its efforts to the creation of an "Atlantic Partnership"—a closer political and economic association of the majority of Western peoples which would provide the means for the defense and extension of their common values. Although the strengthening of transatlantic ties is clearly the prime objective of contemporary U.S. strategy, it is important to relate U.S. hemispheric commitments and interests to the "Atlantic Partnership" concept.

The transatlantic and hemispheric vectors of U.S. strategic interests, forming the two major lines along which U.S. influence is projected, are complementary rather than competitive. Both are integral parts of the broad strategy which has Western unity as its grand design. Thus *the essence of a U.S. strategy for the Americas is to bring Latin America fully within the modern West.* Viewed in this light, Latin America's ties with Europe, and greater European participation in Latin America's development, form part of a North Atlantic strategy for the Americas. This broadened concept of an Atlantic Community of the West gives a harmony of purpose to the existing triangular relationships of Europe, North America and Latin America. The term expressing the resulting synthesis of Western interests is simple and graphic: The Atlantic Triangle.

I

The Atlantic Triangle rests on a broad foundation. A sense of Western consciousness links Europe, North America and many areas of Latin America, and is expressed by multiple ties: historic, religious, political, economic, military and cultural. A historical

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perspective of these triangular ties is afforded by the following commentary:

> . . . the history of the Americas lacks unity except when the story is told in terms of the great forces, mainly European in origin, which have played upon the Atlantic Triangle since the fifteenth century. . . . The mystic notion of New World unity is less a help than a hindrance to the historian who seeks to record and explain the reality of American life. What does hold their disparate histories together is the great experiences that they have shared in diverse ways as members of that "Great Society," as Toynbee calls it, which since the fifteenth century has been based upon the Atlantic Triangle.[1]

The forces of modern technology have forged new links and created greater interdependence among the Atlantic regions. The Atlantic Triangle idea, however, does not call for tightly centralized Atlantic political institutions. Realistically, the surrender of U.S., European or Latin American sovereignties to a unified Atlantic political colossus is beyond present-day possibilities. There is merit in encouraging the vision of a unified Atlantic world, but this goal is certainly a distant one which will have to be approached in a gradual and pragmatic way over a period of decades. Consequently, the Atlantic Triangle concept is advanced not with the utopian hope of creating an Atlantic political structure here and now, but rather in the belief that the existing mutuality of interests which links the three corners of the Triangle offers a firm base for constructing a more closely integrated Atlantic Community of the West.

The Atlantic Triangle idea is a catalytic concept that suggests a synchronization of Western efforts to meet Latin America's pressing needs for modernization. The Atlantic Triangle lends itself well to the pluralistic organizational patterns developed by the modern West—patterns which preserve unity while permitting diversity.

The merger of three regional destinies is visionary, for the path to be traveled leads beyond the horizon of our time. Yet such visions have provided the foundations for the most enduring political edifices which man has built in the past. Comparable inspiration must be harnessed to strategies which will mold rather than adapt to human events. A truly forward strategy does not simply accept the contemporary fragmentation of the West as an enduring political reality. It does not wait for somebody, some-

[1]Arthur P. Whitaker, "The Americas in the Atlantic Triangle," in Lewis Hanke, editor, *Have the Americas a Common History?* (New York: Knopf, 1964), pp. 147, 164.

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how, someday to provide the conditions which would make possible an Atlantic world. Forward strategy sets positive and long-range goals, with due regard for the obstacles which the objective reality poses but with even more regard for the subjective ends of national policy.

The lessons of history illustrate the price to be paid for that parochialism which cynically rejects all hope for broadening the frontiers of the human community. Thucydides tells us of the Greek city-states which, unable to vault the barrier of their narrow interests, went down in separate defeat before the Macedonians. In contrast, the Committee of Correspondence of the American Revolution, with patience and perseverance, overcame parochial interests and in the space of a few years forged an enduring constitution and federal republic. In more recent times, the progress of the emerging European Union in overcoming the narrow nationalisms of its constituent states has astounded those less given to accept the power of ideas. Thus the Atlantic Triangle concept, while far from prescribing the one and only path which Western peoples must inevitably follow, suggests a distant goal toward which they might work with mutual advantage.

II

While the Atlantic Triangle concept has a psycho-political content, it also rests on a more concrete foundation, an examination of which can best begin with the Latin American corner of the Triangle. In a geopolitical sense, Latin America's three salient characteristics are: vast spatial extension, centrifugal regional tendencies, and outward orientation toward the North Atlantic area.

Space, together with other factors, has long been a formidable obstacle to closer integration at the national level in several Latin American countries. Yet from the time of Bolívar there has been a recurrent quest within Spanish America for a broader identity which would provide a base for the "emotional commonwealth" of which so many Latin Americans feel themselves a part. Latin Americanism is an expression of that quest. The search for a broader identity has gone beyond the limits of Latin America into Pan-Americanism, an effort to develop a closer identity of interests on the hemispheric level. While it would appear that the barrier of space becomes a progressively greater obstacle as regional and hemispheric or even wider integration is considered,

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this observation must be qualified by reference to paradoxical developments induced by modern technology. Modern communications and transportation have hurdled geographic obstacles in a spectacular way. A variety of links now binds the urban centers of the triangular Atlantic region of which Europe, North America and Latin America form a part.

Modern communications and transportation are in the process of creating a similar "way of life" for the *porteno* of Buenos Aires, the *paulista* (Sao Paulo), the resident of Mexico City, the Roman, Parisian, Londoner, New Yorker and San Franciscan. Meanwhile, however, the dichotomy between urban and rural areas within Latin America is becoming sharper and deeper with time. In essence, space has been conquered on an intercontinental basis with greater ease and speed than on a national and regional level within most areas of Latin America. This process has been reinforced by a second geopolitical characteristic of Latin America: centrifugal regional tendencies.

The centrifugal tendencies generated by Latin America's physical environment are being countered to a large degree by technological advances in communications and transportation. Yet paradoxically, these very same technological advances are now exerting an even stronger magnetic attraction between the more modern and industrialized areas of Latin America and the urban centers of the North Atlantic area. Consequently, the development of the "big void" of South America's interior continues to be neglected.[2] While the development of some interior areas—particularly in Brazil—will no doubt proceed, contemporary technological trends seem to indicate that more intensive development of South America's fringe areas will take precedence over opening the interior. Latin America's centrifugal tendencies have impeded regional integration. For example, 90 per cent of Latin American international trade is extraregional. Latin America's common market arrangements will alter the centrifugal trading patterns to some degree, but—considering the region as a whole—the Latin American Free Trade Association (LAFTA) confronts enormous natural obstacles to economic integration. The fact that 83 per cent of the traffic in 1959 among the seven

[2]A vast underdeveloped area of South America's interior—aptly termed the "big void"—is centered in the tropical forests of the Amazon Basin, an area of 2.7 million square miles (two-fifths of Latin America's land surface) but containing less than two million people.

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original signatories of LAFTA[3] moved by water (almost 56 per cent of this amount moving between Brazil and Argentina) emphasizes the centrifugal tendencies of Latin America even with regard to *intra*regional trade.[4]

Many years ago, the geographer James Fairgrieve pointed out that in the Southern Hemisphere there is little land south of 30° S. Latitude and the areas so located are "but offshoots of those of the north." Fairgrieve noted the similarity of climatic conditions and geological structures among areas of the Southern Hemisphere, and the consequent fact that production of similar commodities provided little opportunity for trade between South America, Africa, Australia and New Zealand. Thus, while space was itself a dominant factor in limiting contact between the widely separated areas of the Southern Hemisphere, the spatial factor was reinforced by other geographic as well as environmental factors which gave little encouragement to commercial interchange.[5] As a result, geography and economics have conspired with history to forge important links that orient Latin America toward the North Atlantic region.

Despite these geopolitical factors, prior to 1900 the basis for the development of a triangular Atlantic Community was insufficient. The technology of the time had already forged closer links between Latin America and the North Atlantic region. However, developments in transportation and communication had not progressed sufficiently to overcome Latin America's peripheral location. Furthermore, throughout the first decades of the twentieth century, Latin America looked out upon a North Atlantic world which was not only disunited in its purposes but revealed bitter conflicts of interest with respect to the Latin American area itself.

Late in the nineteenth century some European powers, led by Spain and France, began to cultivate close Latin American ties. The Pan-Latin note sounded by the French press emphasized the "racial and cultural affinity" between the French and Latin American peoples. The very term "Latin America" was a French "invention." France's motivation derived in large part from its concern over the prospect of losing some of its economic interests

[3]The Latin American Free Trade Association agreement was signed on February 18, 1960 by Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Mexico, Paraguay, Peru and Uruguay. Ecuador and Colombia have subsequently joined LAFTA.

[4]OAS, Inter-American Economic and Social Council, *General Problems of Transportation in Latin America.* OEA/Ser. H/X.3, Doc. 18-A Corrected. (Washington: Pan American Union, 1962), p. 36.

[5]James Fairgrieve, *Geography and World Power* (8th edition; London: University of London Press, 1941), pp. 341-342.

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to increasing U.S. commercial competition in Latin America. An added incentive, no doubt, was French concern over its ability to maintain control of colonial possessions in the Antilles and French Guiana. A recurrent note in France's Pan-Latin campaign was sharp criticism of U.S. policy toward Latin America.[6]

A Pan-Hispanic movement, launched by Spain early in the 1890's, sought to increase cultural links with Latin American countries. However, it was motivated in part by the fear that the growth of Pan-Americanism and U.S. military power would undermine Spain's hold on its remaining colonies in the Western Hemisphere. Spanish journals and newspapers devoted considerable space to the "Yankee Peril." Early in the twentieth century, however, the tone of Pan-Hispanism—influenced by the moderation of Spanish liberals—softened as far as the U.S. was concerned, and never took on the more virulent anti-Yankee aspects of the French Pan-Latin campaign.

At the time of these early Spanish and French overtures, Latin America played a passive role in world affairs. Only two Latin American nations, Mexico and Brazil, were invited to attend the first peace conference held at The Hague in 1899. Only Mexico sent delegates. However, with the opening of the twentieth century, a number of factors favored greater Latin American participation in world politics. All nations of Latin America were invited to The Hague Peace Assembly in 1907; eighteen of the twenty Latin American nations attended. Latin America's increasing role in world affairs became even clearer during World War I when the Allied and Central Powers vied for Latin American sympathy.[7]

Following World War I, ten Latin American countries became charter members of the League, and others eventually joined. Just as Latin American nations had looked upon The Hague Conference of 1907 as an opportunity to promote measures that would block big power intervention, they viewed the League of Nations as a useful forum before which they could air their grievances as well as gain stature within a growing international community.

[6]A new Pan-Latin note has been struck by France's President de Gaulle. It seems to stress cultural ties, trade possibilities and the importance of Latin America's maintaining its "independent" position. De Gaulle's visit to Mexico early in 1964 opened this new French initiative. Its tone will become clear during De Gaulle's extended tour of South America during the autumn of 1964.

[7]Latin America's sentiments during World War I were mixed. Only eight nations declared war against Germany, while five confined their action to a break in diplomatic relations. A group of seven nations—Argentina, Chile, Paraguay, Venezuela, Colombia, El Salvador and Mexico—maintained a neutral position throughout the war.

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New cleavages within the Atlantic world, which began to take on serious proportions during the late 1930's, were reflected in Latin America by a resurgence of Spanish interest in creating firmer ties. With Franco's rise to power, Spain adopted a more hostile tone toward the United States. Franco's program of *Hispanidad* emphasized not only the racial and cultural affinity of the Iberian peoples, but also ridiculed the democratic system generally and attempted to undermine U.S. prestige throughout Latin America. The force of *Hispanidad,* however, was blunted by other developments on the international scene. For one, in the decade of the 1930's the Good Neighbor Policy did much to reassure Latin Americans that the United States would forswear intervention in the style of the early 1900's. Moreover, the gathering war clouds in Europe convinced most Latin Americans that their interests would not be served by closer links with the Axis powers which the *Hispanidad* movement attempted to forge.

The course and outcome of World War II greatly promoted U.S. political, military and economic interests in Latin America. The strong competition and even antagonism between U.S. and European interests which marked the early decades of the twentieth century gradually disappeared when the clear predominance of U.S. interests in Latin America over those of Europe was established—a predominance abetted by the problems of Europe's post-World War II recovery. This change in relationships raises anew the question as to whether the Atlantic Triangle idea—however remote it may have seemed in pre-World War II years—has not acquired new meaning and vitality.

III

The Atlantic Triangle concept is challenged most vigorously by those who advance one or both of two contentions: first, European-Latin American ties are of insufficient weight to support the Triangle idea; secondly, whatever the mutuality of European and Latin American interests is judged to be, its compatibility with U.S. hemispheric interests is doubtful. Both contentions merit consideration.

Latin America has been the object of European influence for more than 450 years. Ties of history, culture, language, political interests and economic interchange continue to bind the two regions. Yet there is an inclination to feel that Europe's orientation toward Latin America has so weakened during recent decades that a "trend" of diminishing interest has been estab-

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lished and is unlikely to be reversed. Viewed in the broad sweep of history, this estimate may well be erroneous. It is an estimate prompted by the rapid emergence of the United States as a world power and the relatively recent and dynamic projection of U.S. interests southward since the turn of the century. Perhaps even more important, this estimate fails to assess Europe's "retreat" from Latin America as largely the result of internecine warfare between European nations that decimated their overall strength and reduced their trade with, and investments in, Latin America.

European investment trends, particularly French interest in developing closer economic ties with the new nations of Africa, have contributed to the view that European interest in Latin America has declined. The relative strength of Europe's orientation toward Africa and Latin America, and more particularly the degree to which these orientations are competitive, must be considered in assessing the future of European-Latin American ties.

It is evident that Europe has reached no clear consensus concerning the priority of its interests in these two regions. France has heavy commitments and sizable interests in Africa, and will no doubt press its attempt to harness the potential of Europe for the strengthening of these interests. But France has experienced some difficulty in moving Europe in this direction. For example, French and German interests differ with respect to this question; approximately 30 per cent of West Germany's external investments are in Latin America as compared with no more than 5 per cent in Africa. It is to Europe's benefit, and obviously in France's self-interest, to develop closer ties with Africa. But Europe's ties with Africa are not in fundamental conflict with the Atlantic Triangle idea since the latter does not in any sense exclude extra-Triangular relationships—many of which the U.S. as well as Europe will wish not only to maintain but to strengthen.[8] Thus there is nothing mutually exclusive about European ties with Africa on the one hand and Latin America on the other. It is purely a question of relative interests. In view of the rapid expansion of European productivity, it will be to Europe's economic self-interest to expand its trade relations with Latin America.

[8]The Atlantic Triangle idea should not be conceived as an "exclusive fraternity." The U.S. will continue to strengthen its ties with Japan, Taiwan, the Philippines, Malaysia, Australia, New Zealand and other nations. Similarly, the U.K. will certainly attempt to maintain its close ties with the extra-Triangular members of the Commonwealth.

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European economic interests in Latin America are likely to grow at a relatively faster pace and become greater in absolute terms than in Africa. Latin America's capacity to absorb European exports and investment capital clearly surpasses that of Africa, and this gap is likely to become wider. It is difficult to conceive of Africa as a major market for Europe's production of automobiles, radios, TV sets and machine tools. Nor is it likely that Europe will find a rational economic basis for building up an African industrial capability in the near future. By contrast, the nature of Latin American imports will be far more compatible with European export interests.

Much of Europe's current investment in Africa is concentrated in extractive enterprises. European management and capital dominates *both* ends of the commercial circuit. But African nationalism—relatively restrained to date—may in the years to come regard this form of European investment as inimical to African interests. The disinvestment which has already occurred in the Belgian Congo, French North Africa and former British colonial areas is sizable. African political instability and anti-white sentiment may rise in the future. Given these possibilities, European trade with and investment in Latin America may turn sharply upward in the years ahead. The eventual integration of Spain and Portugal within a growing European community would, no doubt, provide an additional link for closer European-Latin American relations. Dutch and Scandinavian commercial interests can be expected to increase their economic ties with Latin America. The growing political power of Germany within European councils is by no means the least consideration. The 1964 Franco-German agreement to coordinate their trade and investment activities in Latin America bespeaks convincingly Europe's increasing interest in Latin America.[9] Finally, the tremendous growth of Latin America's population will provide a market of almost 600 million people before the end of this century—a market potential which European exporters will hardly overlook.

The gist of the above considerations is simply this: increased European attention to, and ties with, Latin America need not rest on U.S. persuasion or an idyllic view of an expanded Atlantic Community, but can be more soundly based upon Europe's concrete self-interest. Thus the Atlantic Triangle concept is more

[9]This agreement resulted from the De Gaulle-Erhard conversations in Paris in mid-February. See *New York Times,* February 16, 1964.

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than an ideal which depends upon a vague mystique for its sustenance. The Atlantic Triangle is supported by the practical realities of European political and economic interests.

IV

The next question to consider is whether the projection of increased European influence into Latin America may not work to the detriment of U.S. interests. Such fears arise from the historical circumstances of U.S.-European rivalry in Latin America. But more often they are engendered by the belief that U.S. economic interests will suffer and the inter-American system of the OAS will be weakened.

The increased projection of European interests into Latin America obviously can be, but need not be, antagonistic to U.S. interests. Latin America will continue to profit from cultural infusions from the modern West—whether they come from Europe or North America. The problems of Latin American development are so vast that greater European participation in the process may provide the margin of success in bringing Latin America into the modern West. Yet an increase in European trade with Latin America is dependent upon European concessions which will give Latin America easier access to the markets of Europe.

Increased European trade with Latin America will inevitably result in increased competition between some European and U.S. exporters. However, if the United States is to favor the practice as well as the theory of free market competition with the benefits of comparative advantage, European competition must be met with entrepreneurial ingenuity rather than defensive reaction. Moreover, since increased Latin American exports to the European market should provide a spur to Latin America's development, U.S. long-term economic interests in Latin America stand to be advanced rather than retarded by the strengthening of European-Latin American trade ties. The possibilities of a net gain to U.S. interests are enhanced by the prospects of an increased flow of European capital investments to Latin America. There are both psychological and economic advantages to be derived from the joining of European capital to that coming from the United States. Increased European trade and investment in Latin America will likely bring with it greater European political involvement in Latin America. However, this trend need not be inimical to U.S. interests since the goals of European statesmen will in all probability be similar to those for which the United

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States is working. That Europe's increased political involvement in Latin America might run counter to some U.S. interests is a problem which would call more for North Atlantic Community consultation than for U.S. hemispheric retrenchment.

The last point raises the question of the effect which closer European-Latin American ties might have on the inter-American system. First of all, there is no intrinsic antagonism between the concepts of Latin Americanism and Pan-Americanism, the North Atlantic Community and the Triangular Atlantic Community of the West. These concepts can best be viewed as overlapping circles which accommodate the pluralistic interests of Western peoples. Thus closer European-Latin American ties need not weaken the multiple bonds which the Organization of American States (OAS) and other inter-American institutions provide. There is nothing in the Atlantic Triangle concept which suggests a need to abandon or even modify the Rio Treaty of 1947 or the Bogotá Charter of 1948. Nor does the Atlantic Triangle concept disturb more recent inter-American agreements, such as that which created the Alliance for Progress. In fact, European investors are expected to supply part of the twenty billion dollars to come from foreign sources in support of the Alliance for Progress. Thus the Atlantic Triangle concept suggests a framework within which Western energies and resources might more effectively be combined to achieve Latin America's modernization and fuller identity with the modern West.

To whatever degree European and U.S. interests in Latin America appear to conflict, the consultative bodies available to the North Atlantic Community (in particular, the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development—OECD) should be utilized fully to harmonize the interests and synchronize the efforts of Western nations. The United Nations Economic Commission for Latin America (ECLA), too, might serve as a useful forum in which a common approach to Latin American problems might be developed. Presently, France, Great Britain and the Netherlands are members of this body in recognition of their financial holdings in the region. Thus ECLA could represent another means of communication to improve understanding among the Atlantic nations.

V

The coordination of European and U.S. actions in Latin America, however, concerns but two corners of a triangular relationship.

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It is essential to consider Latin American thinking on this matter, for it is Latin American interests which the Atlantic Triangle concept must serve no less than those of Europe and the United States. Moreover, it can be said that Latin Americans have been foremost among those who have discerned the need for and the feasibility of creating closer Atlantic ties.

Former Argentine and Brazilian Presidents, Arturo Frondizi and Juscelino Kubitschek, respectively, expressed the need for closer Latin American participation in the Western Alliance.[10] An even stronger plea for triangular Atlantic ties—which specifically contained the term "Atlantic Triangle"—was advanced by the Uruguayan diplomat and current Secretary-General of the OAS, José A. Mora.[11] The former Peruvian President, Manuel Prado, proposed to the North Atlantic Council meeting in Paris in December 1957 that a formal link be established between NATO and the OAS with a view toward strengthening the Western Alliance. The proposal was received courteously, but resulted in nothing more than a routine agreement for "exchange of information."[12]

One of the most hopeful aspects of the Atlantic Triangle idea is the fact that a number of specific steps have already been taken to give the concept practical implementation. The Brazilian military analyst, J. B. Barreto Leite, has pointed out that Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty was clearly modeled after Article 3 of the Treaty of Rio which preceded it by more than eighteen months. Both treaty articles stipulate that an attack on one of the parties shall be regarded as an attack on all, and neither of the articles contains specific reservations with regard to the origins of aggression. The fact that the United States is signatory to both treaties provides a *de facto* military basis for the Atlantic Triangle concept. Yet, as Barreto Leite asserts, there are many who have failed to recognize the basic unity of these separate treaty arrangements.[13]

In the field of commerce, the OAS has established a formal link with the European Common Market, with liaison handled from offices established in Paris and Brussels. The Inter-American De-

[10]J. B. Barreto Leite, "Integration Is Indispensable," *Western World*, July 1959, p. 32.

[11]José A. Mora, "Will Latin America Continue to Adhere to the West?", *The Annals* of the American Academy of Political and Social Science, July 1961, pp. 98-105.

[12]Barreto Leite, *op. cit.*, p. 31.

[13]*Loc. cit.*

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velopment Bank (IADB) has established a Paris office for the purpose of disseminating information concerning investment opportunities within Latin America which might be attractive to private European capital. José Figueres, former President of Costa Rica, has joined the advocates of a triangular Atlantic economy. He stated:

Western Europe should share in the responsibility of Latin American development. Historic ties, culture and trade link our republics with Europe as much as with the United States. Although we have direct relations with the mother countries, the good offices of the United States are essential, especially in coordinating the efforts of what is really a triangular economy.[14]

VI

Latin Americans are not alone in their support for a Triangular Atlantic Community. There is a growing realization both in Europe and the United States that many Latin American problems can be approached more effectively from the Atlantic Community than from the United States alone. In fact, some problems—such as those associated with world market fluctuations affecting Latin America's primary products—can only be solved by a closer harmonization of Atlantic Community policies.[15] The psychological advantages of such an approach are self-evident. Latin America's nationalistic sensitivities could be assuaged by a feeling of greater association within a Western Community. Latin America badly needs this sense of participation in Western councils. It would be difficult to overemphasize this point. The disparity between U.S. and Latin American wealth and power inevitably generates envy, fear and complexes which poison inter-American relationships. What is needed is a broader Atlantic Community which emphasizes the bonds that unite Western peoples rather than the differences that divide them. The psycho-political content of this objective is the "soul" of the Atlantic Triangle idea.

In November 1962, a NATO Parliamentarians' Conference recommended that private and public sectors of the OECD

[14]José Figueres, "The Alliance and Political Goals," in John C. Dreier, editor, *The Alliance for Progress* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press, 1962), p. 85.

[15]The UN Conference on Trade and Development which opened in Geneva on March 23, 1964, provided a forum for the discussion of the divergent interests of the developed and less developed regions, including those of the Latin American and the North Atlantic nations. It is difficult to envisage a harmonization of these interests unless greater and more effective use is made of the machinery established in the OECD, ECLA, and other organizations of the Atlantic Triangle area.

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nations join in a cooperative effort to accelerate Latin America's development. In response to this recommendation, the Atlantic Community Development Group for Latin America (ADELA) was founded, in April 1963, for the purpose of mobilizing a multinational private effort to assist the Latin American private sector, primarily by increasing the flow of equity capital into selective investment projects. The Ford Foundation and other private U.S. groups provided funds enabling ADELA to carry out a study preliminary to the incorporation of a projected ADELA Investment Company. ADELA has established links with the Inter-American Development Bank and other international financial institutions and has a working relationship with other private groups based in Europe and interested in creating closer ties with Latin America.[16] An ADELA Conference held in Paris during January 1964 established an organizing committee to work out the details of incorporating the ADELA Investment Company. Thus ADELA—headed by a tripartite directorate representing Latin America, Western Europe and the United States—marks an important step toward closer cooperation among the North Atlantic nations in their efforts to speed Latin America's modernization.

In 1963 a conference of the secretaries-general of the OECD and the OAS and the president of the Inter-American Development Bank was called to consider ways and means of coordinating private and public sector action within the OECD nations with the Alliance for Progress. In a related move, the Agency for International Development (AID) in 1963 provided the OAS with a grant designed to enable Latin Americans to study in Europe.

It is evident that — without fanfare — a Triangular Atlantic Community is being forged. Despite the many formidable obstacles that lie in the path of a more closely integrated Atlantic world, important progress has been made. A mutuality of interests exists among the peoples of the West. The time has arrived, therefore, to strengthen this triangular relationship and thus enable peoples in Latin America and the North Atlantic area to achieve more effectively their commonly shared goals.

[16]These groups include the International Christian Union of Business Executives (UNIAPAC), the European Committee for Cooperation with Latin America (CECAL) and the Atlantic Institute, whose headquarters are in Paris. It is also of interest to note that Japan is a participant in ADELA, thus illustrating the point made earlier that the Atlantic Triangle idea should not be conceived as an "exclusive fraternity" which would restrain nations within the Triangle from developing close extra-Triangular relationships.

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THE CYPRUS CONFLICT

by T. W. Adams and Alvin J. Cottrell

THE search for peace in the strife-torn Republic of Cyprus has been the source of grave discord among three NATO allies during the early months of 1964. Though Cyprus is not actually a member, its strategic location on the southeastern flank of NATO makes the island a prime concern of the Western alliance. Moreover, there is the threat of war between Greece and Turkey, the strain on the British defense establishment, the delicate role of the UN as peace-keeper, as well as the potential bearing of the crisis on public opinion in both Britain and the United States in an election year. For all these reasons the Cyprus tangle has become a matter of serious concern in Washington. Thus a country half the size of New Jersey, with fewer people than Denver, again has gained prominence in the arena of world affairs.

The Present Setting

Cyprus is an island of divided loyalties. The contemporary problem has its roots far back in history. Cypriot Greeks have intermittently fought with Cypriot Turks since the beginning of Ottoman domination in the sixteenth century. The creation of the independent republic in 1960 was an experiment designed to end several years of blood-letting between the two ethnic groups. But treaties and constitutions cannot in themselves legislate brotherhood between age-old rivals. When grandparents are arch enemies, it is likely that parents and children will retain the same animosities. Thus in Cyprus, yesterday's feuds have once more become today's bitter internecine war.

Of the 600,000 people in the Republic of Cyprus, 79 per cent are Greek to the core, by religion, language and sentiment. The remainder is 18 per cent Moslem of Turkish descent and language, rounded off by a 3 per cent minority of Maronite Christians, Armenians and British expatriates. The Cypriot Greeks have traditionally opposed British rule and, until independence was granted, favored *enosis* (union) with Greece. Prior to 1960, the Turks tended to side with the British, supporting the proposal of partition (*taksim*) only after the colonial status quo appeared

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to be an untenable situation. The 1959 Zurich-London Agreements and the subsequent treaties establishing and guaranteeing an independent Republic of Cyprus appeared at first to be a successful British effort to disengage from a strategically located territory, one which might become a model for similar moves in the future. But in reality the 1959 solution did not have the endorsement of the Cypriot people, for it was a victory for none of the contenders. For that reason, the pre-independence feelings of both Greek and Turkish Cypriots are still voiced by responsible parties. Walter Lippmann recently summed up the problem in his usual terse manner: "The two communities don't want to live with each other. The Greek Cypriots want union with Greece. The Turkish Cypriots want partition. Britain would like to find a way for the two communities to coexist and cooperate."[1]

Whatever peace-keeping method—British, UN or NATO—may ultimately be successful in preventing the warring factions in Cyprus from slaughtering one another, the source of the struggle will remain unchanged. Merely to keep the peace will not attack the fundamental problem. The historic currents which have carried centuries-long hatred into modern-day Cyprus make a fascinating tale in the files of the British Colonial Office. Before one can hope to understand today's critical situation, and thus endeavor to do something toward its amelioration, it is necessary to know the background in some detail.

Recent History

British suzerainty over Cyprus began on July 12, 1878, when the island was leased as a result of a secret bargain with the Ottoman Porte. Prime Minister Disraeli's official purpose for the so-called Cyprus Convention was to extract from Turkey a guarantee safeguarding the valuable overland route through Ottoman territory to India. In return, the British promised to aid Turkey in the event of a Russian penetration southward, i.e., in search of a warm-water port.

When the secret pact was made public at the Congress of Berlin, France in particular felt that the occupation of Cyprus would not only command the coasts of Syria and Egypt, but also allow Britain the legal right to intervene in the administration of all the territory in Ottoman Asia. Concerned that the Mediterranean would become "an English pond," France therefore requested

[1] *Washington Post*, January 30, 1964.

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Great Britain to clarify her purpose in acquiring Cyprus. Disraeli's Foreign Minister, Lord Salisbury, answered:

> Our policy had been inspired by no projects of aggrandizement upon the shores of the Mediterranean, but purely by a solicitude for vast interests which we possess in Asia and which it is our duty to defend. The interests of France as a great Catholic power in the Lebanon and in the Holy Places of Palestine have always been scrupulously respected by this country.[2]

Salisbury's rationale for the acquisition of Cyprus as a base to carry out the "onerous obligation" to contain Russia should the latter attempt to extend its frontiers, was logically presented. Malta was too far away and the other two alternatives were even worse: the occupation of Suez would probably be resisted by France, and a base at Alexandretta "might be construed as indicating an intention to acquire territory on the mainland of Western Asia." Since the British did not want to be suspected of designs "which were wholly absent from their thoughts," Cyprus through a process of elimination, became the only place which could satisfy all the considerations of the pact with Ottoman Turkey.[3]

Actually England had acquired Cyprus for purposes it could never realize with complete satisfaction, and this fact apparently was recognized by the Liberal government of Gladstone within the first four years of British occupancy of the island. The Cyprus Convention entailed a virtually impossible British commitment to protect the vast stretches of the Ottoman Empire which bordered on Russia. Cyprus lies almost a thousand miles from the Russo-Turkish border in Armenia, and an attack from there onward to the Persian Gulf could scarcely have been prevented by any number of British troops garrisoned on Cyprus. The fundamental moral and defense problems that Disraeli wanted to solve with his Cyprus policy were handled in due course either by the British occupation of Egypt after France gave up her role in the joint control of Suez in 1882, or by the Anglo-Russian Entente of 1907, or they were set aside entirely.[4]

The tenuous conditions on which Cyprus was originally held—i.e., England would evacuate the island if Russia restored to Tur-

[2]Quoted in T. W. Adams, "Cyprus: A Possible Prototype for Terminating the Colonial Status of a Strategically Located Territory." Unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, University of Oklahoma, 1962, p. 27.
[3]*Ibid.*, p. 28.
[4]Dwight E. Lee, *Great Britain and the Cyprus Convention Policy of 1878* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1934), pp. 164-165.

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key the Ottoman lands seized in Armenia—discouraged British investments to foster the island's economy. Moreover, the British knew that loyalty to the Empire would be difficult to obtain from the Hellenistic Cypriots. Thus, although much was promised for the island, little was actually accomplished. Elizabeth Monroe, writing as late as the 1930's, claimed that England "allowed it [Cyprus] to degenerate into a Cinderella, and the Fairy Godmother, though announced two or three times, has not yet put in an appearance."[5] Despite the British failure to develop whatever economic potential existed on Cyprus, control of the island was considered to be a valuable, though far from indispensable, link in British imperial defense policy after the turn of the century.

At the outbreak of the First World War, Great Britain annexed Cyprus outright, though it was not until the 1923 Treaty of Lausanne that Turkey formally ceded the island to the British. In 1925 the British constituted Cyprus as a Crown Colony. With the defeat of Czarist Russia in 1917, and in view of Russia's relative weakness at sea during the war, Britain had grown indifferent toward Cyprus as a major military base. She did not, however, contemplate relinquishing the colony, not even when the indigenous movement for *enosis* first erupted into violent activity in 1931.

It was not until after the Second World War that Cyprus assumed a larger place in British military thinking for two important reasons: 1) its proximity to the Suez Canal, and 2) the vastly increased power potential of the Soviet Union. Possession of the island may also explain in part why the British felt themselves in a better position—than the French, for example—to make concessions to rising Arab nationalism. Certain land bases in the Levant and North Africa became less important so long as Britain was able to maintain her three strongholds of the middle sea, Gibraltar, Malta and Cyprus.

A series of miscalculations in British policy on Cyprus served to arouse anti-British sentiment among the Cypriots. The first was the offer to cede the island to Greece in return for a Greek commitment to enter the First World War in order to save Serbia. This offer was refused by King Constantine in 1915, largely because the Greek Army was not prepared for war. Un-

[5]Elizabeth Monroe, *The Mediterranean in Politics* (London: Oxford University Press, 1939), p. 49.

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doubtedly the native Cypriot must have felt that Cyprus was considered a perennial pawn in the diplomatic chess game.

An even more serious cause of Greek Cypriot resentment during the interwar period was the question of "tribute." Under the original lease, Britain had agreed to pay the Ottoman Sultan an amount equal to Turkey's former revenue from Cyprus. The money was never actually transferred in cash, but instead was used to liquidate an old loan which Britain had made to the Ottoman Empire in 1855. The Cypriots were required to bear the payment of the tribute in addition to normal taxes, and the practice continued even after Great Britain had annexed the island. The British never acceded to Cypriot insistence that the tribute payment be stopped and that restitution from 1914 was due the island. The result was a severe drain on the island's economy and a smoldering hatred of the British. In 1927, the British in effect canceled the tribute with an equivalent grant-in-aid, but the principle of having to pay the tribute still made the Cypriot feel that he was a vassal.

The Greek Cypriots rioted over the tribute issue in 1931. The British responded with stern measures which the Greek community on the island never forgot: abrogation of the original constitution of 1882; abolition of all electoral bodies; imposition of censorship; curtailment of the practice of flying the Greek flag; and expulsion of high dignitaries of the Greek Orthodox Church, which had been in the forefront of the *enosis* movement since Greek independence in the 1820's.

A further blunder which contributed to the upheaval in Cyprus in the late 1950's was the fact that the British had made no cultural inroads there as they had in Malta, where the use of Italian was forbidden in the schools. Little attention had been paid to Cypriot secondary schools. These were left largely in the hands of teachers imported from Greece, who were free to expound the most extreme form of nationalism. Students of university age went to Athens, not England, for their education, where anti-colonial sentiments were certainly reinforced.

The tenseness caused by the *enosis* movement prevailed until the start of the Second World War. After Greece was invaded by Italy, and Rhodes was seized, there was a temporary *rapprochement* between the Cypriots and the British.[6] Several thousand

[6]Possibly the Orthodox in Cyprus feared another occupation by the "Latins" (Roman Catholics) who had once ruled Cyprus for three centuries.

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Cypriots, along with their sturdy indigenous breed of mules, distinguished themselves in the mountain campaigns in Greece and elsewhere. The wartime harmony, however, was short-lived. The postwar influx of Jewish refugees who were interned on Cyprus to prevent illegal immigration to Palestine, together with rumors that British forces would move from Suez to Cyprus, gave a new impetus to the Greek nationalist movement.

After the war, the British made serious attempts to seek a compromise in Cyprus. In 1948 a new constitution was proposed, but the islanders refused to consider it. The Greek parties boycotted any constitutional discussion which made no provision for *enosis,* while the Turks insisted that *enosis* was totally unacceptable. Again in 1954, in the face of growing unrest, the British offered the Cypriots a constitution similar to that of other colonial possessions—but to no avail, since by that time the active terrorist campaign had already been planned and organized. In a futile gesture, the British assigned Lord Radcliffe to write a constitution in 1956; his brilliant proposals likewise met with Cypriot opposition. In 1958, the Macmillan Plan for a seven-year partnership represented Britain's last attempt to seek a solution prior to agreeing to the independence of Cyprus.

In the postwar period the British had also allowed officials of the Church of Cyprus, who had been deported in 1931, to return to the island. This paved the way for the election in 1950 of the then Bishop of Kitium as Archbishop Makarios III—to a seat which had been vacant for almost two decades. His election was a significant step in reviving the organized movement for union with Greece. Archbishop Makarios openly admitted his leadership of the *enosis* movement, but he stalwartly denied any implication in the anti-British terrorist activities which began in 1955. Without actually preferring charges against him for complicity, the British deported Makarios and three other priests to the Seychelles Islands in 1956.

The Cyprus story took a new turn in November 1954 when a hero of the Greek Army, Colonel George Grivas (Dighenis), returned to Cyprus. A native Cypriot, Grivas began to organize a secret indigenous resistance group, the National Union of Cypriot Combatants (EOKA), to gain by force of arms the *enosis* objective. The rebellion started gradually, but in seven months its intensity increased to the point where a state of emergency was proclaimed by the Governor in November 1955. The next four

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years were characterized by a revival of the age-old tension between Greek and Turkish Cypriots. As a counterweight to EOKA, the Turkish Cypriot Pioneer Organization (TMT) also emerged as a terrorist group, and communal blood-letting became widespread.

NATO's Role in the Cyprus Settlement

Members of NATO recognized immediately after the Eleventh Session of the General Assembly in 1956 that there was little hope for a political settlement of the Cyprus question through the United Nations. In December 1956, the North Atlantic Council passed a resolution that made the "good offices" of the NATO Secretary-General available for conciliation efforts and the peaceful settlement of disputes. In accordance with this resolution, in March 1957 the Secretary-General, Lord Ismay, offered to the British, Greek and Turkish governments to serve as the mediator for talks on the Cyprus question. Both the British and the Turks were receptive to the idea, but within a few hours of its announcement the Prime Minister of Greece issued an uncompromising refusal of the NATO offer. The three powers met later in 1957 in Paris at the NATO Council meeting, but little that was constructive emerged from the discussions about Cyprus despite a personal plea by President Eisenhower.

Terrorism was rampant on Cyprus through the first half of 1958, and Greece and Turkey grew further and further apart. In the meantime, Paul-Henri Spaak of Belgium had become Secretary-General of NATO. He had encouraged friendly talks throughout the year among the three powers and tendered his good offices for possible negotiations leading to a settlement of the question. Greece remained reluctant because the talks were to include Turkey, which she insisted had no valid part in the problem. On September 23, 1958, Secretary-General Spaak made a surprise visit to Athens to urge the Greek government to come to terms. The next day he submitted a plan (subsequently termed the Spaak Plan) to the NATO Council meeting in Paris and requested that it be accepted in principle immediately and discussed in detail later.

The Spaak Plan was similar to Britain's 1958 Macmillan Plan (the "Seven-year Plan") in that it proposed two separate houses of representatives, one for each community on Cyprus, both of which would advise and aid the British governor for a period of

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seven years. By the end of that period of time there should have been "important progress towards the possibility of the Cypriot community governing itself. . . ." The British delayed acceptance of the Spaak Plan in order that Her Majesty's Government could study the various proposals. The discussion lasted another month. Though the participants (Greece, Turkey and the United Kingdom) made concessions and finally agreed to a future conference, they could not decide which outside parties should be in attendance and whether the conference would lead to a final solution for Cyprus or merely a provisional solution.

When Britain's Colonial Secretary, Mr. Lennox-Boyd, made a speech in England on October 9, 1958, in which he declared "Cyprus is Turkey's offshore island," and the Turkish government on October 24 denied a statement in the *New York Times* that she "has given up the claim for partition," the Greek government on October 24 instructed its NATO representative that "Greece would take no further steps, seeing that her efforts and concessions had not met with the least response." By November the NATO talks had broken down. When the UN General Assembly failed to endorse a resolution on Cyprus in December, the tripartite powers realized they would have to act on their own. At the NATO meeting in Paris later that month, Greece and Turkey scheduled bilateral talks which ultimately led to the Zurich and London Agreements on the Cyprus question.

The key to the Cyprus settlement was the February 1959 meeting in Switzerland between the Greek Prime Minister, Karamanlis, and the Turkish Prime Minister, Menderes. These two leaders, rivals under the most favorable circumstances, finally resolved their differences and at least temporarily ended the bloody guerrilla action for control of Cyprus. Their bilateral accord, known as the Zurich Agreement, marked the first time the Greeks and the Turks had ever reached an agreement concerning the future disposition of Cyprus. The Agreement was immediately presented to London, where the British Cabinet accepted it eight days later, after provisions for the base areas were added. The leaders of the Greek and Turkish communities on Cyprus could do little but go along with the "powers" as a formality, and the Zurich-London Agreements were then consummated. The British, Greek and Turkish parliaments added their respective endorsements before any of the signatories could express official reluctance. As a last step, the tripartite declarations

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and documents of February 19, 1959 were published in an official British White Paper, and thereupon were considered the "agreed foundation for the final settlement of the problem of Cyprus."

Greek, Turkish and British Stands

Prior to 1960 the Greeks based their claim to Cyprus upon ethnic facts, although the island never formed a constituent part of modern Greece. Cyprus was colonized by the Greeks in ancient times, and today the speech of the Cypriots is considered closer to the classical Greek than is the language spoken on the mainland. The Greek Cypriot population has long paid homage to Greek heroes and royalty, and the Greek flag was more in evidence than the Union Jack during the British rule.[7] In essence, it can be said that the Greeks rested their case on cultural rather than strictly legal grounds. Contrary to the position taken by former Prime Minister Karamanlis, the present Athens government became less favorably inclined toward the Zurich-London Agreements, preferring instead President Makarios' stand for a unitary state with majority rule. Self-determination, or some variation of *enosis,* is an option the Greek Cypriots would like to preserve for possible use at a later date.

The Turkish attitude toward Cyprus is influenced by strategic and ethnic considerations. Cyprus is located just forty miles from Turkey, and the Ankara government does not relish a two-sided Greek encirclement of Anatolia. Moreover, the Turks see great strategic value in Cyprus; a strong Western base maintained on the island could provide logistical and tactical support to Turkey in the event of a military emergency. Turkey must also be concerned with the well-being of the Turkish minority on Cyprus and was, therefore, satisfied with the protection afforded that minority by the British under the terms of the 1923 Lausanne Treaty. According to the Turks, if a final settlement on Cyprus is to be made, it must be founded upon the twin principles of "security of the island and security of the people."

Before the conflict assumed its international flavor in 1954, the Turkish community on Cyprus did not take seriously the Greek Cypriot drive for *enosis*. Greece wrongly interpreted the passive Turkish attitude, both on the mainland and in Cyprus, during

[7]Even today the Greek and Turkish flags are legally displayed by private citizens. The white banner of the Republic can be seen only over government buildings or post offices.

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the resurgence of the union movement in the late 1940's and early 1950's under Archbishop Makarios. When Greece was sufficiently convinced that Turkey would not jeopardize good Greco-Turkish relations by interfering with *enosis,* it then openly supported the campaign for Cypriot "self-determination" and took the Cyprus issue to the United Nations in the fall of 1954. This move jarred the Turks out of their complaisance. Spurred by memories of the fantastic *megali idea* (Greek irredentism of old Byzantium) and of the 1919 Greek invasion of Anatolia, Ankara soon countered with demands first for continuation of the status quo, then for returning Cyprus to Turkey, and finally for partition (*taksim*). Even today, many responsible Turks feel that giving up Cyprus would be a concession to the Greek offensive against Turkey, and that partition is, therefore, the only sensible solution to the Cyprus problem. To the Greeks, physical division of the island is impossible and unconscionable.

The British, before agreeing to independence, took their stand on grounds of international law. They stressed that Cyprus was never incorporated into the modern state of Greece, even though the island had been part of the Hellenistic Byzantine Empire for over eight centuries. (Prior to British annexation in 1914 Cyprus was legally a part of the Ottoman Empire, which it had been since 1571.) Although Britain's legal arguments helped to stave off two efforts to have the Cyprus question placed on the agenda of the UN General Assembly, they did not lessen sentiment for union with Greece, either on the island itself or on the Greek mainland. While the British outwardly insist that the Zurich-London Agreements must be upheld in Cyprus, in reality Whitehall must feel that these Agreements may no longer be tenable.[8]

Institutionalized Seeds of Discontent

The Zurich-London Agreements of 1959 ended the four-year emergency period in which more than 600 lives were lost. The Greeks did not gain *enosis,* the Turks could not maintain the status quo or win partition, and the British were to lose another

[8]There has been a strong pro-Greek bias in English public opinion, even during the emergency period (1955-1959). This attitude, which continues today, stems from the fact that many educated Englishmen, who pride themselves on their classical learning, would feel illiberal if compelled to conduct a prolonged struggle against Greece, the cradle of Western democracy. This long tradition of philhellenism can be traced back at least to 1824 when Lord Byron, the poet, died in the Greek war for independence with the Ottoman Empire.

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jewel from the imperial crown. Therefore, the Cyprus agreements really satisfied no one. Each of the contending parties, including the Cypriots, had to compromise something of its original objective. The Greek Cypriots ostensibly gave up *enosis* for the island's independence, and the Turkish Cypriots gave up their aim of partition in return for special safeguards and a secondary, though important, position of political power in the Republic.

The source of the present difficulties, hence, is rooted in the Constitution and the three enforcing treaties which protect the Republic of Cyprus. The Constitution specifically forbids total or partial union of Cyprus with another state or the partition of the island into two independent states. Moreover, the Treaty of Guarantee, signed by Great Britain, Greece, Turkey and Cyprus, is designed to secure the territorial integrity and the Constitution of the Republic. It provides that if, after consultation, common and concerted actions to maintain the terms of the treaty should prove impossible, each of the guarantor powers would have the right to take unilateral action to re-establish the state of affairs at the time of independence. The other two treaties, those of Establishment and of Alliance, provide, among other things, for the full sovereignty of the two British bases (in the former) and for the stationing of Greek and Turkish troops, originally for training purposes, under a rotating military command in Cyprus (in the latter).

These three related treaties, together with the draft Constitution of the Republic, formed an expedient way out of the complex problem of pre-independent Cyprus. They form the *sine qua non* for the independence of the island. According to Turkey, the minority safeguards granted the Turkish Cypriots paved the way for independence, which otherwise would have been "unthinkable and impossible." Thus, Turkey has threatened to intervene legally, by the terms of the Treaty of Guarantee, on behalf of the Turkish Cypriot minority if the Greek majority should proceed unilaterally to alter any part of the Republic's Constitution.[9] The mainland Greeks well understand this and do not want to risk another war with Turkey, in spite of an ebullient public opinion in Greece. Whether or not the new government of Prime Minister Papandreaou would like to detach itself from the Cyprus tangle so as to preclude the possibility of war with Turkey, the matter may be out of its hands. The in-

[9] *The Question of Cyprus* (New York: Turkish Information Office, 1964), p. 5.

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dependence of Cyprus was, as Doros Alastos pointed out in his excellent study, *Cyprus Guerrilla,*[10] "against the aspiration of generations of Greeks."

An ironic twist on the future disposition of Cyprus was suggested by *New York Times* correspondent W. Granger Blair, writing from Nicosia in February 1964. In view of the heavy concentration of communists on Cyprus (some 30 per cent of the electorate) and their strong organization in the labor movement, "Turkey for strategic reasons probably would not be happy with an independent Greek Cypriot island republic off her southern coast." Therefore if no other solution is in sight, Turkey might demand that *enosis* be carried out, "thereby making Cyprus part of the North Atlantic Alliance and free of the communist danger."[11] If this unlikely development were to take place, it would make a mockery of the original Greek Cypriot position. The leaders of the majority in Cyprus have noticeably treated *enosis* with some reluctance since the Republic was established; they would rather try to make self-government work under a new constitution without extensive minority rights.

The Strategic Position of Cyprus

On the present role of Cyprus, one commentator on military strategy has observed: "Malta is no longer officially regarded as a suitable point of departure for mobile operations by the [British] Army and Air Force and from that standpoint the chief United Kingdom base in the Mediterranean is now Cyprus."[12] In truth, the Cyprus base serves primarily to protect the Middle Eastern oil supplies which are so vital to Britain's industry and financial solvency.

Gradual attrition of other British bases in the Middle East has given Cyprus its vital position. The strong base of Aden at the tip of the Arabian Peninsula, which Britain has held since 1839, is too remote to be considered the key strategic nexus of the Middle East. If anything, Aden serves to emphasize that Britain's primary interest is still centered in the protection of the Persian Gulf. Libya at one time could have provided a possible staging area, but the Libyan government has declared that it will not renew the present U.S. lease after 1971, nor the British base agreement scheduled to expire in 1973. When Great Britain was vir-

[10]London: Wm. Heinemann, Ltd., 1960, p. 202.
[11]*New York Times,* February 23, 1964, p. 4E.
[12]Neville Brown, *Strategic Mobility* (New York: Praeger, 1964), p. 29.

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tually forced by Egypt to withdraw from the Suez Canal Zone in 1954, the military establishment for the defense of Suez had to be shifted elsewhere. The loss of Suez, coupled with the surrender of Palestine in 1948, has therefore made Cyprus the primary point of British power in the Mediterranean.

Even the presence of NATO bases in Turkey cannot minimize the crucial location of Cyprus. Perennial concern for adequate defense measures against her traditional Russian enemy inspired Turkey to depart from her World War II neutrality and join NATO. This paved the way for the construction of a number of important Western bases on the Soviet periphery. However, the Turks, possibly responding to Soviet admonitions, have thought it unwise to give complete control of the bases to the United States or other NATO members. This again emphasizes the necessity of having sovereign British bases in Cyprus. Although these areas on Cyprus do not fill the logistical needs of an ideal defense base, largely because of a shortage of fresh water and the lack of a good harbor, there is seemingly no substitute for Cyprus within the geographical boundaries of the Middle East.[13]

For the West in general, the unique location of Cyprus vis-à-vis Europe, the USSR, the Levant and Africa makes it a topic of renewed salience in present international relations. In 1964 the Soviet Union opened up a Moscow-Nicosia air route which is

[13]For a detailed analysis, see Halford L. Hoskins, *The Middle East: Problem Area in World Politics* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1954), p. 250 ff.
The Defense Correspondent of the *New Statesman* has given a cogent summary of the strategic significance of Cyprus to Great Britain: "Since Cyprus became independent in 1960 it has often been assumed that the British interest in her strategic importance has diminished. Once the headquarters of Middle East Command, the island is now no more than a district command controlled at the policy level from London. 'Normally' only two battalions are stationed there, and much of the responsibility of H. Q. Cyprus District is to operate a training complex—which includes Libya—for forces sent out periodically from the United Kingdom. . . . Akrotiri is the largest RAF station in the world and V-bombers regularly engage in training flights from it. Moreover, since official British nuclear strategy assumes the credibility of a nuclear threat as a means of limiting or deterring hostilities on the part of a minor Power, Middle Eastern military targets are also among those earmarked for Cyprus-based aircraft. . . . The flying distance from Cyprus to Bahrein, Britain's forward headquarters and garrison for the preservation of oil interests in the Persian Gulf, is sufficiently short to allow for rapid intervention in the Gulf area by troops sent direct from the former garrison. Moreover, the Cyprus and Gulf climates are very similar, and troops stationed on the island need no acclimatization if moved east.
"Hence, Cyprus clearly does have strategic significance, particularly in the role of training area, staging post, troop reinforcement, and stockpile. The Suez and Jordan crises of 1956 and 1958 were directly affected by the British control of Cyprus." (Anthony Verrier, "Cyprus: Britain's Security Role," *The World Today*, March 1964, pp. 136-137.

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only 1,500 miles in length and provides ready access to a number of potential targets within a 1,000-mile radius of the island. The vital importance of Cyprus is also based on its geographical proximity to the Dardanelles and to Turkey's main southern port of Iskenderum, terminal of the oil pipeline from Iraq. Beyond its military significance, it is of considerable psychological value as a symbol of the West's power and concern in the eastern Mediterranean. After the evacuation of Suez, Britain cannot afford to beat another hasty retreat in the Middle East from Cyprus; nor would such an act serve to bolster the prestige of the West. Indeed today the British bases on Cyprus fulfill the purpose for which they were originally intended when Britain occupied the island in 1878, namely, protecting Turkey against Russia.

The British Sovereign Bases

The British Sovereign Base Areas in Cyprus were secured by the Treaty of Establishment of 1959. The British government retained direct sovereignty over two distinct enclaves totaling ninety-nine square miles on the southern shore of the island: Akrotiri-Episkopi-Paramali and Dhekelia-Pergamos-Nikolaos-Ayios-Xylophagou. In addition, Britain was to receive all the facilities required for her unencumbered use of the bases. These included free access to roads, ports and communication and training sites outside the base areas; specific use of and accommodations at the port of Famagusta; use of the airfield at Nicosia; ingress, egress and overfly rights; and jurisdiction of the British forces comparable to NATO's Status of Forces agreement. The sovereign base concessions British Foreign Secretary Selwyn-Lloyd ultimately managed to extract from the Cypriot leadership, however, did not come easily. Discussions on the terms of reference for the bases lasted from February 1959 until July 1960.

Archbishop Makarios had made a rigid demand throughout the negotiations that there should be created certain special arrangements whereby the Cypriots were to control the civil administration of the bases. Any concessions of this sort by the British would have infringed on Britain's policy of "unfettered control of the base areas." In order to bring the two sides closer together, the British made a series of proposals which continually reduced the total square miles the bases were to encompass. The idea was obviously to delineate an area sufficiently large for military pur-

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poses, yet small enough so that the number of Cypriots living therein would not be a bone of contention. In the British mind, sovereign authority over the bases meant sovereignty all the way. Thus any resident, including Cypriots, within the base area would remain under British jurisdiction. It was clear that the British were prepared to make any number of necessary concessions, provided they contributed in some way to securing the sovereign nature of their future bases in Cyprus.

The question of the administration of the base areas was finally decided in Britain's favor. Makarios dropped his demands that the civil administration of the bases be controlled by the Cypriots, but by doing so he gained something far more valuable in the formative years of his Republic. The British "declaration of policy"—which the Cypriots at that time had declared lacked validity in international law—granted no concession on the sovereignty of the base areas, but it did include an assurance that Great Britain had no intention of revoking certain special privileges of Cypriots living in the area, such as citizenship rights or free access. In other words, Britain promised not to make "little colonies" out of the base areas.

The counter-offer made by the British negotiators on the continuance of aid to Cyprus even beyond the first five years of independence, informally agreed to during the London negotiation in 1959, broke the impasse over the bases. The British were careful not to go overboard in their offer of future aid, since "too generous aid might be regarded as a precedent for other territories in the throes of gaining their independence."[14] Yet the figure, totaling over twelve million pounds sterling, was tempting enough to bring the inordinate demands of the Archbishop back within the limits established by Her Majesty's Government.

Great Britain desired sovereignty rather than a lease of the bases in Cyprus "because if they became involved in hostilities with a third power and had to use the base, the Republic of Cyprus would *not* be involved."[15] Were the bases actually on the territory of Cyprus, the Republic could not avoid a commitment, one way or the other, in such hostilities. Not long ago, it was difficult to visualize a situation in which Cyprus would not want to side with Great Britain, but that is apparently not the case today. Perhaps the British anticipated the present turn of events.

[14]*The Manchester Guardian Weekly*, June 25, 1960.
[15]*The Times* (London), January 22, 1960.

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In any case, the two British enclaves are "actually chunks of England sitting on the littoral of Cyprus."[16]

The British have now enjoyed almost four years of "unfettered control" of the sovereign base areas. Civil-military relations with the 1,000-odd Cypriot citizens living in the areas, as well as with the 10,000 native laborers who come to work there daily, appear to be working smoothly. According to Neville Brown, the present-day use of the bases is quite extensive:

> The base includes a stockpile for one or more brigade groups, a NATO early warning station, a wireless station that is officially regarded as constituting an essential link in Britain's global radio network, accommodation for the three infantry battalions and their supporting units, and Akrotiri, at which some tactical aircraft are permanently located and which is used periodically by transport planes and V-bombers.[17]

After a construction "standstill" in early 1962, millions of pounds were subsequently expended on improvement of base facilities.

The number of British forces in the bases has been as high as 13,000, although the British hope that the number could eventually be reduced to 4-5,000, chiefly RAF personnel and a minimum of infantrymen for garrison duty.[18] Because of the present emergency in the island the exact number of British forces cannot be determined, but estimates made when the fighting broke out in December 1963 were as low as 3,000 for troop duty under the 1959 treaties.[19] This contingent was increased to an estimated 7,500 in early 1964, before the UN forces began to arrive in March.

Makarios on the Future of the British Bases

The British declaration of intent that the Sovereign Base Areas would be used for no other than military purposes was possibly the key element which caused Archbishop Makarios to drop his demand for civil administration of the areas in 1959. His fears that the gestation of colonialism would always be represented in the bases were not eliminated by virtue of the declaration, but they were sufficiently allayed for as long as it took to sign the final treaties. Makarios explained his rationale for the retreat from his original stand in this way:

> We had to accept the offers made to us and to sacrifice some of our

[16]Thomas W. Adams, "Cyprus," in *Viewpoints* (published by the American Friends of the Middle East), March 1964, p. 28.
[17]*Op. cit.*
[18]*Cyprus Mail*, February 18, 1962.
[19]*New York Times*, February 23, 1964, p. 1E.

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rights *temporarily* [italics supplied] instead of sticking to all our demands and obtaining nothing. That was because we wanted to get rid of the colonial shackles. I am happy that we have gained our freedom . . . we oppose colonialism and support freedom everywhere.[20]

The allusion which the President of the Republic of Cyprus made to the temporary sacrifice of rights has disturbed many Western statesmen. It appears that Makarios looks upon the intricate Cyprus solution more as a *modus vivendi* than a finality, and such an attitude in a person of his stature is indeed a threat to the future of the British bases. An Egyptian journalist managed to draw this statement from the Archbishop during an interview in Cairo:

> We have made it clear to Britain that if the bases were ever used in a manner that prejudiced our relations with other countries or were equipped with atomic weapons, we would rise in revolt once more. Personally, I believe that all bases, particularly atomic bases, should be put under the supervision of the United Nations. The world seeks peace and does not want to live in the shadow of fear. At any rate, it was not Cyprus that gave the bases to the British. Those bases must return to Cyprus one day.[21]

Perhaps it is not surprising that the opinion of Makarios is close to that of the Kremlin. The Soviets feel that the bases "constitute a continuation of British imperialism in the Eastern Mediterranean, which can transform Cyprus into a nuclear base for NATO."[22]

The viewpoints expressed above hardly augur well for the perpetuation of the status quo in Cyprus. The statements seem consistent with the attitudes of neutrals as well as the Soviets toward Western bases in general. Makarios, however, is too shrewd a politician and diplomat to attack the Cyprus treaties blatantly. While he would like to place restrictions on the uses the British make of their sovereign base areas, he knows full well that there is no legal or economic way by which he can justify such action. Yet even the spoken desire of the Archbishop-President to place the British bases "one day" under Cypriot sovereignty creates a disruptive potential. Makarios represents, or better yet embodies, the two most powerful institutions in the Republic: the Presidency, the repository of the political power of the Cypriot na-

[20]"Cyprus Breaks the Shackles," *Arab Observer,* September 4, 1960, p. 16.
[21]*Ibid.,* p. 15.
[22]Quoted by Theofanis G. Stavrou in a review of S. M. Leonidov, *Kipr v Borbe Za Nezavisimost* (Moscow, 1963), *The Middle East Journal,* Winter 1964, p. 114.

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tion, and the Church (Ethnarchy), the repository of the national conscience of the majority of the Cypriot people. Together these two institutions constitute a force that could be suppressed only by military power—an alternative the British would rather not face, either now or at some future date.

The British base issue was temporarily overshadowed by the rampant communal violence of early 1964. However, the presence of British troops trying to keep the peace outside the sovereign enclaves has indeed suited the communist propaganda line against the bases. *The Economist* recently speculated on what the present state of affairs in Cyprus could portend:

> In this atmosphere, two nightmarish possibilities will have to be faced by the British. The first is that the next target for Greek Cypriot wrath will be the British bases, which hitherto have not been a factor in the dispute. . . . The second possibility, hideous to contemplate, is that Greek security forces, now being trained to fight against the Turks, will be used against the British. . . . One incident could spark off an inferno and put the clock back ten years.[23]

Conclusion

Cyprus is a critical issue for NATO and the entire Free World. Hatred and bloodshed between the Greek and Turkish Cypriots probably has passed the point of no return. Hence, there can hardly be a political settlement patterned after the terms of the Zurich-London Agreements.

Current proposals for resolving the Cyprus conflict have bypassed the terms of the Republic's Constitution and treaties. Whether it be *enosis*, partition, plebiscite, resettlement, unitary state, federation or confederation, the Zurich-London Agreements are not applicable. The requisite tolerance, good will and common sense have already vanished.

The overriding criterion for any permanent solution in Cyprus should be its effect on the Western alliance. In the interests of NATO and world peace, Greece and Turkey again must abandon their extreme views on Cyprus, as they did in 1959, and cooperate to bring about a new, workable *détente*. The present conditions only enhance the influence of the indigenous communists and the Soviet Union in this eastern Mediterranean trouble spot. How to prevent large-scale communist intervention, while simultaneously negotiating a peaceful Cyprus settlement and avoiding the mistakes and emotions of the past, is the challenge which still confronts Western statecraft.

[23]February 29, 1964, p. 782.

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THE SOVIET MILITIA IN THE MISSILE AGE

by Walter C. Clemens, Jr.

WHAT mix of quantity and quality of armaments will enable a modern state to deal with the diverse contingencies along the broad spectrum of national and international conflict? What mix will be economically feasible and least inhibitive to the nation's growth rate? What mix is most conducive to a strong position in arms control negotiations—both as a means of enhancing national security and providing grist for the propaganda mill? Finally, a question of particular importance to communist governments, what mix can best justify the ideological pretensions of the regime?

The relative cost-effectiveness of alternative arms systems is a perennial strategic problem, which becomes increasingly acute as technology advances, as weapons become more expensive, and as ever more possible forms of conflict enter the planner's calculations. The instruments required for various wars — global nuclear, mass conventional, limited nuclear, counterinsurgency —are far from interchangeable. If the communist ruler's problems are complicated by ideology, the Western leader's are magnified by the number of business operations which will fail or prosper depending on his choice of weapons systems.

There has been in recent years increasing recognition that in guerrilla and certain other warfare traditional means of combat are still applicable and even indispensable. But most attention since 1945 has been focused on atomic and missile-type weapons. The exponential increase in the destructive power of modern weaponry has produced profound doubts concerning the utility of the foot soldier. Walter Millis, for example, has questioned the rationale of maintaining large armies and reserves in an age when the decisive blows may be struck in hours or days, when the number of potential "brushfire" wars exceeds our logistic capacity to contain them by conventional forces, and when advanced weaponry cannot be mastered by part-time reservists. Britain, for similar reasons, has disbanded all but two of her

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territorial units, on the ground that two are all that could be mobilized in time to be of use abroad.[1]

The object of this essay, however, is to demonstrate that there are objective factors which could lead the Soviet government to implement what Khrushchev threatened in 1960, namely, the re-establishment of a territorial militia like that which existed in the Soviet Union from 1922 to 1939, parallel with a regular military force.[2] Such a militia, even if not a direct threat to Western security, would still be an additional factor of Soviet power which U.S. planners would be compelled to take into account, particularly as it affected Moscow's capacity to deal with its immediate neighbors in Asia and Europe.

When resources have been scarce and when nations have felt relatively secure, they have naturally leaned toward glorification of the citizen-soldier—the image of Cincinnatus who would drop his hoe for a weapon to repulse the invader. Either to make a virtue of necessity or out of downright conviction, Western thinkers have idealized the citizen militia and fumed against professional standing armies. For the United States the result has usually been virtual unpreparedness when the foe has struck. For Switzerland, on the other hand, the militia has been an effective means of maximizing the number of men trained and equipped to defend their country.[3]

Communist ideologues have also endorsed the militia and—especially before coming to power—railed against standing armies. While for decades the militia atrophied in the United States due to wide apathy and the decentralized responsibilities of the federal system, these problems would not confront a communist regime with totalitarian controls over its human and material resources.

[1]See Walter Millis, *Arms and Men: A Study of American Military History* (New York: Mentor, 1956), pp. 316-19.

[2]For documentation on the Khrushchev statement and the 1922-1939 militia, see Walter C. Clemens, Jr., "Soviet Disarmament Proposals and the Cadre-Territorial Army," ORBIS, Winter 1964.

[3]For background on the militia, see Millis, *op. cit.;* William H. Riker, *Soldiers of the States: The Role of the National Guard in American Democracy* (Washington: Public Affairs Press, 1957); Frederick Martin Stern, *The Citizen Army: Key to Defense in the Atomic Age* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1957); C. Joseph Bernardo and Eugene H. Bacon, *American Military Policy* (Harrisburg, Pennsylvania, 1955); Eric W. Sheppard, *A Short History of the British Army* (London, 1950) (New York, 1951).

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Soviet Strategic Doctrine

The 1962 and 1963 editions of *Military Strategy,* edited by Marshal Sokolovsky,[4] suggest the utilities and disadvantages of a territorial militia as seen by Soviet theorists today. Debate over military strategy in the Soviet Union continues to take Khrushchev's January 14, 1960 speech as its tacit point of departure. This address raised the question of re-establishing a militia but it did so only as a corollary to a more important strategic thesis: that contemporary technology makes it possible to reduce ground forces, naval forces and even air power while increasing firepower through rocket and nuclear weapons. Symbolic of this attitude was Khrushchev's announcement in May 1960 that a fifth branch of the armed forces had been created, the strategic rocket forces.

Western analysts[5] have labeled the supporters of Khrushchev's 1960 thesis as "left, radical, modernist" and the opponents as "rightist, conservative, traditionalist." While the first group holds that modern weaponry implies a reduced role for other arms, the second group argues for adding nuclear-missile capabilities to existing forces rather than replacing the latter. Thus, in addition to a dispute between Khrushchev the politician (with many concerns other than strategic) and the "marshals," there is a dispute *among* the military leaders, which mirrors in part their interservice rivalries and personal ambitions. The debate is still in progress, and Defense Minister Malinovsky himself has been compelled to shift position abruptly on several occasions.[6] But the 1962 and 1963 Sokolovsky volumes indicate that the tentative, semi-official compromise is what may be called "right of center" or "enlightened conservative," although one Soviet reviewer berated the book's overemphasis on nuclear weapons.[7]

The conservative skein which runs through the Sokolovsky tract is that wars are not decided by any "absolute weapon" but

[4]*Voennaia Strategiia* (Moscow: Voennoe izdatel'stvo Ministerstva Oborony SSSR). The 1962 edition appears in two English translations: *Military Strategy* with an introduction by Raymond L. Garthoff (New York: Praeger, 1963) and *Soviet Military Strategy,* fully analyzed and annotated by Herbert S. Dinerstein, Leon Gouré and Thomas W. Wolfe (Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1962). All page citations here are to the Prentice-Hall edition.

[5]See the introductions to the two English translations of the Sokolovsky volume; see also Robert Dickson Crane, editor, *Soviet Nuclear Strategy: A Critical Appraisal* (Washington: The Center for Strategic Studies, 1963), *passim.*

[6]Compare, e.g., his report to the Twenty-second Party Congress, *Izvestiia,* October 25, 1961, and the pamphlet ascribed to him, *Bditel'no stoiat na strazhe mira,* which was sent to press by the Military Publishing House on November 28, 1962.

[7]See General P. Kurochkin, "Critique of Soviet Military Strategy," *Krasnaia Zvezda,* September 22, 1962; translated in Prentice-Hall edition, pp. 523-29.

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by the "combined action of all arms and services." And these services must be combat-ready:

> Massive armed forces, well trained in the use of modern military equipment, will be required from the very first days of the war. . . . Combat operations, employing nuclear weapons extensively, will immediately develop on a tremendous scale, on land, on sea, and in the air. . . . In such conditions, one can hardly count on a more or less extended period, as in previous wars, to mobilize fully and to deploy one's forces. . . .
>
> Troops must be constantly well prepared for action. . . . Their disposition and deployment must ensure the rapid initiation of combat activities. . . . The high combat readiness and combat potential . . . must be maintained in peacetime as well as in wartime.[8]

This would seem to leave little need for a militia or other reserve force. But the book concedes:

> Not even the economically strongest states can today keep their armed forces fully deployed in peacetime. . . . Obviously, the best solution of this problem would be the peacetime maintenance of such armed forces as would be able to secure at least certain proximate strategic war aims, while the remaining echelons were being fully mobilized and put into operation. [Further] whatever types of armed forces exist during peacetime, they cannot solve all the problems of war even by using nuclear weapons. Troops will still have to be mobilized in order to supplement peacetime forces. . . . This [mobilization] apparently will take place partially during the threatening period when international tensions are mounting, and will continue on a full scale during the active military operations of the initial period of the missile and nuclear war.[9]

Thus, even at the risk of rationalizing a cut in regular forces, the conservative voice in the book recognizes the need for reserves. This pragmatic risk may indeed reduce the logical interest of a military "traditionalist" in extensive reserve training.

The utility of reserves and, more specifically, of a territorial force is stressed in one chapter of the Sokolovsky volume, the only part of the book attributed to a particular author. Colonel General A. I. Gastilovich, the book's front-piece tells us, "worked on Chapter 7," entitled "Preparation of a Country to Repel Aggression."[10]

Gastilovich's contribution is identified, perhaps, because it departs from the "right-of-center" line which permeates the book as a whole. His chapter shares Khrushchev's 1960 estimate of the importance of nuclear and rocket weapons. It may not be acci-

[8] Prentice-Hall edition, pp. 338 and 350.
[9] *Ibid.*, p. 339.
[10] The following comments are based on the chapter section "Preparation of the Armed Forces," *ibid.*, especially pp. 432-39.

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dental, therefore, that the single modernist exposition in the Sokolovsky collection seems also to endorse the policy-corollary of Khrushchev's strategic assumptions, i.e., the development of a territorial army to supplement the regular forces. However, Gastilovich fails to clarify whether the territorial army will undergo training in peacetime or be merely a paper organization for wartime mobilization.

To be sure, Gastilovich does not advertise that his views differ from his colleagues', nor, in fact, do they differ on many points. But he does not hesitate to establish priorities for the various military arms, given the pressure of economic scarcities. No state can afford to maintain the peacetime forces capable of achieving "the main objectives of the initial period of a war without additional mobilization." But peacetime forces must be capable in the first few hours of the war of "seizing the strategic initiative and ensuring the attainment of the most immediate strategic objectives."

Within this framework of economic limits and strategic objectives, it is necessary to keep in combat readiness

> strategic forces and weapons of the amount and composition required for attainment of war aims, a nation-wide air defense system, and a certain portion of the other branches of the armed forces: ground troops, naval forces, air forces, and civil defense rescue and rehabilitation troops.

The strength of these numerically larger branches of the armed forces is "increased at the outbreak of the war by mobilization." Some ground forces in border districts and some submarines will be combat-ready in peacetime. "Another portion of these forces has a short mobilization period, enabling them to participate in the initial operations; and finally, a certain portion is kept at reduced strength in peacetime." Gastilovich grants, however, that "in contrast to the covering forces of previous wars, the combat-ready part of the ground forces must in modern conditions be numerically much stronger to be capable of executing its assignments."

The author warns that one cannot easily forecast in peacetime the dimensions of the forces that may be needed in war, but he suggests that in order to meet prevailing needs and the requirements of mobilization, "new formations may be created for subsequent expansion of the armed forces. A significant part of these formations can be brought together through [territorial?] admin-

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istrative arrangements, taking into account existing manpower and material resources."

How does he propose to bring the armed forces up to prescribed strength in peacetime and during mobilization?

> The system of bringing the armed forces up to the prescribed strength in peacetime and during mobilization is an important factor affecting their level of preparation. *A system of territorial build-up of troops during mobilization is considered the most acceptable.* Under the conditions of nuclear war this system considerably speeds up the process of putting one's troops on a war footing. As for a peacetime army, its principal mission of promptly repelling the aggressor and preparing trained reserves for war can only be fulfilled on the basis of cadre formations [which are recruited on an extraterritorial basis].[11] (Emphasis added.)

The most extensive mobilization in wartime would take place in the ground forces and the civil defense forces. The "great losses" and communications disruptions resulting from enemy strikes make it expedient that present-day mobilization be simplified, dispersed and rapid. All these requirements, Gastilovich states, may be achieved by "the territorial method." Thus, troops would be called up, formed and mobilized locally under "military commissariats" with the "fullest possible autonomy." This system would have the added advantage of allowing the replacement in wartime of entire units liquidated in combat with fresh, integrated units (as distinguished from the "casual replacement" method still possible in past wars).

The author does not explain how these new units are suddenly to become combat-ready or even how they will find the transportation to move them to the front. But he indicates that the shorter the term of regular service, the larger the number of trained men discharged into the reserve; that even persons exempt from regular service could receive *ad hoc* military training; and that civilian technical skills are similar to those needed in the military.[12]

Gastilovich's argument contains a fundamental ambiguity. Does he come down for a peacetime territorial army trained in peacetime? Or only for a "territorial build-up" of reserve and other manpower during and after mobilization for war? The thrust of his remarks, in either case, is to downgrade the "balanced" forces

[11]The bracketed words were added in the 1963 edition, a fact which, at the least, suggests that debate has continued over "territorial" forces and could amount to a mild recantation by Gastilovich. For pointing out this addition to the 1963 edition, the author is indebted to Dr. Thomas W. Wolfe.

[12]The foregoing arguments are set out in the Prentice-Hall edition, pp. 432-39.

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advocated by the conservatives and to counsel reliance on advanced weaponry.[13] Gastilovich, it seems, would draw from a reserve—the readiness and training of which are not specified—to provide the conventional forces that might be needed after the first exchanges of a nuclear war.

To sum up, it is manifest from Chapter 7 and from the Sokolovsky book as a whole that Soviet strategists recognize a continuing need for reserve forces in the nuclear age. Such troops must be capable of rapid mobilization in case of an all-out nuclear war, because—although the initial blows may be decisive—the enemy's territory must be occupied and controlled to end the war, a task requiring quantity as well as quality of forces. Further, while Soviet theory continues to stress the dangers of escalation, the Sokolovsky treatise admits that the "armed forces of the socialist countries must be ready for small-scale local wars which the imperialists might initiate. . . ." Hence Soviet strategists are called on to study how to wage, limit and win such conflicts.[14] There is an urgency, it would seem, for Soviet reserves—like American—to be able to fill quickly the ranks of troops dispatched to "local" engagements, e.g., in the Middle East or Southeast Asia.[15]

Because any reserve system might fill this and other requirements set forth in the Sokolovsky volume, it is well to distinguish the territorial militia from other reserve units.[16]

The very word "territorial" denotes a force organized in a

[13]It should be noted, however, that the "rightist" critique cited above in note 7 refers favorably to Chapter 7 and in particular its assertion that "in contrast to the covering forces of previous wars, the combat-ready part of the ground forces must in modern conditions be numerically much stronger to be capable of executing its assignments." (Prentice-Hall edition, p. 433.)

[14]See comments by U.S. editors and page references cited in Prentice-Hall edition, p. 47. See also the illuminating discussion in Crane, *op. cit.*, pp. 27-31.

[15]According to the Institute for Strategic Studies: "The deepening nuclear stalemate between the great powers has given a strategic significance to mobile ground forces. The United States has a Strategic Army Corps of three divisions (two airborne, one infantry) with headquarters in North Carolina. This is under joint Army-Air Force command, and one division is maintained in a high state of readiness. The British strategic reserve consists of one division of two infantry brigades and one paratroop brigade based in Southern England. France is developing a 'force d'intervention' of one division. Canada has one brigade designed for such a role. . . . The [U.S.] Army Reserve contains 274,500 men and the Army National Guard 375,500. They will provide: (1) 6 divisions, 11 brigades and the units needed to round out the active Army within eight weeks of mobilization; (2) 2 theatre reinforcement divisions for Alaska and Panama with four to twelve weeks readiness; (3) 21 divisions and other non-divisional units to be ready within 24 to 36 weeks. (*The Military Balance: 1963-1964* [London, 1963], pp. 13, 23.)

[16]For the particular application of the word "territorial" to the Soviet militia, 1922-1939, see Clemens, *loc. cit.*, note 14. For additional references on reserve forces, see above, note 3.

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geographical area—according to states in the case of the U.S. National Guard. Militias are often responsible, at least in the first instance, to local authorities, who—like U.S. state governors or Party leaders on Chinese communes—are political rather than military officials. These qualities reflect the fact that militias have most often been thought of as defensive forces, meant to serve a short term in case of enemy attack, although Lenin and Frunze stressed also their offensive capabilities. For Greek city-states, republican Rome, feudal systems of the Middle Ages, modern democracies and communist ideologues, service in a militia has been thought of as a duty and even as a right which the citizen exercises as part of his organic relationship to his society. Therefore militia service has usually been voluntary throughout history, although conscription or its threat has been used increasingly in various countries since about 1870.

In contrast, while their training and capacity for mobilization may vary widely, reserve forces are thought of as an extension of the regular standing army, obligated to the central government and its military staff, subject to longer tours of duty than militias, eligible for attack as well as defense, and serving as mercenaries or conscripts rather than as volunteers.

The militia, in short, is viewed as more "popular" than a "professional" army or its reserve. Its members are "citizens first," and soldiers only in emergencies. Nevertheless, the distinctions between militias and other reserves are not rigid. It is also evident that certain militias, such as the Swiss, are better armed, trained and combat-ready than the "regular" reserves of many other countries. A militia, obviously, can be poorly financed and organized, as in the United States throughout most of the nineteenth century; or it can be well-prepared like the Swiss; or part of it can be highly qualified while another, probably the larger and older elements, may exist only as a paper organization.[17]

The Soviet reserve is reported to include men up to age 50. Soviet law provides that military service is a duty and that no citizens from 16 to 50 may refuse this obligation. Following his

[17]George Washington's proposal after the Revolutionary War for a militia organized like the Swiss suggested that there be a front-line corps "always to be held in readiness for service" composed of men aged 18 to 25, while older men would form a reserve. (See Millis, *op. cit.*, pp. 38-39.) Somewhat similarly, a U.S. law of 1933 specified that the portions of the National Guard which passed inspections by national officers would be supported financially by the federal government and liable as units for federal service; other units would receive no federal aid, but could function as state militia. China's present militia is divided into a first and second line (see below p. 103).

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period of active service, the Soviet conscript enters the reserve. Until his 35th birthday, he serves in Class 1 Reserve, and during this time he is called up six times for periods of training, each lasting two months, or, if he is an NCO, three months. From age 35 to 45, the Soviet citizen is placed in Class 2 Reserve, which involves five periods of training, each of one month's duration. In Class 3, from age 45 to 50 he is called up only once, for one month's training. Call-up and demobilization take place in the autumn of each year.[18]

A territorial militia, linked with a given locality and disciplined by a totalitarian regime, might well train more frequently than the pattern described for the Soviet reserve.[19] Why then the apparent resistance of Soviet "traditionalist" strategists to the militia? Why should they not welcome any device that would maximize both pre- and post-induction military training? The Soviet marshals' objections to a militia might be due to: (1) its local autonomy, even though it is military rather than political—a danger suggested by Gastilovich's insistence on the "fullest possible autonomy" for local military commissariats "enabling them to form units independently"; (2) the common association of amateurism with militias, even though they might train more than the present Soviet reserve; (3) the possible exhaustion of the militia in *corvée* labor to the degree that its fighting ability was slighted and impaired; and (4) underlying all these fears, the suspicion that the "modernists" in government do not take the militia seriously but will use it to justify greater cuts in military power and spending than they could otherwise secure.

Expediency and Practice

Despite the apparent reluctance of at least some military leaders to accept the idea of a reactivated militia, the economic, military, political and ideological problems of the Soviet regime appear to be moving the Kremlin increasingly toward the creation of such a force. A territorial army could prove particularly effective in carrying out six major tasks, which are now performed, to some degree, by similar institutions.

First, a reduction of regular forces and their absorption in a militia or other reserve would free scarce human and material

[18]See J. Malcolm Mackintosh, "The Soviet Soldiers' Conditions of Service," in B. H. Liddell Hart, editor, *The Soviet Army* (London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1956), p. 408.

[19]For the training program of the interwar Soviet territorial army, see Clemens, *loc. cit.,* note 14.

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resources for productive enterprises. A territorial army, organized close to the place of work of its members and in a particular territory, would be uniquely effective in instilling labor discipline and providing, where necessary, *corvée* labor. These functions may well grow in importance as the Kremlin grapples with "parasitism," high labor turnover, and the recruiting of workers for the Far East and northern regions.[20]

Second, the formation of a territorial army, organized close to the place of work, would reinforce the trend toward organizing the USSR into economic and, to some extent, military regions. Since 1957, and even more since 1961, economic planning has been done on the basis of regions, now eighteen in number, many of which cut across Republic frontiers. While this organization of the USSR is based on regional specialization, its purpose is to improve the economic integration and balance within each region so as to reduce bottlenecks and scarcities.[21]

The eighteen economic regions correspond in part to the country's eighteen military districts, and this alignment may become closer. The need to coordinate military and economic activities and planning is given great weight in Colonel General Gastilovich's chapter in the Sokolovsky volume. Every link in

[20]The Soviet government, in that case, would be following a practice increasingly used by China and Cuba. See, e.g., *New York Times,* March 31, 1964, p. 10.

Moscow is confronted with a manpower shortage arising from the deaths, the low birthrate and high infant mortality of 1941-1947, a problem which led in 1962 to reducing the age for compulsory registration from 18 to 17. (See *The Military Balance, op. cit.,* p. 3.)

Moscow must also come to grips with the many economic weaknesses that have become increasingly evident in the Soviet economy in recent years. In the words of economist John B. Hardt:

"The pressure for modernizing certain elements of Soviet industry, transportation, and agriculture apparently may no longer be postponed without running the risk of retardation of the economic development of the U.S.S.R. Likewise, substantial quantitative and qualitative improvements in Soviet living conditions apparently can no longer be deferred without serious consequences."

Hardt concludes that "if these pressures continue to be recognized by the Soviet leadership, the implementation of a substantially increased military budget does not seem likely." This, however, does not mean that the Kremlin will cut conventional forces to build up its nuclear and space effort, for the skills and resources employed in the former may not be easily transferred to the latter, at least in the short run. Further, as the recent Sokolovsky volume indicates, the supporters of ground forces seem to retain the upper hand in current strategic debate. (Hardt's comments in Crane, *op. cit.,* pp. 18-19.)

[21]See *Ekonomicheskaia gazeta,* October 19, 1963, pp. 12-13; for maps and texts of relevant documents, see *Current Digest of the Soviet Press,* March 20, 1963, pp. 3-6 and November 13, 1963, pp. 3-6, 18. For maps and charts showing the overlap between the 18 economic regions and 18 military districts, see N. Galay, "The Economic and Military Division of the U.S.S.R.," *Bulletin* (Munich: Institute for the Study of the U.S.S.R.), December 1962, pp. 27-36. For pointing out the possible relevance of the military and economic regions, the author is indebted to John H. Hoagland.

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the chain of military supply, he suggests, from production through deployment and use, should be found within a given region in a "planned economy." The concomitant to wide dispersal of targets is a high degree of local self-sufficiency. Therefore industry should be self-contained, almost autarkic within a given economic region. This reduces problems of transport, assembly and supply, thereby accelerating "production and industrial mobilization" and assuring "a steady flow of supplies to the armed forces in case of war."[22]

Third, a militia could assist in patrolling the Soviet-Chinese frontier, while at the same time helping to settle and cultivate Soviet Asia. Moscow's nuclear advantage over Peking makes it unnecessary for the Kremlin to attempt to match China man-for-man along the Sino-Soviet frontier. The Institute for Strategic Studies observes: "Apart from 17 Soviet divisions in the Far East, troops already in Central Asia, and a few detachments beyond Lake Baikal, the Soviet Union has no military formations, other than border guards, along its border with China." Although "there might be military pressure for a reactivation of the cadre divisions in the Soviet Union, and a reorganization of naval and air defense," the Institute "doubts that this policy will be put into effect" or that there will be "any shift of forces from Europe or European Russia" to Soviet Asia.[23] Given some other means, nonetheless, the Kremlin would surely prefer to fill in a power vacuum which might tempt Chinese incursions rather than attempt to halt these incursions after they had begun—an effort which would involve a shift of regular forces eastward and the risk of escalation.

A movement toward something like a territorial militia is suggested by a *Kazakhstanskaia Pravda* report that volunteer guards are being mobilized to guard the Soviet Central Asian frontier with China. Civilian volunteers, described as "second-line soldiers," together with farmers and young communists are said already to "have detained and rendered harmless not a few enemy infiltrators." Plans have been laid to "form a staff of liaison

[22]Prentice-Hall edition, pp. 450-51. For a note on military maneuvers within the Belorussian Military District, see ". . . I samolet vzletel bystree," *Krasnaia Zvezda,* September 20, 1963.

[23]*The Military Balance, op. cit.,* pp. 2-3.

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officers from among the voluntary guards to undertake measures to strengthen passport controls in border zones."[24]

Evidence that the first three functions may be of increasing importance to Soviet decision-makers is provided by recent reports that hundreds of demobilized Soviet soldiers have arrived en masse at Central Asian cities where they were "welcomed" as the builders of certain new plants.

Fourth, a territorial militia could be used to broaden or perhaps even to help coordinate civil defense in the Soviet Union. The Sokolovsky volume's treatment of civil defense, interestingly enough, is left to the same Colonel General Gastilovich who stresses, more than his colleagues, the significance of nuclear-rocket forces and suggests a "territorial build-up" of reserves. Gastilovich's concern for civil defense, however, would not seem to be markedly "leftist," as witnessed by the endorsement, in May 1962, by the Communist Party Central Committee of *DOSAAF's* efforts in this field.[25] Such activity will probably intensify if, as Moscow claims, progress is being made toward anti-ballistic missile capabilities.

Although Gastilovich does not mention "territorial forces" in his discussion of civil defense, his presentation suggests a number of contributions which they could make. (1) Soviet civil defense, according to Gastilovich,[26] is centrally directed by the All-Union Civil Defense Headquarters. It has republic, provincial and municipal headquarters, to which are subordinated medical, food supply and other services. While many civil defense measures are centrally organized by the Civil Defense

[24]Article by Col. D. Suvorov in *Kazakhstanskaia Pravda,* January 14, 1964, as reported in the *Washington Post and Times Herald,* January 15, 1964, p. A12. The situation appears to be confused by the large number of refugees from China's Sinkiang province among whom may be "enemy infiltrators." "Beginning with 1960," according to a Soviet government statement, "Chinese servicemen and civilians have been systematically violating the Soviet border. In the single year of 1962, more than 5,000 violations of the Soviet border from the Chinese side were registered. Attempts are also being made to 'develop' some parts of Soviet territory without permission." From Part III of statement printed in *Pravda,* September 21 and 22, 1963. For the origins of the volunteer guards in 1961 and their subsequent functions, see *New York Times,* November 17, 1963, p. 13.

[25]See *Pravda,* May 22 and 23, 1962, and Leon Gouré, *The Resolution of the Soviet Controversy Over Civil Defense* (Santa Monica: The RAND Corporation, RM-3223-PR, June 1962). Cf. also the recent article by Marshal Chuikov in *Voennie Znaniia,* published by *DOSAAF,* calling for the construction of fall-out shelters to protect the Soviet population against attack and for wide instruction in the means of protecting exposed parts of the body. Cited in the *New York Times,* January 17, 1964, p. 3. *DOSAAF* stands for the paramilitary organization *Dobrovol'noe obshchestvo sodeistviia armii, aviatsii i flotu* (literally: Voluntary Society for Assistance to the Army, Airforce and Navy).

[26]Prentice-Hall edition, pp. 461-63.

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Headquarters and other ministries and departments, other measures are decentralized in cities, industrial plants and institutions. Indeed, the staffs of the local civil defense headquarters "organize their own centers of command." Rescue and rehabilitation detachments must have their own vehicles, so as to travel considerable distances under their own power. Civil defense troops must be stationed at a proper distance from large cities and industrial targets so as to enable them to carry out their missions. (2) The anti-aircraft organization *Protivovozdushnaia Obornona (PVO)*, under the Ministry of Defense, must warn the civil defense agencies of enemy attack, so they may warn the population. (3) Gastilovich sees a need for general military training of the population, not only to replenish the armed forces during a war but also to be employed in organized combat against spies, to carry out sabotage against small enemy air and naval landings, and to carry on partisan operations in case of major invasions of Soviet territory. The population, Gastilovich goes on, "should understand as much as possible about modern infantry weapons, anti-tank weapons, and other military equipment." It should have "some information" about the enemy's methods of operation and should have instruction in how to protect itself against weapons of mass destruction. As if to stump for more Soviet civil defense, Gastilovich states that the United States and Britain have civil defense organizations which "directly supervise numerous practice atomic alerts, prepare a large system of antinuclear shelters, and are in charge of the military training of the population."[27]

Clearly, the establishment of a territorial militia could facilitate and provide support to the present activities of *PVO, DOSAAF* and the Civil Defense Headquarters. To absorb their functions in a militia, however, might place too many special responsibilities under one roof. Already it is recognized that "civil defense represents the sum of very diverse measures whose execution, in different degrees, is the duty of all Party, Soviet, and economic agencies."[28] On the other hand, given the occasional Soviet pen-

[27]The exact size of Soviet civil defense organizations is unknown, but Khrushchev is reported to have claimed that 10 per cent of the Soviet population has been trained in civil defense, and that an additional five million persons are trained each year. The paramilitary organization *DOSAAF* is believed to number more than 30 million members. It aims to "attract the majority of the adult population to become members of the society." A 1941 law making every Soviet citizen liable to civil defense training is still in force. See Gouré, *op. cit.*, pp. 17-18, 33-34.

[28]Prentice-Hall edition, p. 462.

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chant for central organization, all aspects of civil defense might indeed be placed in one organization.

A *fifth* function of a territorial army would be to contribute to internal order. This task, since 1959, has increasingly become the responsibility of "non-governmental, social" agencies—the People's Police, the Comrade's Courts, and others. These organizations, Khrushchev told the Twenty-first Party Congress, "possess no less scope, facilities and power" than the regular police and courts.[29] The Congress resolution on Khrushchev's speech affirmed that "many functions now being performed by state organs are to pass gradually into the competence of social organizations" which "are to perform the functions of guardians of order and the rights of citizens *alongside* the state organs. . . ." (Emphasis added.) These transfers, plus the enhancement of the soviets as mass organizations, are to constitute the "all-round development of society."[30] Might not a territorial militia, parallel with the regular army, contribute to this image of "social" and "state" institutions?

In addition to the interwar territorial army, both the regular and the volunteer Soviet police are termed "militia." The volunteer or "People's" Police (*Narodnaia Druzhina*) have recently been reactivated. A decree of the Central Committee and the Council of Ministers "On Participation of Workers in the Maintenance of Public Order," formalized the militia's role early in 1959. A membership of over 2.5 million members was claimed for the people's militia in 1960—almost the size which Khrushchev predicted (in January 1960) the regular armed forces would reach in 1962. Whole factory units and labor brigades were enlisted in what was intended to be a mass movement.[31]

[29] *Vneocherednoi XXI s"ezd kommunsticheskoi partii sovetskogo soiuza: stenograficheskii otchet* (Moscow, 1959), I, p. 104.

[30] *Ibid.*, I, p. 445. For further analysis, see Solomon M. Schwarz, "Is the State Withering Away in the USSR?" in Leonard Schapiro, editor, *The U.S.S.R. and the Future: An Analysis of the New Program of the CPSU* (New York: Praeger, 1962), pp. 161-78.

[31] For documentation, see Herbert Ritvo, "Totalitarianism Without Coercion?", *Problems of Communism*, November-December 1960, pp. 23-24.

According to the late Mr. Ritvo, the *druzhiny* are "the direct descendants of the *brigadmils* formed in the early 1930's to aid in the collectivization drive. Discredited as a result of their collaboration with the police and the NKVD during the purge period, the *brigadmils* died out almost completely until late 1956, when the idea of using them was revived in connection with the renewed 'struggle against antisocial elements.' The start of the present country-wide mobilization is credited to the initiative of a 'workers' militia group' in Leningrad in November 1958." (*Ibid.*)

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A decree of the Presidium of the USSR Supreme Soviet on September 27, 1962, sought to improve the prestige of the regular police by establishing a "Day of the Soviet Militia," to be celebrated annually on November 10. The celebration in 1962 marked the forty-fifth anniversary of the founding of the Soviet (police) militia in 1917, three days after the Bolsheviks came to power. Soviet pronouncements concerning the anniversary have tended to identify the police militia with the "all-popular" army which Lenin – before the November Revolution – said should replace standing armies, gendarmes of reaction.[32]

The police militia has been urged to collaborate with the masses and with the Communist Party, the Komsomol, the courts and other organizations in preserving order.

> The activity of the volunteer *Narodnaia Druzhina* is now receiving wide development in the country. Together with the [police] militia, the organs of the procurator's office, and the courts, [the *Narodnaia Druzhina*] carries out functions to prevent criminal behavior and to guard public order. Close cooperation of the organs of state power, volunteer [*samodeiatelnykh*] organizations of workers and of all Soviet society is an indispensable condition for the successful struggle for the removal of all criminal activities.[33]

The blurring and broadening of responsibilities for internal order reached its logical conclusion in Khrushchev's declaration in 1963 that it is the "duty of every citizen, figuratively speaking, to feel himself a militiaman, that is, a person who stands on guard to

For recent moves to strengthen the powers of the Comrade's Courts, see "On Introducing Additions and Amendments to the Statute on Comrade's Courts," Decree of Presidium of Russian Republic Supreme Soviet, *Vedemosti Verkhovnogo Soveta RSFSR,* October 31, 1963, pp. 843-63, cited in *Current Digest of the Soviet Press,* December 18, 1963, pp. 9-10.

For additional material on the volunteer police, see N. P. Iablokov, *Narodnye druzhiny na strazhe obshchestvennogo poriadka* (Moscow: Gosiurizdat, 1963); G. Rusov, *Povest' o druzhinnikakh* (Moscow: Znanie, 1963).

[32]*Pravda,* September 27, 1962, p. 1; TASS International in Russian, November 12, 1963; *Kalendar' znamenatel'nykh i pamiatnykh dat,* November 1963, pp. 15-18. Compare with material on Lenin's views in Clemens, *loc. cit.* See also N. Sizonov, "Liudi v sinikh shineliakh," *Oktiabr',* II (1962), pp. 145-49.

The announcement of the "Day of the Soviet Militia" also noted that the Presidiums of the Union-Republic Supreme Soviets had transferred the tasks of their Ministries of Internal Affairs to "Ministries for the Guarding [*Okhrany*] of Public Order," thus bringing "the name of the ministries into agreement with the functions" they perform. The same announcement stated that the Central Committee and USSR Council of Ministers had decreed the militia should operate to strengthen socialist legality; should have a close tie with society; and should be given an improved technical and transportation base. Instead of being ignored or presented in a distorted fashion in literature, the police militia would now be honored in the press and in film. While enjoying its rights, however, the militia was warned that it should be answerable to complaints, and that it should establish a close tie with society (*Pravda,* September 27, 1962, p. 1).

[33]*Pravda,* September 27, 1962, p. 1.

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preserve public order, on guard to defend the riches of society."[34]

While the upgrading of the regular police and spread of police powers to "mass organizations" are justified in ideological terms, there can be no doubt that these steps are intended to facilitate law enforcement. The need for even more effective machinery for maintaining internal order is suggested still more acutely in the 1963 regulation on garrison and guard duties in the Soviet armed forces which replaced the rules in effect since 1950.[35] The new rules enlarge the territory covered by each garrison so as to include all nearby military institutions and population centers. The powers of the post commanding officer are also broadened. Thus garrison commanders are to make mobilization plans, "muster units to be on battle alert, arrange anti-aircraft defense. . . , plan for local defense of military installations and . . . render assistance to the civil defense commander and his staff."

Many of the new measures seem to aim at adapting Soviet armed forces to the demands of modern warfare, such as Gastilovich describes during the initial phase of a nuclear war, and improving military discipline. But taken as a whole, the rules show a major concern to improve the military's ability to deal with disturbances, such as the workers' riots reported at Novocherkassk and elsewhere in 1962. Marshal Chuikov states:

> The Regulations give an armed patrol the right to resort to arms in defense of military personnel and, when necessary, of civilians from assaults constituting a threat to their life; in order to repulse attacks on a patrol [the members of which are to be, among other things, "physically well-developed"]; when the life of the patrol commander or of patrol members is exposed to immediate danger; in detaining a criminal who offers armed resistance; in detaining a criminal who escapes while under arrest.[36]

It is no surprise, then, that the regulations enjoin the deputy garrison commander to maintain "close contacts with [police] militia organs and with headquarters of urban voluntary militia

[34]N. S. Khrushchev, *Vse reservy promyshlennosti i stroitel'stva—na sluzhbu kommunizma!* (Moscow, 1963), p. 9.

[35]Information on the regulations has become available only as they are discussed in a long article by Marshal V. I. Chuikov, Commander-in-Chief of Soviet land forces, which appeared in *Krasnaia Zvezda*, October 8, 1963, pp. 2-3. Much of the following analysis is based on Nikolai Y. Galay, "The Significance of the New Regulations Concerning Soviet Garrison Troops," *Analysis of Current Developments in the Soviet Union* (Munich: Institute for the Study of the U.S.S.R., No. 10, 1963/64).

[36]Many of the new rules, however, focus on limiting the use of arms, especially in crowded areas, recommending instead reliance on bayonets and riflebutts. Whether the rules aim more at curbing military or civilian excesses, they imply a serious concern over internal disorders.

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squads [*druzhiny*]." This despite the assurance of the new Program adopted by the Communist Party in 1961 that, "in terms of internal conditions, the Soviet Union needs no army."[37]

With regard to the maintenance of internal order, as in the case of civil defense, there is already a proliferation of state and "mass" organizations which a territorial militia might help to coordinate or unify. Here, however, Mikhail Frunze's 1922 caveat still applies: Without the proper organization of the masses by agitation, a territorial militia might be so lacking in discipline and a common will as to be counterrevolutionary.[38] Certainly one would not expect in the USSR, as in Switzerland, that militiamen would keep their weapons in readiness at home.[39]

Sixth, a militia would serve propaganda and ideological functions important to the Kremlin leadership. The emphasis since the Twenty-first Party Congress on transferring "state" functions to "mass" organizations is clearly an attempt to uphold Soviet claims to ideological leadership of the communist camp.[40] Although the Communist Party dominates the "social" organizations as it did the state bureaucracies, the transfer of functions is represented in the 1961 Soviet Party Program as a "still greater development of democracy" and as a "withering away" of the state.[41]

Khrushchev's suggestion in January 1960 that discharged troops be absorbed in a territorial militia may have been part of the broad program since 1959 to develop certain mass organizations as a partial fulfillment of communist ideals. As observed earlier,

[37]See Part II, Chapter III, Section 3, of the Program, given, e.g., in Schapiro, *op. cit.,* pp. 254-312.

[38]See Clemens, *loc. cit.,* note 37.

[39]See the statement of a senior Chinese Communist Party leader who, in a single address, first bragged that only a country in which the people are masters dares to give arms to the masses, and then called for a reorganization of the Chinese militia to assure that weapons are issued to those who are politically reliable. (Huang Huo-ch'ing, *Liaoning Jih-pao,* February 27, 1960, quoted in *Survey of the Chinese Mainland Press,* April 12, 1960, pp. 13, 15, and cited in Ralph L. Powell, "Everyone a Soldier: The Communist Chinese Militia," *Foreign Affairs,* October 1960, p. 105.

[40]True, Khruschchev announced as early as November 1957, the impending entry of the USSR into a new stage of communist construction. The call for the Twenty-first Soviet Party Congress of the "builders of communism," which met in February 1959, was issued on September 5, 1958—one week after the Chinese commune program was adopted in Peking but before it was made public. The Twenty-first Soviet Congress, in the words of a close student of Sino-Soviet affairs, was "convoked in large measure because Khrushchev believed that he had to reply to the Chinese challenge [of moving rapidly toward communist forms] in the highest forum available to him." For documentation, see Donald S. Zagoria, *The Sino-Soviet Conflict* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1962), p. 109.

[41]See Part II, Chapter III, Sections 1-3, of the Program.

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Soviet military leaders seemed cool to Khrushchev's proposal and nothing came of it. But the 1961 Party Program stated that the Party would "promote in every way the further development of voluntary mass defense organizations." The Program warned, however, that the complete withering away of the state could not take place before "the victory and consolidation of socialism in the world arena."[42] The 1961 Program did not comment on the promise of the 1919 Party Program that "with the abolition of classes" the Red Army would be transformed into a "national socialist militia."[43]

In addition to providing "evidence" that the Soviet Union is serious about the withering away of the state, a recreated territorial militia would provide propaganda about a "people's army" which Khrushchev could contrast, as Lenin once did, with the "standing armies" of capitalist states.[44] The patriotism of the Soviet people could then be more convincingly extolled, along with the morale and other qualities central to the "permanently operating factors" doctrine which is still influential in Soviet military thinking.

The Militia in a Disarming World

In addition to the six functions described, a territorial army would probably strengthen Moscow's strategic and bargaining posture in disarmament negotiations, and give Moscow a military advantage should an agreement on force reductions be reached. In the interwar period, Moscow's transfer of regular forces to a militia reached the point where the "territorial" army became larger than the "cadre."[45] These reductions in the regular army were keyed to Soviet proposals that other states cut their forces in like proportion. When they refused, the Kremlin announced that, as a gesture of its peace-loving policy, it would

[42] *Ibid.*, Section 4.

[43] The 1919 Program is also in Schapiro, *op. cit.;* see p. 318.

[44] In Stalin's last years, however, the "militia army" of the 1923-1939 period was given short shrift in the *Large Soviet Encyclopedia,* which wrote it off as a temporary expedient, and with no comment on its ideological significance. After 1939, the *Encyclopedia* states, "in connection with the significant enlargement of the economic resources of the socialist state and the growth of the war danger, the U.S.S.R. Armed Forces went over entirely to the cadre system of recruitment. . . ." *Bol'shaia sovetskaia entsikopediia* (second edition; Moscow, 1954), pp. 483-84.

The same publication affirms that the (police) militia, formed on November 10, 1917, is an organ of the dictatorship of the proletariat to protect revolutionary order and public security—a far cry from the body which is now to cooperate with mass organizations and to be beyond reproach.

[45] See Clemens, *loc. cit.*

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unilaterally reduce the Red Army. Then, as now, Moscow could rely on its superior ability and greater need, compared to the West, to create a broad program of paramilitary training.

The creation of a Soviet territorial militia would add to the strategic problems confronting the West in the various arms control proposals now under consideration. Conflicting estimates over the years concerning the number and strength of Soviet divisions reflect, *inter alia,* a lack of precise information about the existing reserve system in the USSR and its ability rapidly to flesh out cadre units. If Moscow were to develop a territorial army which trained regularly and enjoyed a certain amount of local autonomy, the Soviet capacity for rapid mobilization of the civilian population would increase still more relative to the West. Any thinning out of forces in Central Europe would redound to the relative advantage of whatever country could train and remobilize these men most efficiently. The need for observation posts would grow because of differential mobilization rates and patterns. Static posts, however, might be unable to detect a territorial build-up, thus adding to the need for mobile inspection teams.[46]

Neither the current U.S. nor the Soviet proposals for General and Complete Disarmament (GCD) seem to restrict military training of civilians in the first stage of the treaty.[47] In Stage II of the U.S. proposal "agreed limitations consistent with retained force levels would be placed on military training, and on refresher training for reserve forces of the Parties to the Treaty." By Stage III, however, the proposals of both Washington and Moscow

[46]As Dr. Morton Gorden has pointed out to the author, even the distinction between countercity and counterforce strikes might be altered by the existence of a territorial army.

[47]For an analysis of League of Nations plans for the limitation of "average daily effectives," paramilitary and other reserves, see Philip Noel-Baker, *The Arms Race* (New York: Oceana, 1958), pp. 473-81.

The following analysis is based on the U.S. "Outline of Basic Provisions of a Treaty on General and Complete Disarmament in a Peaceful World," presented to the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament on April 18, 1962, and the Soviet draft Treaty on General and Complete Disarmament under Strict International Control, presented to the United Nations on September 22, 1962. Both documents appear, e.g., in Seymour Melman, editor, *Disarmament: Its Politics and Economics* (Boston: The American Academy of Arts and Sciences, 1962), pp. 279-331. This analysis also takes account of Foreign Minister Gromyko's statement to the General Assembly on September 19, 1963, modifying the Soviet draft to the extent "that limited contingents of intercontinental, antimissile and antiaircraft missiles should remain at the disposal of the U.S.S.R. and the United States in their own territories not only until the end of the second stage, but also until the end of the third stage, i.e., until the completion of the whole process of general and complete disarmament." Text, e.g., in *Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists,* November 1963, p. 43.

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would abolish all national military institutions except whatever forces were agreed on as being necessary for internal security and fulfillment of obligations under the UN Charter. This force, interestingly enough, is termed in the Soviet draft "police (*militia*) [*politsiia (militsiia)*]."

If the freedom of a state to carry on paramilitary training is not considered a factor of enough military significance as to require restrictions during Stage I, then severe limitations must be imposed in Stage II and Stage III of GCD. This is true not only because of the manpower potential available to Moscow, but even more because of Peking's ability to train and mobilize huge numbers of its "civilian" population.

Chinese sources stated that by late 1958 the militia organized as part of the "Great Leap Forward" numbered 30 million, although only 4 million had practiced marksmanship with live ammunition. More recent information suggests that the militia's "first-line" numbers 10 to 15 million men, but even these are too lightly and poorly armed to be used as light infantry. One estimate indicates that the militia program, if fully implemented, could give some basic training to 120 million young men and women, while another 180 million persons could receive an elementary conception of discipline and military organization.[48] Roughly 3½ per cent of the adult male population consists of demobilized regulars of the People's Liberation Army, who—obligated to serve in the reserve until age 40—provide cadres for the militia.[49]

Although China's regular army—not to speak of her militia—is not now an imposing force compared with those of NATO and the Warsaw Pact, China can still move with considerable impunity against her Asian neighbors unless they are reinforced by the West. If the major powers, including China, and the rest

[48]See Powell, "Everyone a Soldier: The Communist Chinese Militia," *loc. cit.*, pp. 100-111. For other sources on the Chinese militia, see, e.g., Sen Ming Chiu, "The Chinese Communist Army in Transition," *Far Eastern Survey,* November 1958, pp. 168-75; James E. Garvey, *Marxist-Leninist China: Military and Social Doctrine* (New York: Exposition Press, 1960); J. Clement Lapp, *Tensions in Communist China,* published as 86th Congress, 1st Session, Senate, Document No. 66 (Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1960); Allan Nanes, "The Armies of Red China," *Current History,* December 1960, pp. 338-42.

[49]Barton Whaley, *A Study of Word-of-Mouth Communication in the Chinese Communist Army* (Washington: Special Operations Research Office, The American University, 1961), Annex V, p. 16. Peking's continued infatuation with the militia is suggested by the publication in China's leading newspapers on January 4, 1964 of a new poem by Mao Tse-tung, entitled "Inscription for the Portrait of a Militia Woman." (*Peking Review,* January 10, 1964, p. 3.)

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of the world are ever to work out a mutually acceptable first stage of GCD, then not only must the industrialized states be called on to lay down some of their advanced weaponry, but means must also be found to neutralize the Soviet Union's and China's manpower advantages. While individual states and, eventually, UN forces may have to rely on nuclear retaliation to ensure the peace, it would be preferable to lessen this reliance by placing rigid limits on the military training of civilians as early as Stage I, or at least by Stage II.

When a small, "have" nation like Switzerland trains and equips each citizen for military service, the conditions for peace become stronger; when a large, "have-not" state carries out universal military training, the reverse is true.

Conclusions

A territorial army, then, could help Moscow in dealing with problems of the state economy, frontier patrol, civil defense and ideological justification of the regime. If sufficiently trained, it could provide the reserves required to replace regular forces dispatched to "local" wars or to persevere in a protracted, "broken back" war.[50]

A U.S. intelligence officer, Robert A. Kilmarx, has forecast a number of complementary trends in Soviet military planning which, it would seem, point to additional pressures for the re-establishment of a territorial or other form of reserve army. Reductions in ground forces are expected to continue, while strategic arms, especially rocket forces, are considerably augmented. Closer command and organizational links are anticipated between offense and defense (including *PVO*), between Long Range Aviation and Strategic Rocket Forces, and even between Soviet, satellite and nonsocialist friendly forces abroad. These and other changes will be "conditioned in largest measure by the outcome of the internal political/economic debate and maneuvering and by future U.S. weapons and force programs."

We can also expect the Soviets to give more attention to improvements in mobilization potentials, to increase their capabilities to augment their forces during a period of threat. This requires a reinvigoration of their

[50]See comments by Stefan T. Possony in Crane, *op. cit.*, p. 79; also J. M. Mackintosh, *Strategy and Tactics of Soviet Foreign Policy* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1963), Chapter XXII, together with its review by John A. Armstrong in the *American Political Science Review*, September 1963, pp. 734-35.

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reserve programs, based on more intensive training and new organizational forms.[51]

Despite the potential uses of a territorial militia, such a force is resisted by conservative strategists who have the upper hand in Moscow. The functions a militia might serve are supplementary or tangential to the requirements of technologically advanced warfare; its actual fighting capacity, when mobilized, is probably inferior to that of regular forces. The military, therefore, will tend to oppose the creation of territorial forces, especially if their formation provides a pretext for greater cuts in regular forces than would otherwise take place, or if it leads to a diversion of funds from regular to militia forces.[52] There would seem to be, nevertheless, a strong prospect for the creation in the USSR of a territorial militia—if not on the interwar model then *mutatis mutandis*—to deal with the internal, bloc and foreign problems of the Kremlin and the inertia of "conservative" marshals.

The result is a paradox: The militia is backed by Soviet modernists who stress the significance of the nuclear weapons Moscow has acquired, and by Chinese leaders who scoff at nuclear weapons while striving covertly to obtain them. The political leaders in both cases feel relatively secure strategically and seek greater economies. If the economic pressures on Moscow and Peking persist or increase, their political leaders may be expected to show still greater interest in the militia as a cheap and even productive instrument of security policy.

If Moscow should reinstitute a territorial militia or Peking better train its present militia, these would be additional power factors in the communist arsenal which the West would have to take into account, with or without disarmament.

[51]Comments by Robert A. Kilmarx in Crane, *op. cit.*, pp. 75-76. *Pravda,* December 17, 1963, suggested that in addition to the planned reduction in defense expenditures, a cut in the size of Soviet armed forces is under consideration.

[52]Active discussion of territorial forces is taking place in Europe. See, e.g., Alastair Buchan and Philip Windsor, *Arms and Stability in Europe* (New York: Praeger, 1963); *Auf Dich Kommt Es An: Die Landesverteidigung in den kleinen Staaten Europas,* edited by Hans Vetter and Helmut Bohn (Frauenfeld, Switzerland: Huber & Company, and Cologne: Markus Verlag, 1961). For suggestions on these matters, the author is grateful to Harald B. Malmgren, Head, Economics Group, Institute for Defense Analyses.

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IDEOLOGY AND ORGANIZATION IN COUNTERINSURGENCY*

by Eugene H. Methvin

U.S. foreign policy is beset by no problem more exasperating and urgent than the development of an adequate counter-insurgency doctrine to cope with communist-sponsored or -supported "wars of national liberation." Counterinsurgency is not only, or even primarily, a military problem. Civilian and military officials of the U.S. government maintain that U.S. and South Vietnamese armed forces trained in anti-guerrilla tactics can, at the least, fight the Viet Cong to a military standstill, but concede that the enemy is beating us with psycho-political operations at the "grassroots" level. With Cuba and Zanzibar turning into unsinkable schoolhouses of subversion, and Khrushchev continuing to espouse his wars of liberation doctrine, this U.S. doctrinal deficiency is going to become an increasingly critical problem in Latin America and Africa, as well as Asia.

The situation is not changed in the least by President Johnson's announcement[1] that the U.S. Army has 344 guerrilla "teams" working in forty-nine countries to train the local military in the "most advanced techniques of internal defense" against subversive war. For as the chief of the Research Branch in counter-insurgency action of the U.S. Army School Europe (Oberammergau, Germany), recently told Congress: "The Army cannot solve the problem by itself. We have neither the know-how nor the doctrine for the type of organization necessary to respond effectively to the form of irregular warfare in which we are involved."[2]

That Americans have a congenital mental block to understanding this alien world of psychological and ideological warfare is evident even in the popular classification of it as "unconventional." Our diplomats and soldiers are discovering in Vietnam

*Based on lecture at U.S. Army Engineer School, November 13, 1962.

[1]*New York Herald-Tribune,* June 4, 1964.

[2]Dr. Michael C. Conley, Testimony of April 8, 1964. "Hearings on Freedom Commission and Freedom Academy Bills," House Committee on Un-American Activities, pp. 588-616. Unpublished transcript.

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that they cannot beat an idea with a weapon, a helicopter or even a radio network. It is worth recalling that Lawrence of Arabia, the first great guerrilla leader of this century, said his first step in organizing a rebellion was "preaching." Revolutionaries like Lenin and Mao read Clausewitz, Jomini and the other "proper" books on strategy and tactics, and spent much of their time studying the motivations and attitudes of the soldier, the peasant and the worker—for the purpose of subverting and confusing them. The West so far has not turned the tables on the communists and studied their methodologies to learn how to counter-subvert and counter-confuse. This can be done—at the cost of some dear illusions.

The Anatomy of Discontent

In the French Revolution the nineteenth-century communists found a laboratory of urban and revolutionary sociology. They learned that two ingredients are essential to instigate a riot or insurrection: economic or social grievances (real or fancied) and propaganda—the ideas to crystallize and slogans to ignite the grievances. Based on this analysis they developed their doctrine and designed their conflict organization to supply the catalysts and to manage the resulting social strife for the capture of political power. As Churchill observed in 1937: "A communist is not only the holder of certain opinions. He is the pledged adept of a well-thought-out means of enforcing them. The anatomy of discontent and revolution has been studied in every phase and aspect, and a veritable drill book prepared in a scientific spirit for subverting all existing institutions."[3]

Sociologist George Rude's study of the crowds in the French Revolution[4] confirms the scientific validity of the bolshevik conclusions. He found that masses of people respond to revolutionary harangues or become politically militant only when some objective condition, often but not necessarily economic, favors action. If proper food, shelter and working conditions are absent, or government inept and uninspiring, conditions are rife for violence. But Rude's study revealed that trouble is not automatic. *It must be agitated.* Latent discontent must be converted into active discontent by slogans which articulate and focus the

[3]Winston Churchill, *The Great Contemporaries,* cited in *Report of the Royal Commission on the Gouzenka Case* (Ottawa, 1946), p. 23.
[4]George Rude, *The Crowd in the French Revolution* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1959), pp. 196-210.

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dissatisfaction, and by formal or informal organization which leads people to share each other's grievances, achieve psychic unity, and finally take action. Prevent the sloganeering and psychological coordination, and people will suffer and die without protest. The absence of major outbreaks during the famines in Ireland in 1846-48 and on Mainland China in 1959-62 are cases in point.

Yet for fifteen years the keystone of American doctrine for anti-communist action has been massive outpourings of economic aid designed to "eliminate discontent," followed by massive military intervention when the original strategy fails. This was exactly the sequence of our policy in Vietnam. From 1954 to 1961 we had a large economic aid program and a small military mission that equipped the country's armed forces—over its government's protests—to fight a conventional Korea-type war. For three years, until 1961, we virtually ignored the guerrilla war. Then the Kennedy Administration increased the U.S. mission from 500 to 12,000 men in twenty-four months. After another three years of war, during which the Administration's patience grew so short that it connived in the overthrow of the regime it had intervened to support, Secretary of Defense McNamara had to report that the situation remains grave. News reports estimated that the communists controlled 50 per cent of the country. Clearly Vietnam has been a doctrinal failure.

The following quotations illustrate the fundamental irrelevance of current U.S. doctrine to communist operational methodology:

(1) In his April 1963 message to Congress President Kennedy, pleading for more foreign aid, said:

> Had the needs of the people of Cuba been met in the pre-Castro period —their need for food, housing, education, jobs, above all for a democratic responsibility in the fulfillment of their own hopes—there would have been no Castro, no missiles in Cuba, and no need for Cuba's neighbors to incur the immense risks of resistance to threatened aggression from that island.

(2) Cuban communist leader Anibal Escalante wrote in the July 1961 issue of *Verde Olivo,* the Cuban armed forces magazine:

> Cuba was not one of the countries with the lowest standard of living for the masses in America. On the contrary, Cuba had one of the highest standards of living. Yet it was here that the first great democratic, socialistic and patriotic revolution of the continent broke out. . . . If historical development had been governed by the false axiom [that poverty and

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backwardness are prerequisites of communism], the revolution should have occurred first in Haiti, Bolivia, Colombia, or even Chile, countries of much greater poverty than Cuba in 1952 or 1958.[5]

(3) The former Comintern agent Eudocio Ravines, graduate of the Lenin School of revolutionary tactics who reorganized Latin American communist parties in the 1930's, since his defection has declared:

I never used the poverty of the workers or the misery of the peasants. I used the vanity of the women of high society, the ambition of the politicians who had no electoral support, the intriguing nature of students who want to get on in the world, and the genius of writers who did not know what to write.[6]

(4) Ecuador's Deputy Minister of Public Works Roberto Serrano, after witnessing the power of a few agitators to disrupt the normal workings of a government, observed:

You can feel the communists everywhere. If a village needs a new bridge or road, they stir up the people, create public disorders, and before we know it a small problem becomes a big issue.[7]

There is enough such evidence from communist history to bury once and for all the misconception that any necessary or even conditional causality exists between poverty and communism. Otherwise, how to account for the Tokyo riots of 1960 which turned President Eisenhower away and toppled a government at a time when Japan, an industrialized nation, was enjoying unprecedented prosperity? Or the million-vote gain by the Italian Communist Party in April 1963, mostly in the north, at a time when the Italian economy was more prosperous than ever and growing at a rate of 9.5 per cent a year? Under prevailing U.S. doctrine, we should launch massive aid programs for Japan and Italy—an obvious *reductio ad absurdum*.

A careful study of communist campaigns of guerrilla and urban violence will show that the insurgency problem at root is this: It is a product of an *organization* that systematically propagates an *ideology* of violent revolution and power conquest. The organization *recruits* and *indoctrinates* agents from the indigenous population, carefully seeking out the elite minority of politically resonant individuals and making use of the Pavlov-James prin-

[5]James Monahan and Kenneth O. Gilmore, *The Great Deception* (New York: Farrar, Straus, 1963), p. 190.

[6]Quoted from a mimeographed press hand-out distributed by the Moral Re-Armament movement at one of MRA's international meetings in Miami (c. 1961).

[7]*Washington Post*, February 28, 1963; *Chicago Daily News* Service dispatch from Dom Bonafede in Quito.

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ciple of psychological "hot spots of consciousness"[8] to create quasi-religious conversions and fanatical obsessions among the hard-core cadres. Simultaneously the organization trains the recruits in a highly pragmatic body of *operational techniques* developed and tested through 170 years of revolutionary and conspiratorial history since the French Revolution, particularly since 1900 in Russia and China by Lenin and his followers. Some form of *schooling*, formal or informal, is used to mold new cadres and arm them with a mastery over this body of techniques. *The founding of a school to create a general staff of indigenous cadres is the first step of insurgency.*

The school may be inside the nation, such as the National Cadres School launched by the Cuban communists under the Batista regime in 1954 or the Aurora School run by the Argentine communists in Buenos Aires in 1958. Or it may be outside the target-nation's territory, such as the training in Hanoi and communist-held areas of Laos given to cadres infiltrating into Thailand, the training in Castro's Cuba of cadres from all over Latin America and Africa for action in Panama and Zanzibar, or the Communist Chinese training of Congolese guerrillas in hotel rooms in Bujumbura, Burundi. This system produces organized "Typhoid Marys" who go about systematically spreading the virus of the ideology of hate and violence which demands, in the name of service to humanity, such acts as the assassination of village officials and the cutting off of the fingers of little children who are sent to the schools of a noncommunist government.

The Balanced Counterinsurgency Program

No sensible fire prevention campaign undertakes to eliminate all ingredients of a fire. That would require the removal of all wood in buildings, all paper, even all oxygen. Rather, a fire marshal adopts a balanced approach: get rid of the combustibles which can be easily removed, such as oily rags, and concentrate on preventing a spark of ignition and whatever conditions might produce the spark. The balanced counterinsurgency program must be similar. But U.S. strategy so far has concentrated on "eliminating discontent." We can properly proceed to attack social grievances, but meanwhile we must prevent the communist ignition system from operating.

[8]See Eugene H. Methvin, "Mob Violence and Communist Strategy," Orbis, Summer 1961, pp. 170-171.

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There are four major techniques which may be used to counter insurgency in both the pre-insurgency and active states, and a wise strategy consists of a balanced mix of all four:

1. *Economic and Social Action Against Discontent.* We can make war on the enemy's socio-economic base, the discontent and underdevelopment that provide him with grievances to exploit. This is a difficult mission in the long run, and hopeless in the short run if it is not undertaken in conjunction with other action, since communist political warfare is depriving the democracies of the real estate on which to experiment with reforms.

2. *Psychological Action Against Ideology.* We can destroy the enemy's philosophical and psychological bases of action. When those are gone, his activities will diminish and his behavior will change. It is better to convince him than to kill him. But this is the kind of warfare the West has not yet begun to fight; in fact, we have hardly recognized its existence.

3. *Police Action Against Cadres.* We can track the insurgent down and kill or capture him. This is a costly process, as the twelve-year war in Malaya proved. There it was a matter of ferreting the guerrilla cadres out of the jungle one by one. Near the end of the war the British had an entire army engaged for months in one area hunting four terrorist leaders.

4. *Pre-emptive Organizational Warfare.* We can deprive the enemy of the opportunity to exploit social stagnation and political disorganization by pre-empting his opportunity to recruit and mature his own organization. We can give the ambitious and discontented young man some avenue to express constructively his urge to modernize his society and to pursue his ambitions. This requires programs such as Iran's drafting of educated young elites into Peace Corps-type village literacy campaigns, and South Vietnam's youth and women's organizations which have borrowed from the American 4-H Club experience.

Counterinsurgency action using some combination of all four techniques may be aimed simultaneously at four distinct targets: (1) the "Typhoid Mary" organization—break up its schools, arrest its leaders or infiltrating cadres, destroy its printing presses and arms caches; (2) the individual "Typhoid Marys"—make direct appeals, offer rehabilitation, refute Marxist-Leninist dogma, re-educate them, intern them; (3) the idea they carry, the ideology of violent change—wage anti-violence campaigns, broadcast attacks

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on the "vanguard" and "new class" theories, launch "nation-building" movements to rescue the "progress" theme and Utopian dream from the agitators; and (4) the populace that is the target for infection and the reservoir for recruitment—inoculate the public by creating an anti-violence climate of opinion and focusing attention on the cooperative task of "nation-building."

The Research Gap

The U.S. government has vast platoons of scientists and technicians developing all manner of hardware for all imaginable kinds of warfare. They have studied the guerrilla wars in Malaya, the Philippines and Vietnam and spend thirty million dollars annually to design equipment for U.S. and indigenous armies fighting anti-guerrilla wars. They have produced spike-proof shoes, gliders and electronic kites for jungle cargo drops, swamp buggies, lightweight body armor and chemical defoliants. But these weapons will never hit the real enemy: the virus of the ideology of violent change and its carriers. Ironically, the United States has little research and development activity in the realm of ideas. To paraphrase Churchill, we have not studied the anatomy of democracy and peaceful progress, nor have we prepared a veritable drill book in a scientific spirit for helping others to reform outmoded institutions.

Any government under communist attack must as a first requirement have a good message to communicate to the people. It must generate among the populace a positive sense of solidarity and identification so that intelligence will flow to government forces, for apathy is as deadly as outright hostility. Examples of this sort of positive action are the honest election Magsaysay and the Filipino Army conducted in 1950, and President Diem's effort to introduce village democracies in Vietnam's strategic hamlets which allowed villagers to elect their own councils for the first time. It means simply practicing the ideology of democracy which Americans all understand but seldom articulate.

Like Lawrence of Arabia, we must start to "preach." Such a campaign can take the name of Moral Re-Armament with its theme of absolute honesty and absolute love; or "personalism," as Diem called his humanistic philosophy of the dignity of the person; or "solidarism," as the Russian *Narodno Trudovoi Soyuz* (National Alliance of Solidarists), the anti-communist underground, calls its alloy of humanism, individual dignity and the need for community cooperation to enable the individual to

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fulfill his destiny. They amount to the same thing in the final analysis: articulating the philosophy of individual liberty. These are what sociologists call "constitutive ideologies," the psychological glue that holds social movements together.[9] And all these movements have had demonstrable successes against communism under social combat conditions.

This adaptability in our ideology is a measure of its strength. The ideology will require different semantic dressing for different settings; different articulations for different cultural backgrounds; different institutional forms for different national temperaments and geopolitical situations. In order to adjust our ideology to suit given situations and needs, the United States will need to rely upon a psychological warfare research institute, just as the USSR has its Marxism-Leninism Institute to brew ideological blends to suit given tactical situations and locales.

The Ideology of Democracy

The American Revolution gave us an ideological legacy—the ideology of freedom. It did not guarantee man a perfect state of happiness; it did promise the opportunity for *pursuit* of happiness. The American Constitution did not promise a perfect society —only a *more* perfect one. The Founding Fathers faced up to human frailty and the problem of evil. They recognized that man was not created all good or all evil; they set out to design institutions that would emphasize man's finer traits and neutralize or even utilize the baser ones.[10] For example, they sought to harness political ambition and jealousy when they divided the powers of government among separate branches each of which would be jealous of its power and quick to repulse any usurpation by others. They thus used the very desire for power to prevent an overconcentration of power, and to enhance the growth of freedom.

This contrast between freedom and the totalitarian ideology was reflected clearly by Attorney General Robert F. Kennedy when he said: "It is an unfinished society that we offer to the world, a society that is forever committed to change, to improvement, and to growth, that will never stagnate in the certitude of

[9]The communists use the phrase "orientation theory" to denote the same function in their ideological warfare planning. See William R. Kintner and Joseph Z. Kornfeder, *The New Frontier of War* (Chicago: Henry Regnery, 1962), pp. 336-337. The phrase was introduced into this work by Kornfeder, a former Comintern organizer in Latin America, and was derived from his experience at the Lenin School in the early 1930's.

[10]See David Reisman, *The Lonely Crowd* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1960), p. xxii.

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ideology or the finalities of dogma." What the Attorney General did not make clear is that to have no "certitude of ideology or finalities of dogma" *is in itself an ideology—the ideology of freedom.* And this is the psychological weapon we must use against the communist ideology.

The target is not the communists themselves. It is their idea that they have the "Divine Right" by special appointment from the forces of "history" to make life-and-death decisions for all other human beings and institutions—and that this obliges them to gain the final victory, usher in the communist Utopia, and secure the eternal salvation of all mankind. We must confront this false notion with our idea: that all men are created with the equal right to make decisions about their own lives, and for the good of their own family, village and nation.

Properly formulated and communicated, this is powerful ammunition to use against the communist offensive. Thomas Jefferson said: "I know of no safe repository for the ultimate powers of government save the people themselves." A century and a half later, the Socialist Norman Thomas declared:

> We have learned much about the temptations of power, and we know that there is no messianic working class nor any sort of elite that we can trust automatically to save "mankind." . . . The messianic hope which consciously or unconsciously inspired most of us to become socialists is scarcely tenable in America or elsewhere in the world. History and our better knowledge of human psychology have destroyed or profoundly altered that particular scheme of earthly salvation. *There will never be an absolute final victory.*[11]

Thomas here acknowledges the profound error of the basic premise of communism and socialism: that there can ever be a final victory, or a perfect state, or a completed society.

Tactical Deployment of Idea Weapons

How does one apply this philosophical wisdom in practical ways? What do we do with our ideology in the jungles of Southeast Asia where we are up against communist guerrillas who ambush government officials, blow up bridges, and assassinate village chiefs who resist them? U.S. officials are dealing with tribal people who care little about events beyond their village, and who do not even know they have a government or that there is a U.S.A. or a USSR.

One U.S. Information Service officer recently applied a little

[11] "The Socialist Call," November 14, 1952, cited by Max Nomad in *Aspects of Revolt* (New York: Noonday Press, 1961), p. 68.

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Yankee ingenuity to the problem. Either by accident or timely inspiration, he demonstrated a basic grasp of the idea as a weapon and set up a model ideological warfare operation. In the backwoods of Laos, since time immemorial, three-man teams of troubadors called "mohlam" have roamed the villages regaling the people with song and verse. Searching for ways to get his message across, he hit on the plan of using mohlam teams, hired three of them and sent them out along the broad Mekong River. These gaily dressed entertainers stroll into a village and begin to tell the people, in simple song and verse, what would happen if the communists should seize power. Sitting around the fire, they may start with tidbits of gossip from a neighboring village, or a ballad of love and heroism. Then they swing into a saucy story about a Lao lad who married a sweet young girl—but for a sister-in-law he got a nagging old maid who proceeded to tell him where to live and work, what to plant, and how to raise his children. She buried his bliss. And the song makes clear that the sister-in-law is a symbol for the communist guerrillas.

The mohlam singers also debunk seductive communist promises of Utopia by comparing the guerrilla agents to a man who lost his arm. "The man is unhappy," they sing, "but he goes around saying how happy he is because he doesn't have to work hard. 'To be happy like me,' he says, 'cut off your arm and we'll all be armless and happy together.' " After these ideological inoculations, the Lao villagers are ready to laugh at the communist agents.

Beyond stressing fatal flaws in the enemy's idea system, we have the tremendous positive appeal of government "of the people, by the people, for the people." Said former Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs Roger Hilsman:

> In the past, government has usually meant—if anything—an official who collects grain or yams and gives nothing in return. So we have a revolutionary appeal to excite and inspire these people—the simple but very effective concept that government exists to serve and protect them.[12]

Noncommunist Attempts at Organizational Warfare

The Free World can wage organizational and ideological warfare just as effectively as the communists. It is a matter of creating organizations staffed by skilled, trained operators who are disciplined and dedicated to promote the cause of freedom as fervently as communists promote their cause. A survey of threatened Free World areas in the pre-insurgency stage of com-

[12]Interview in *General Electric Forum*, April-June 1963.

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munist penetration shows at least five highly promising but little recognized prototypes of organizational warfare efforts that could be used more widely in the fight against the communist insurgency machine.

(1) *San Jose Institute of Political Education.* In 1959 José Figueres, former President of Costa Rica, called together representatives of his country's National Liberation Party and Venezuela's Democratic Action Party to found a political training center which would produce leaders for the hemisphere's democratic movements. They recognized that democratic groups in Latin America lacked well-structured political parties, experience in governing, know-how for effective political action, the rudiments of organization, a clearly defined ideology, and above all, trained party functionaries.

The basic aim was to train middle-level party officials in the techniques of party organization, political action and social reform. The Institute offered in addition to political theory and area studies such practical courses as "parliamentary procedure," "how to argue with communists," "how to plan land reform," "working with youth," and "trade union organizing." Soon seventeen democratic political parties from thirteen countries and Puerto Rico joined the sponsors. Norman Thomas' Institute of International Labor Research provided academic help, and the J. M. Kaplan Foundation underwrote 60 per cent of the $180,000 annual budget. The founders rented a former night club in San Jose and opened the Institute's doors in October 1960, with an attendance of twenty students from twelve parties in eight countries. Subsequent courses lasted three months and the student body grew to fifty, with an average age of twenty-nine.

The San Jose Institute was an imaginative effort to save democratic groups from the disastrous alternatives they frequently face after the overthrow of an oligarchic-military regime, as in Cuba after Batista. Inadequately equipped to exercise power, democratic parties often must either turn to the better disciplined and organized communists, or seek the assistance of individuals associated with the previous regime. The Institute demonstrated its utility after Trujillo's assassination, when elections were scheduled in the Dominican Republic. The democratic parties there had no experience in mass organization, political campaigning, or party and governmental administration. On a crash basis the Institute ran a three-month course designed for the Dominicans and attended by thirty-eight party and union officials. Their

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practical training proved of great value in helping their nation to execute its first democratic election and make the difficult transition to an elected regime. The fact that a military coup later occurred there and in Honduras was not proof of the strength of democracy's enemies but rather of the weakness of its friends. Ironically, most of the military officers involved in the coups were U.S. trained, while the politicians they ousted lacked comparable leadership training. More ironically still, the San Jose Institute shut its doors in 1963 for want of Free World support.

Another promising venture is the American Institute for Free Labor Development (AIFLD), begun in Washington in 1962 under the auspices of the AFL-CIO, with financial support from large American corporations doing business in Latin America and the U.S. Agency for International Development. So far AIFLD has trained more than 200 graduates in trade union organization and anti-totalitarian tactics. In addition, fourteen regional institutes have been launched in Latin American countries and these have trained more than 3,700 in seminars and resident courses up to three months in length. The best of their graduates are selected for the Washington course.

AIFLD should be extended to Asia and Africa. Moreover, training such as was offered at the San Jose Institute is needed for leaders from the other sectors of society.

(2) *Newspapers for Vietnamese Villages.* It is a devastating commentary on the U.S. aid program in Vietnam after 1954, and on the state of U.S. counterinsurgency doctrine, that as late as mid-1963 communist Radio Hanoi actually had more effective communications with rural South Vietnam than the Saigon government had. Though Washington decided in 1954 to build a transmitter system for the Diem regime, policy vacillation and bureaucratic feuding stalled the project. Meantime, South Vietnam had daily newspapers in only two cities, and a handful of rural weeklies. Yet the potential audience was great: because of the traditional Asian reverence for learning, virtually every family has at least one literate member. Viewing this situation in 1962, Robert Lawrence, a communications specialist for the Agency for International Development, proposed an experiment based on World War II experience with front-line newspapers.

With the help of Vietnamese civic action officials, Lawrence recruited 100 villagers with some typing ability, brought them to Saigon for a six-week course in journalism, and sent each home

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equipped with a typewriter, mimeograph machine, motorbike and shortwave radio. For a $500 investment, each was converted into a one-man daily newspaper. At 7 a.m. each day Radio Saigon, its power stepped up so it can reach all areas, broadcasts news at dictation speed. The "editors" take it down, add local news, household hints, farm news and other items, and print daily newspapers. Then they climb on their motorbikes and distribute copies to each village in their district, the equivalent of an American county. The aim is to train enough editors to install one newspaper in each of the nation's 346 districts. The Viet Cong have already paid this venture the supreme compliment—by assassinating more than a score of the editors.

"For the first time many villagers will be getting regular news from the outside world and learning what their national government is doing to protect them and help them enjoy better farming, education and health," said Lawrence. "These newspapers will be channels of education into every home just as our own rural weeklies, with their county agent's columns and farm news, were twenty-five years ago. The only thing wrong with this program is that it wasn't started four years sooner. If it had there might not have been any guerrilla war."[13]

For some reason, USIA has made no move to apply this experience in Latin America or elsewhere. This failure reflects the absence of a central training and research institution in the United States, such as the proposed Freedom Academy and Research Center, where operations could be analyzed and helpful experiences shared among personnel from all governmental agencies.

(3) *Mobilizing the Villages.* Before the 1960 military take-over in Korea, communist infiltration and subversion menaced South Korean independence. The communists had set up a secretly-controlled newspaper, agents had infiltrated into a corrupt and inefficient government, and communist-led demonstrations were occurring at the rate of twenty-nine a month. Faced with this disintegrating situation, young army officers intervened, choosing not to allow their country to slide into communism while they sat idly watching the official UN demarcation line.

After an initial roundup of communists and display of puritanism, the officers launched a "National Reconstruction Movement (NRM)," a party organization based on the principle of nation-building and dedicated to a twofold program: 1) eliminating the

[13]Interview with the author.

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poverty and starvation which communists exploit; and 2) creating a foundation for the responsible exercise of freedom. On the village level people were enlisted in the cause of national development and anti-communist vigilance.

In effect, the Korean army officers waged ideological and organizational warfare to create a spirit of positive nationalism. So successful were they, according to General Jong Pil Kim,[14] the deposed director of Korea's Central Intelligence Agency, that any strangers in any South Korean village were immediately challenged by NRM members. When six North Korean agents tried to land on the southeast coast, villagers led by a seventeen-year-old girl killed one and caught the others, turning them over to the authorities. Before the end of 1962 over 200 communist agents, who had been trained in North Korea for six to sixteen months, were captured. The government also sponsored a "Freedom Center" in Seoul, under the auspices of the twenty-one-nation Asian Peoples' Anti-communist League, to train grassroots cadres for organizational work in villages throughout Southeast Asia.

It remains to be seen whether this one-party regime in Korea will achieve a workable democracy and whether its Freedom Center will become an effective institution. But the initial efforts of the Korean revolutionary junta certainly offer valuable lessons for other underdeveloped nations.

(4) *The Peace Corps.* Another kind of organizational weapon the United States possesses in the ideological warfare arena is the Peace Corps. Although the primary purpose of the Corps is to "help others to help themselves," especially in economic development, technical assistance and educational activities, and although the U.S. government has adhered rigidly to the original plan of keeping the Corps out of Cold War politics, the very presence of Corps men and women working at the grassroots level cannot help but be a very important psychological and ideological weapon for freedom. The Peace Corps should remain independent of U.S. short-term policies, but the volunteers should be better prepared to act, on their own, as emissaries for freedom. Given the proper training, they could in the course of their work seed democratic cadres throughout Asia, Africa and Latin America.

One of the most valuable contributions the Peace Corps has made to ideological-organizational warfare is the setting of an example which other nations can copy. One of the most explosive factors in Asia today is underemployment among the educated

[14]Interview with the author.

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youth. The UN Economic and Social Council estimates that in India alone there are one million educated young people without jobs. Most of these young adults have contemptuous attitudes toward manual work, desire high-prestige positions in the already overstaffed government bureaus, and have been educated for the wrong types of work. Most are unable as well as unwilling to pursue technical and professional occupations.[15] This situation, so full of frustration for the young people involved, is made to order for communist agitators. But a Peace Corps-type organization might tap this reservoir of energy and skills. Iran, for example, has already begun drafting educated young people, heretofore largely idle, for village-level teaching and other social work. In 1963 a forty-three nation manpower conference established an International Peace Corps Secretariat, operated by the U.S. Peace Corps, and a score or more nations are setting up their own operations on the U.S. model.[16]

(5) *Thailand: A Preventive Program.* That the United States may have begun to develop and apply a doctrine of counter-insurgency measures is suggested by the balanced program of political education and economic rehabilitation which the Thai government has launched, with U.S. help, in northeast Thailand. Ever since the communist invasion of Laos, native Thai communists and cadres from North Vietnam have been infiltrating the remote Mekong River Valley areas bordering Laos, where nine million Lao-speaking Thais live. Infiltrators often pose as itinerant peddlers. They travel in groups of up to a dozen, quarter themselves in a village, and remain for a week or so disseminating pro-communist and anti-Bangkok, anti-American propaganda. They cannot sell their wares; a single peddler on a yearly visit would absorb the entire buying power of the average village of forty families. Nevertheless they distribute clothing, medicine, shoes and radio sets as good-will gifts and rewards. They have hidden caches of arms and munitions at strategic points, and regular airdrops supply more. "Free Thai" radio broadcasts from Hanoi and Peking, made in the local dialects, urge revolt against Bangkok. Thai army patrols find they are able to assess the extent and success of the communist subversive effort by the sullen and hostile reception they get at affected villages.[17]

[15] *Washington Post,* March 18, 1963.
[16] *New York Times,* May 5, 1963.
[17] *Washington Post,* March 26, 1963; dispatch by Richard Hughes, London *Sunday Times* correspondent in Bangkok.

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Early in 1962, survey teams sent to the remote border provinces made sobering discoveries of horribly depressed economic and social conditions, poor soil, little water, no industry. The government was handicapped by transportation and communications difficulties. The standard of living was only about half the national average. Ethnically, the people are much closer to the Lao than to the Thai; most speak the Lao language and virtually all understand it. Settled along the Mekong were 25,000 refugees who fled North Vietnam during the Indochinese war. Communist agents, already engaged in propaganda and organizational activities, select local recruits and send them to Communist North Vietnam for indoctrination and guerrilla training. Most appalling of all was the survey's discovery that many of the natives did not even know they lived in Thailand or had a government. The name of (the late) Prime Minister Sarit Thanarat was unknown to them, although some could identify communist chiefs.[18] A team that visited forty villages found that in ten of them the people had never seen a government official, a policeman, a health inspector, not even a tax collector. One team, finding a communist-front "solidarity society" which had escaped Bangkok's previous notice, reported an incident symbolic of the entire problem. An old man was asked why he had joined the society. His reply: because he had never been asked to join anything else!

Since the survey the Thai government, with U.S. aid, has initiated an information program in this area to convince the natives that they have a government which is both friendly and helpful. Feeder roads are under construction and communications systems are being improved or installed. Village development is underway, comparable in kind to the great agricultural extension programs of our own country in the 1930's, and health programs have been introduced.

The basic operational agency is the National Security Organization, formed late in 1962, which operates four mobile development units (MDU's) with a dozen more planned. These units are staffed by personnel from several Thai and U.S. government branches and their mission is both economic aid and propaganda. A typical MDU operation involves the establishment of a temporary base for three to five villages to give the villagers modern medical treatment, dig water wells, build roads and improve

[18] *Washington Post*, January 12, 1963.

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subsistence rice farming. Officials estimate that one such unit in the course of a year can influence the attitudes of about 100,000 people. In addition, three mobile information teams tour remote villages, showing films and giving talks that stress national unity, Thai culture, and loyalty to the king.[19]

An American reporter wrote the following description of one of these villages, Ban Kud Rua Kam, base of MDU No. 2:

> In this village there are now brightly-painted new white fences; a new gateway into the village, a new roof on the all-important Buddhist temple; a road; bridges; a clinic tent; a gaily-colored children's playground with swings; a badminton court for adults. And, perhaps most important of all, there is a pump on the well so that the village women no longer have laboriously to fish for their water with a bucket dangled on the end of a hooked bamboo pole. The Thai government has appropriated an unheard of $1 million for MDU No. 2. Already a giant TV antenna is nearing completion and there will be a glass-enclosed TV set below it here in the village square. Six water tanks are being built, so even the new well pump may become outmoded when the diesel generator pumps the water into high storage areas and allows it to come pouring down again with the flip of a faucet.[20]

But of more importance is the political education program. Chiefs of the larger rural political subdivisions have been brought to Bangkok by the hundreds for political orientation and training. Similarly, village chiefs have been summoned to provincial capitals for briefings on what communism means and how to combat subversion, as well as how to improve their own administration. In 1963, 2,200 policemen graduated from the first courses set up especially for them.

It did not take long for the political education program to show positive results: a village chief reported to provincial police that a "stranger" had come to town. The stranger, it developed, was a Thai communist equipped with a radio and propaganda tracts. And in January 1963, less than a year after the survey, similar intelligence uncovered a communist plot against the Bangkok government. The late Premier Sarit himself personally led border police in rounding up some fifty communist suspects. Political observers attributed this success directly to the Thai-U.S. political education and economic rehabilitation program.[21]

In northeast Thailand the United States is forestalling insurgency by putting to practical use the lesson of our failure in

[19] *New York Times*, December 31, 1963, dispatch by Seymour Topping.
[20] *Washington Post*, June 4, 1963, dispatch by Warren Unna.
[21] *Ibid.*, January 12, 1963.

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Vietnam in 1954-60. Roger Hilsman described the problem facing U.S. policymakers in these terms:

> The long-range task is nation-building. To become a stable nation, Vietnam needs much more than dams, power stations, steel mills and other giant foreign aid projects. In the short term, these people need more simple aid such as communication routes, so that goods and services can flow freely from village to village throughout the country. There must be a way for information about the needs of the people to flow upward and a way for government services to flow downward to answer these needs. They need health programs, police security, educational systems, economic help, sewer systems—the very things many an American pioneer village needed over 100 years ago.[22]

Unfortunately, there is little evidence that the United States is applying the doctrine developed in Thailand to other danger areas.

The U.S. Response

The communist conversion campaign consists of six elements: organization, recruiting, ideology, indoctrination, training and tactical science. Though inspired by a far different purpose, the elements of Western "preaching" will perforce be similar—not because of any desire to emulate the communists but because the West must, like them, deal with the same basic problem: how to win the allegiance of human beings to our democratic values and goals. To say that we are in a war for men's minds is a misnomer; the war is for their souls. Freedom is a religion and an ideology just as is communism, only more potent. We can no more prove scientifically our democratic precepts and values of class cooperation than a Marxist can prove his values and doctrines of class warfare and economic determinism. Since it is a faith we are striving to propagate, we must use many of the same methods all faiths have used throughout history.

Drawing upon what the sociologists call the "natural history" of social movements—the study of their stages and development—and upon the framework of a strategy described above, we can devise a functional, step-by-step counterinsurgency program. Fundamentally it is a program of nation-building[23]: (1) *Ideology.*

[22] *General Electric Forum,* April-June 1963.

[23] The nearest analogy in U.S. experience is the operational doctrine of the Agricultural Extension Service whose duty is to extend into the grassroots the knowledge being gathered in centers of learning, to identify the potential leaders that exist in every community, to motivate and develop them, inform them with the facts, and then sit back and watch democracy work. The radical revolution the U.S. "county agent" has worked in rural America since 1916 is testimony to the soundness of this approach.

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Identify the elements of an indigenous constitutive ideology, usually an amalgam of nationalism, humanist individualism and cooperative community spirit, synthesize them, and plan for the systematic articulation and dissemination of the ideology. (2) *Recruiting*. Initiate a talent search to find intelligent young men and women, capable of leadership. Man is the ultimate weapon; nobody understood this better than Lenin, who recruited and trained followers before he did anything else. The proper counter-insurgency program needs *talent scouts*. Finding one Magsaysay or Diem may be sufficient to save a nation. Whole armies of such men should be organized at every level from the villages to the capital. This program requires politically-trained educators, agricultural technicians, public health officers, home demonstration agents, road engineers, policemen, intelligence agents, psychological warfare specialists—often all rolled into one human being. (3) *Schooling*. *Indoctrinate* and *train* the recruits. The former impregnates them with the values of the democratic ideology; the latter arms them with the techniques of democratic government, organization, administration, and—in the case of a society under direct attack—effective anti-communist action. (4) *Methodology*. Systematize the body of tactics of indigenous democracy to be taught in the training program. Create how-to-do-it handbooks for everybody from Boy Scout patrol leaders to province chiefs and even presidents and kings. (5) *Organization*. Build the structure of organization throughout the society for recruiting, training, command, communication with the populace, intelligence collection and action.

General Bela Kiraly, a Hungarian Army officer engaged in communist counterinsurgency training before 1956, states the case for ideological warfare against the communists:

> In an anti-guerrilla war the first target must be the ideological basis of partisan combat. There is no question that Marxism-Leninism can be countered by the ideas of freedom, particularly the fundamentals of the American Constitution and Bill of Rights. It should be noted, though, that communist ideological strategy is highly aggressive. Mild defensive means will not be successful against it. Forceful, offensive ideological warfare will push Marxism-Leninism to defense, then into withdrawal, finally into defeat.[24]

[24]From an unpublished essay prepared for Brigadier General Edward Lansdale, USAF, special assistant to the Secretary of Defense on counterinsurgency problems.

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NORTH AFRICA: A NEW PRAGMATISM

by Lorna Hahn

THE leaders of North Africa, like their counterparts in many other countries, recently have been taking a penetrating second look at themselves. They have been examining critically what they are doing and where they are going, and attempting to form better syntheses between illusions or ideology on the one hand and harsh reality on the other. Independent of direct or vestigial control just long enough to be able to take that second look, and to know that they themselves are largely responsible for what they see, they are finding the process of self-examination rather trying. They will find it so for some time to come. For not only must they continue attempting to reconcile indigenous traditions with imported technology, political independence with economic dependence, and dreams of Maghrebian unity with existing national peculiarities; they must now make these efforts at a time when popular disappointments are beginning to catch up with popular expectations, when international realignments are rendering passé their old versions of nonalignment, and when petty squabbling often makes a North African Confederation seem more distant than in the days when all three countries were working for Algerian independence.

These fundamental problems take distinct forms, and have elicited distinct patterns of response, in each country. Yet revolutionary republican Algeria, traditionally monarchial Morocco and evolutionary republican Tunisia have all been meeting them with a similar willingness to shelve doctrinaire preferences in favor of pragmatic imperatives. This is particularly evident in the keystone state of Algeria, where stark necessity has left the government little room for choice, and its critics few genuine alternatives to offer.

I

Although Algeria has been independent only since July 1962, she has undergone greater metamorphoses, with greater jolts, than either of her neighbors has experienced in eight independent years. It is therefore hardly surprising that the process of self-criticism should have set in rather early. Few Algerians have

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been upset with the rapidity per se of the government's charge down the bumpy road to socialism, since it had long been understood that Algeria should become as socialist as possible as quickly as possible. Larger numbers, however, object to the style and substance of the revolutionary changes, which have been achieved partly by design, partly by desperation and partly by default. And as so frequently happens in newly-independent states, most criticism stems from, and focuses on, the personal characteristics of Algeria's leaders and their relationships with one another.

Since it had been agreed before independence that Algeria should be a one-party state, the major political issue today is how the party should guide the government, and whether one man should completely dominate both. The one man in question, of course, is Ahmed Ben Bella, erstwhile sergeant in the French Army, a founding father of the Front of National Liberation (FLN), one of five Vice Premiers of the Algerian Provisional Government, while a prisoner of the French until spring of 1962, and, today, President, Premier and FLN party chairman. Endowed with peasant shrewdness rather than finely honed political craftsmanship, earthly charm rather than charisma, ambitions that remain steadfast but views which shift with each change in the political climate, Ben Bella is well suited to swim with the tides as well as divert their course, as any leader of this destitute but not despairing people must. He is still handicapped, however, by the fact that he did not reach his present position because he was undisputed leader of the nationalist movement before independence—as was the case with Bourguiba in Tunisia. Instead, it is well remembered that he and some colleagues flaunted the collective leadership principle around which the FLN had been organized; threatened civil war immediately after independence unless Provisional Premier Ben Youssef Ben Khedda surrendered his authority; and subsequently formed a government, and excluded persons from it, not on the basis of genuine ideological affinities or disagreements, but on the basis of whether or not they wished to hold power under Ben Bella's aegis.

For approximately a year, Ben Bella's technique of bargaining, threatening and appealing to patriotism managed to retain the support, or neutralize the opposition, of most of the important political figures. Several conservatives, such as one-time Provisional Premier Ferhat Abbas, joined Ben Bella mainly because they had personal grievances against the men he had ousted. Some op-

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ponents of personal rule who agreed to temper their criticism in the name of national unity, such as the young former Vice Premier from the Kabylia, Hussein Ait Ahmed, were deputies in the Constituent Assembly. But several top-echelon revolutionaries who could not tolerate Ben Bella's coup d'état, such as Ben Khedda, Belcacem Krim and Mohammed Boudiaf, either did not receive or did not accept bids to join the ruling fraternity.

Deference to Ben Bella thus became the criterion for political acceptability, and it extended even to the two men chiefly responsible for the Ben Bella success story. Thus, Colonel Houari Boumedienne, whose troops had cleared the way for Ben Bella, has remained his chief lieutenant not only because Ben Bella needs military support, but because Boumedienne's dull personality and ill health make him content to play the role of *eminence grise.* A disciple of Mao Tse-tung and Vo Nguyen Giap, although apparently his own man, Boumedienne felt he could use his army as the vanguard of the struggle to revolutionize society, while making the more popular and somewhat malleable Ben Bella the front man. Through his direction of the army's civil action programs, as well as its occasional pacification operations in areas of unrest, by directing many political activities such as organizing elections, and by acting as Premier during Ben Bella's absences, Boumedienne has been able to influence both the formation and the execution of policy in many spheres.

In sharp contrast is the fate of the veteran politician, Mohammed Khider, another FLN founding father and former Vice Premier who saw Ben Bella as the key to personal power. As Chairman of the five-man Political Bureau in the early post-independence period, Khider converted the FLN into a peacetime apparatus which forcefully embraced all other major national organizations, such as labor and student unions, and which was designed to control almost every sector of government activity. The party was soon rent with quarrels, however, between young protégés of Ben Bella and older veterans, and between those who favored a small, elite party and those who wanted a broader, more democratic organization. A badgered Khider resigned from the Political Bureau in May 1963, and was replaced by the man Ben Bella was sure could make the party an effective tool of revolution: himself.

Throughout this steady process of elimination, Ben Bella was careful to avoid harsh or sweeping repressions that could pro-

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duce martyrs and crystallize a strong opposition. The politically dispossessed, wherever possible, were thus left alone in exile or private business; the disenchanted were silenced through censorship of press and restriction of meetings; the openly disgruntled were chastized by "peoples' corrective and criminal courts" hatched by the party as needed; and the doubtful were properly oriented toward the regime by the Ministry of Information. There were indeed hints of disturbance in mid-1963, when several deputies balked at accepting the constitution which Ben Bella himself had drafted and which sought to establish a virtual party dictatorship. Abbas consequently resigned as President of the Constituent Assembly, and was later read out of the FLN. Ait Ahmed, whose revolutionary credentials matched Ben Bella's, also resigned and returned home to organize an opposition against his former cell mate. But on September 8, over 90 per cent of the people voted for Ben Bella's constitution, and one week later equal numbers elected him President. With his place apparently assured, and with the tremendous revolutionary spirit and resources of the Algerian people behind him, Ben Bella seemed destined to accomplish more than his early idol Nasser, his former critic Bourguiba, or his prison pen pal, Castro.

The very actions which officially consecrated Ben Bella's power, however, also immediately precipitated the first real threat to it, and the first measures toward curbing it. Discontent had long been brewing among the restless Berbers of the Kabylia Mountains, a simple but proud people who had contributed many of the leaders, and most of the victims, to the war effort. Feeling under-represented in the new regime, they also believed they were being cheated out of the economic fruits of revolution, since most governmental assistance was going to better developed areas where it could presumably bring larger dividends.

Since their discontent could not be effectively expressed within the FLN, it had to be voiced outside it. Ait Ahmed therefore revived the clandestine Front of Socialist Forces (FFS), attracted to it many discontented elements within Algeria and France, and won the support of the local military commander. He then boycotted the September elections and at the end of that month declared open revolt unless Ben Bella returned to the ideals of the revolution. Threatened with open resistance, and with the Moroccan Army choosing that moment to redeem territorial claims against Algeria in the Sahara, Ben Bella finally agreed to Ait

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Ahmed's basic conditions for cooperation: the release of political prisoners and the calling of an all-party Congress the following spring in which all "tendencies" could freely participate.

There were still manifestations of both rural and urban discontent in early 1964, but many political grievances were at least muted at the FLN Congress held in April. As a concession to the "legal opposition" within the party, Ben Bella—now the officially elected Secretary General—agreed to enlarge the Political Bureau to seventeen members, including some erstwhile opponents. It was also expected that some of Ben Bella's protégés in the Cabinet would be replaced by experienced men whose talents had too long been wasted. Were Ben Bella willing to accept a further devolution of power—which conceivably could include the creation of a special post for Kabyle affairs—he could thereby make it possible for hold-outs in the Front of Socialist Forces to rejoin their comrades within the FLN, and thus strengthen the party considerably. Most FFS members would probably be willing to do so, since their present role on the sidelines can hardly be satisfactory for long.

II

While there has been much criticism of Ben Bella's method of personal rule, it is noteworthy that no one has made a really serious effort to replace him. This is not only because most outsiders wish to prevent further chaos, or because they do not want to assume governing responsibility themselves. A more important reason is that, given the conditions under which Ben Bella has had to work—in a ravaged country with millions unemployed, and with more than nine-tenths of the French having fled with their capital and their skills—few people think they could have done much better. Ait Ahmed has indeed complained that Ben Bella's socialism is "not scientific enough." But neither he nor anyone else, including avowed Marxists, has offered any concrete alternative to Ben Bella's haphazard policy of helping those who have already started to help themselves, improvising theories to suit actual situations, and relying heavily on French economic assistance to remove the remnants of French colonialism.

Agricultural reform, which has constituted Algeria's most striking revolutionary accomplishment, did not come about merely because 80 per cent of the people—and 90 per cent of the fighters

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—were farmers and theoretically deserved to be rewarded. Instead, it was achieved mainly because many of these ordinary people began initiating land reforms themselves. Immediately after independence, some two million displaced persons began returning from regroupment camps or exile. Having no place to go, many simply settled on estates abandoned by French owners, began tilling them and choosing committees to plan their work.

The government recognized a going concern. It placed more of the unemployed on abandoned lands and labeled the whole process "operation labor," while simultaneously conducting arrangements with France for the compensation of departed owners. Through a series of decrees starting in March 1963, these lands are being officially converted into collective farms run by workers' committees acting under the supervision and with the technical assistance of the central government. Under wage scales still being adjusted, workers are theoretically compensated according to their abilities and their level of production. There has been a good deal of dissatisfaction with inefficiency and inequities on many farms, and Minister of National Economy Boumaza, in January 1964, called for a thorough examination of the program. But since this arrangement has provided partial answers to unemployment and local government problems, as well as producing many successful crops, it will doubtless be continued and extended to include the large estates owned by Moslems and previously uncultivated lands.

Since land reform must remain the backbone of the revolution, Ben Bella has glorified it to the peasants by referring to the traditionally cooperative nature of Algerian society and of Islam. But for the benefit of his colleagues who speak in Marxist jargon, and who wish to give Algeria a legitimate place in history by associating her with other great agrarian revolutions, he has also resurrected the theories of the long-obscure Sultan Galiev. This Russian deviationist, expelled from the Bolshevik Central Committee in 1917, advocated (a) that peasants are the true source of revolution, as they receive no benefits from industry, and (b) that the total revolutionary attitude of a people is more important than their class structure—ideas which fit in very well with the amorphous condition of Algerian society today, and which can justify continual readjustment of revolutionary goals and methods.

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III

Ben Bella and his colleagues realized from the start, however, that while happy peasants and healthy attitudes are essential, they are hardly enough to build the modern, industrialized state most Algerians desire. Nor were the nationalization of French and many Moslem enterprises, or the inauguration of public works projects, really significant steps in this direction. To develop Algeria's resources, it was evident that massive outside help, on a continuing basis, would be needed, and that the Western countries—particularly France—could best provide it. This was hard for many militants to accept in principle, but it became increasingly apparent that there was no alternative.

The countries which had steadily supported the Algerians during the war made repeated offers to trade, build factories, send equipment and technicians. But Algeria's Arab brethren, save for feudal Kuwait, have had little to spare except teachers and scholarships. Hence, although the Algerians have acquired a renewed interest in things Arabic and Islamic in recent years, although they like to be heard in Arab League circles and take pride in mediating quarrels between Egyptians and Bathists, they realize they can expect little more than psychic income from Arab sources.

Most Algerians also feel some kinship and gratitude toward the "socialist" states, particularly those which provided helpful lessons on people's wars. They have a special regard for Yugoslavia, not only because of the extensive aid furnished by Tito (partly from American loans) but because Yugoslavia achieved reforms with a minimum of oppression, and because its "neutralism" has permitted it to obtain the best of two competing worlds. But the Algerians learned from such countries as Morocco and Guinea that while the communist nations are apt to promise much, they often fail to deliver as scheduled. They also learned—partly from their own experiences with communist infiltrators—that individuals posing as advisers generally perform additional duties. Since Algeria's course is not yet completely mapped out, and since some Algerian communists are already working in the government, Algerian leaders have decided that too many foreign communist advisers might be dangerous.

Bearing these facts in mind, the Algerian government has concluded numerous trade and cultural agreements with most communist nations. It has received hundreds of doctors, tractors,

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and other forms of assistance, welcomed such visitors as Alexei Adjubei and Chou En-lai, and sent numerous delegations eastward. Playing the new version of the positive neutralist game, which pits Peking against Moscow, Algeria recently received from the former a promise of a fifty million dollar loan, and from the latter, double that amount. Ben Bella's trip to Moscow in May 1964 yielded promises of additional favors. Most of these benefits, however, have yet to materialize. Meanwhile, for the kind of help that can render agricultural pursuits more productive, build industrial complexes and educate the young, for socialist living, the Algerians are counting on the capitalists—particularly those of France.

IV

Cooperation between Ben Bella and De Gaulle has weathered sudden seizures of French property, demands for revision of the Evian accords ending the war, and protests against nuclear weapons explosions in the Sahara. Although puzzling to most Americans, their rapport comes from a high degree of personal understanding between the two leaders and from a growing community of national interests. Both men are pragmatists, and in dealing with each other they have been tacitly operating on a principle evolved largely by Bourguiba: namely, that a treaty such as the Evian Agreement is to be regarded as a basis for immediate peace and future discussions rather than as a final, definitive statement of relationships. De Gaulle has therefore been willing to lend Algeria money to compensate departed Frenchmen, underwrite much of the Algerian budget, listen calmly to demands for quick evacuation of the Mers-el-Kebir port, and purchase wines at inflated prices, if in return he can maintain French cultural influence in Algeria, protect France's preferred position in developing the resources of the Sahara, and weave Algeria into the fabric of French foreign policy.

De Gaulle's interest in Algeria's resources, especially its petroleum, springs not only from the desire to protect French investors or to obtain cheap fuel. Since Algeria exports almost all its petroleum, with 62 per cent going to France last year, this product could be an important element in De Gaulle's dealings with Peking. It might also initiate a triangular trade arrangement now rumored in French and North African circles—a system whereby France would send modern equipment and fuel to China, China would send tea and manufactured items to African

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countries, and the latter would either send natural resources or simply go in debt to France, or export resources via France to China. The Algerians seem amenable to such an arrangement because they need the steady income provided by France. Furthermore, they cannot absorb much petroleum at home, as they have only one large refinery and little industry, and they would have difficulty shipping petroleum themselves since they have no tanker fleet. Hence, despite some recent disputes arising from Algerian desires to obtain a greater share of profits, petroleum will probably remain a strong link between Algeria and France.

There have been disagreements over the exporting of Algerian natural gas, all of which has been consumed internally so far. Difficulties in shipping liquefied gas, combined with French reluctance to build a trans-Mediterranean pipeline, have encouraged Algeria to think in terms of sharing this cheap and abundant source of energy with Tunisia and perhaps even with Morocco (probably in exchange for suitable border adjustments). But this arrangement might not be too displeasing to De Gaulle as it might discourage such potential European competitors as Spain and Great Britain, which have shown interest in importing Algerian gas and in helping Algerian development in other ways.

Algeria's relationship is thus fairly satisfactory with France, which supplies not only most of her aid but also the bulk of her trade. However, as is the case in Tunisia and Morocco, the government is anxious to expand its ties with other nations—particularly those of the Free World. Early differences with the United States over Castro and the nature of American aid have been largely eliminated through the efforts of the late President Kennedy, the sympathetic U.S. Ambassador, William Porter, and the large amounts of emergency aid given Algeria by both private and governmental groups. At the end of 1963, for example, the United States was shipping Algeria 25,000 tons of surplus grain per month, or enough to provide jobs for 150,000 unemployed Algerians in what is the largest food-for-peace program thus far initiated. Negotiations are underway for more substantial aid in the near future, facilitated by the fact that Algeria now has an investment code to protect foreign interests. American oil companies already have considerable investments in the Sahara, and the Algerian government is anxious to increase them, particularly if they involve marketing arrangements and the manufacture of petroleum chemical by-products.

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Among the European firms, which extracted about one-third of Algerian oil last year, probably the one most worth watching is Italy's ENI, a newcomer which has agreed to build Algeria another refinery, and which is extending widely its interests throughout the Maghreb. West Germany and Japan are also increasing their trade and investments here, as elsewhere in Africa. Tokyo, for example, has agreed not only to ship large amounts of cheap goods, but also to create a petrochemical industry which will enable Algeria to produce artificial fiber from gas and oil. This extensive nonsocialist help is sometimes rationalized by an old theory popularized for the Algerians by the FLN intellectual, Franz Fanon. This holds that the West is rich because it robbed Africa of its natural wealth, and is therefore only returning what it stole. Usually, however, aid has simply been taken with little comment.

V

In sum, then, Ben Bella's ability to combine Algerian revolutionary will with foreign ways and means should enable his regime, with a few additions and subtractions, to remain in control for some time. In addition to providing Algeria with a modicum of political stability, this formula has also lessened intra-Maghrebian tensions. It has enabled the Algerians to make just enough progress to resist embarking on rash foreign adventures designed to divert mass discontent, as Morocco has done on occasion, but not enough progress to allow large numbers of Algerian militants to continue boasting of spreading revolutionary benefits to their neighbors.

The desire to export revolution still is strong, particularly among the indoctrinated soldiers and young party members who have grown up knowing no way of life other than waging revolutionary war, and who believe that their own revolution will not be fulfilled until colonialism is eliminated throughout Africa. While reminiscent of Trotsky and Mao, this concept of permanent revolution is a native Algerian phenomenon. It springs both from the Algerians' pride in their own victory over France, and from their desire to play elder statesman toward other "exploited" peoples. At times, moderate Tunisia and especially monarchial Morocco have been listed among those in need of liberation. However, economic and political problems at home, plus the military setback at the hands of Moroccan troops last fall, have led the Algerian government to conclude that cooperation

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with at least one neighbor might be preferable to antagonizing both. Algeria's liberation efforts have therefore been concentrated south of the Sahara, chiefly on Angola, Mozambique and South Africa. In addition to her verbal and diplomatic support, approximately 1,000 guerrillas from these countries completed guerrilla training in Algeria during 1963.

VI

Despite the *détente* reached with Ben Bella at the Arab Summit Conference in Cairo in January 1964, and the Algerian leader's hints about sharing Algeria's wealth with its neighbors, Morocco's King Hassan still has reason to feel uneasy about Algeria—particularly if Ben Bella should be faced with a serious domestic crisis. A direct Algerian military attack seems unlikely. Not only could it easily backfire by rallying Moroccans of all persuasions around the king, as happened in October 1963, but it would undoubtedly be condemned by many of the sub-Saharan Africans Algeria wishes to impress. The Algerians could, conceivably, encourage and assist subversive efforts by a Moroccan opposition leader such as Mehdi Ben Barka, the President of the National Union of Popular Forces, who expressed sympathy for the Algerians last fall, and who is in exile under a sentence of death for doing so. But any plot would have to be extremely well organized to succeed, despite Morocco's obvious need for widespread reforms.

Compared with the other North African countries, Morocco has changed very little and only gradually since becoming independent on March 2, 1956. No elections whatsoever were held until May 1960, and not until December 1962 was there in operation a constitution which officially limited the powers of the king. Its new democratic institutions, notably its Parliament, are far from democratic in practice; justice remains a rather arbitrary matter, and there has been widespread economic distress with few concomitant efforts at reform. The young king has remained in control through his ability to capitalize upon his own assets and his opponents' weaknesses, to enact (if not fully implement) domestic changes as they become imperative, and to use foreign policy as an escape valve for domestic discontent and a supply artery for his propaganda mills.

Hassan's strength is the deep popular attachment of the people both to the institution of monarchy and to the king as leader of

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the Islamic faith. This popularity is reflected in the fact that neither the moderate Istiqlal Party nor most elements of the socialist National Union of Popular Forces (UNFP)—both of which are in the political opposition—openly preaches republicanism: they merely demand such improvements as genuinely free elections. Equally important, these parties and their leaders, with their long records of squabbling and self-seeking, have alienated many ordinary people and turned them toward the one man who seems above politics, the king. Hassan has channeled this support fairly successfully through the Front for the Defense of Constitutional Institutions (FDIC), a hodgepodge of minor parties and political independents held together by royal funds and favors and by personal grudges against the two genuine parties. With the FDIC holding a parliamentary majority and neutralizing within its ranks such erstwhile rebels against central authority as Dr. Khatib of the rural-based Popular Movement, the king has managed to keep his opposition divided and ineffective. These political advantages, buttressed by a sizable modern army loyal to the throne and an efficient secret police, make the king a formidable opponent for any plotters—as participants in several *putsches* have learned.

Realizing, however, that faith, favors and force might not suffice forever, Hassan has also sponsored some recent concessions to the spirit—if not yet to the substance—of "democracy" and "economic planning." Last November the new Parliament chose a premier—a post which Hassan had formally held until that time. The protracted trial of the arrested UNFP conspirators, while hardly conducted in the tradition of Anglo-Saxon justice, at least resulted in fairly light penalties for most of the men finally convicted, in February 1964, of "treason." The decision at the end of 1963 to scrap the ailing Four Year Plan in favor of a more systematic development program, and the plans to purchase French-owned lands for the benefit of Moroccan farmers, gave further weight to the thesis that the king, rather than the political parties, has the welfare of the people at heart. There were even suggestions in April 1964 of the FDIC spawning a socialist-oriented (or at least labeled) offshoot, the "Democratic Socialist Party."

VII

Abetting Hassan's internal divide-and-rule techniques is a foreign policy which has successfully identified Morocco with the

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anti-colonialist struggle in Africa, while also bringing substantial benefits from the "colonialists." By loudly espousing "radical nationalism" and sponsoring the Casablanca Group in 1961, for example, Morocco neutralized for a considerable time the anti-monarchist fervor of Egypt and Algeria, and diverted many leftists at home. By letting this moribund grouping die gracefully at Addis Ababa in May 1963, and favoring the creation of the Organization of African Unity, King Hassan impressed many of his own people and others abroad by seeming to favor African unity above outmoded national pride. Signing the OAU Charter last fall also allowed the government to drop its claims to Mauretania, a move which gratified France and many of her African protégés; at the same time it facilitated *rapprochement* with Tunisia, whose recognition of Mauretanian independence in 1960 had caused a diplomatic rupture with Morocco.

The withdrawal of its claim to Mauretania, however, was one reason for Morocco's subsequent effort to expand her borders at Algeria's expense. The move temporarily alienated her from Tunisia, and accelerated closer Algerian-Tunisian ties. But even though Morocco was rather obviously the aggressor, Algeria's southern neighbors, apprehensive of the potential neighborhood bully (Algeria), were not too distressed that the Algerian army received a setback. The African group mediating the conflict has thus been more than fair to Morocco, with much credit redounding to Hassan at home.

A bit of luck, and some skillful finessing, have netted Hassan even more impressive gains from the West. The denouement of the Algerian war, for example, led France to withdraw her remaining troops, and to lend Morocco extensive assistance. These conciliatory gestures, in turn, caused Spain not only to begin similar moves but also to discuss a settlement of territorial claims which may result in Morocco obtaining all but the small northern presidios. Another anti-colonialist coup, of course, was the reversion of the American air bases to Morocco, and their subsequent conversion into a civilian airport and several housing, educational and industrial centers. In brief, then, nonengagement in party politics at home, combined with shrewd nonalignment diplomacy abroad, have provided King Hassan with a workable basis for continued rule.

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VIII

The shelving or scorning of radical objectives or principles, accompanied by *de facto* economic dependence on the West, may seem somewhat hypocritical in the case of Algeria or even traditionally *suffisante* Morocco. A similar situation, however, represents no crisis of conscience for Tunisia. To the contrary, this little country's strength lies in the fact that her leaders always admitted her internal weaknesses, realized that they would have to adjust goals and policies to circumstances, and recognized that Western aid was essential to progress.

It was this skill at negotiating from weakness which enabled President Habib Bourguiba, for example, to recover completely from his one outstanding blunder—the attempt to force the French from Bizerte in July 1961. By taking a conciliatory tone toward De Gaulle, after a brief and unsuccessful flirtation with neutralism, Bourguiba obtained the complete evacuation of Bizerte in the fall of 1963, and is now converting the base into a major industrial complex. The habit of compromise also led him to heed demands of younger party members for a greater decentralization of the Neo-Destour Party, and to agree gracefully to reforms which have made his position at home stronger than it had been for several years. Bourguiba's popularity has been bolstered by the adoption, after careful consideration, of "Destourian socialism," which aptly blends private and public economic sectors, and by the general success of Tunisia's three-year development plan, to which the U.S. contributes about sixty million dollars a year. Furthermore, flexibility at home has been matched by adjustments in foreign policy which suit the complexities of the times.

Unlike his Maghrebian colleagues, who shifted from belligerent "neutralism" to increased friendship for the West, Bourguiba has in recent years adopted a "nonengagement" policy. This has been marked by limited relations with the East, increased contacts with the Arabs—including his erstwhile enemy Nasser—and intensive interest in Africa. These new diplomatic frontiers have made him immune to charges at home and abroad that he is the lackey of the West. More important, they have given Tunisia a wide area of operations and a wide range of possible allies in case of serious trouble with a neighbor such as Algeria.

A Tunisian-Algerian clash seemed not improbable until mid-1963, for Tunisia, too, has unrequited claims to the Sahara.

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Bourguiba had denounced Ben Bella's assumption of power in 1962, and the latter had retaliated with provocations against Bourguiba. Tunisia's growing political, economic and diplomatic strength, however, coupled with her subtle offers to help ease Algeria's economic difficulties in the spring of 1963, favorably impressed Ben Bella. Increased understanding began to bear fruit in the fall, with the signing of a series of agreements providing for the linking of telephone and telegraph lines, the sharing of natural gas and oil resources, coordination of production and marketing of many products, and cooperation in several other spheres. Bourguiba hopes to extend this Tunisian-Algerian cooperation to include Morocco and, to a limited degree, Libya.

IX

All the North African countries, in sum, are now coming to terms with themselves and with one another. Only Tunisia could probably be termed stable, in the sense of having firmly grounded and popularly understood institutions. But the head of each government enjoys broad internal support, and is trying to adjust his programs and actions to suit his country's needs rather than merely his personal preferences.

This growing pragmatism has brought with it greater tolerance of their neighbors' different methods of handling problems, and greater willingness to work with them where feasible. From this practical standpoint, we might regard the Moroccan-Algerian border skirmish not as a catastrophe, as many observers reported, but as a sobering experience for Algerians intoxicated with their own earlier successes, and for Moroccans and Tunisians who might have thought that force was a proper method of settling disputes. Political unification of North Africa is now recognized as an impossible short-term goal, but practical, albeit limited, economic cooperation is on the horizon.

The North Africans' reliance on pragmatism rather than doctrine might also add some new dimensions to our own methods of analyzing international developments and forming policies. It should be obvious, for example, that such terms as "socialism" or even "Marxism" mean different things to different peoples. Thus the Tunisians have their "Destourian socialism," spawned in Tunisia's unique national experiences and described as an aspect of the Tunisian term "Bourguibism."

The Algerians, by contrast, speak in words which any com-

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munist could understand. But they are speaking of an Algeria whose constitution describes the country as an Arab, Islamic state before it outlines a Leninist concept of party organization; which adapts Mao's ideas on liberation wars to an Arab-African milieu; which fought France instead of a class enemy, but which now works more closely with France than with any socialist country; which will decry America's treatment of Castro, but which deeply and sincerely mourned the death of the American President who proclaimed their own right to independence long before it was fashionable to do so.

We can no longer expect any North African state to align itself formally with us—even some of our best friends no longer do this—but it is possible that these countries might directly or indirectly further some of our basic policy objectives in Africa. In this connection, we might consider whether Algeria's help to the Portuguese and Mozambique rebels might not in the long run indirectly benefit the West; at least it helps to keep these African revolts within an African context. Furthermore, Algerian involvement in these struggles puts Washington in a position to persuade the Portuguese to make meaningful concessions if they want to maintain any influence in Africa and prevent complete disaster in these troubled areas. At the same time, of course, it would enable the United States to show Africans that we favor decolonization by moderate means.

Moreover, it is instructive to remember that Tunisia masterminded much of the United Nations Congo operation and, in effect, has often acted as a proxy for the United States in areas where we could do little work overtly. Conceivably, North African military contingents or civil servants could again help restore order in troubled African nations. This could be of significant help to the West if it becomes a question of preventing communist control of a part of the continent.

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ATLANTIC PARTNERSHIP — HOW?*

by Livingston Hartley

THE concept of Atlantic Partnership as a means toward Atlantic unity was launched before a world audience by President John F. Kennedy in his widely acclaimed Fourth of July speech of 1962. It was put forward at a time when Western Europe appeared to be moving directly toward an integrated union which would include Britain, when its economic resurgence had awakened among its peoples a new sense of pride and dignity and a new urge for equality with the United States, and when our own government still shrank from any Atlantic commitments of a supranational nature.

The phrase, Atlantic Partnership, had wide appeal, because it seemed to take account of anticipated developments in Europe and because everyone is familiar with partnerships in private life. But it has been described since then in such varied ways as to create confusion over what kind of a partnership is envisaged. Sometimes it has appeared from official statements to be bilateral in form, comprising only two partners; at other times, to be multilateral, consisting of many. Sometimes it has appeared to be a partnership of the future; at other times, a partnership which already exists but requires development.

I

If the concept of an Atlantic Partnership can actually provide the means for attaining greater unity, it is important to understand what it involves in terms of partners and of timing. In his Fourth of July speech, President Kennedy stated:

> We do not regard a strong and united Europe as a rival but as a partner. . . . We see in such a Europe a partner with whom we could deal on a basis of full equality in all the great and burdensome tasks of building and defending a community of free nations. . . .
>
> It would be premature at this time to do more than to indicate the higher regard with which we view the formation of this partnership. The first order of business is for our European friends to go forward in forming

*This article will appear as a chapter in a forthcoming book by Mr. Hartley, tentatively entitled "Atlantic Challenge," to be published by Oceana Publications early in 1965.

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the more perfect union which will some day make this partnership possible. A great new edifice is not built overnight. . . .

But I will say here and now on this day of independence that the United States will be ready for a Declaration of Interdependence—that we will be prepared to discuss with a United Europe the ways and means of forming a concrete Atlantic Partnership—a mutually beneficial partnership between the new union now emerging in Europe and the old American union founded here 175 years ago.

Earlier in 1962, in speeches made on February 6 and March 6, Under-Secretary of State George W. Ball had declared: "Yet a strong partnership must almost by definition mean a collaboration of equals. . . . We have wanted a Europe united and strong that could serve as an equal partner in the achievement of our common endeavors."

On April 24 of the same year, Dr. Walter Hallstein, President of the Commission of the European Economic Community, had declared that "Atlantic partnership . . . will . . . be built upon two mighty pillars: America on one side, and an integrated Europe on the other."

These statements appeared to contemplate a bilateral partnership which would be created at some future time after the nations of Western Europe had succeeded in forming a union sufficiently integrated to be able to function effectively as one of the partners.

In this period, the so-called "Dumbbell Theory" of partnership had a considerable vogue within the U.S. government. This phrase was used during the discussions of 1948 which preceded the drafting of the North Atlantic Treaty. It had then been derisively applied to ideas advanced by those who advocated a different type of security arrangement between the United States and Western Europe than that finally adopted in NATO. The "Dumbbell Theory" visualized two globes of power, one of them the United States and the other a United Europe, connected by a bar of mutual interest and cooperation. Its proponents emphasized the argument, which is theoretically irrefutable, that their two representatives would be able to make decisions much more rapidly and efficiently than the fifteen representatives of the NATO nations on the North Atlantic Council. What neither its proponents nor anyone else could estimate, however, is how difficult it would be for these two representatives to reach agreement.

II

Six months after President Kennedy's Fourth of July speech, General de Gaulle barred the British from membership in the

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Common Market and embarked upon policies which have drastically altered the prospects for the kind of Atlantic Partnership originally envisaged. Before turning to the conceptions of partnership which have developed since January 1963, it will be instructive to outline some problems inherent in the earlier concept of a partnership of equals consisting of the United States and a United Europe.

Economically, it does seem possible that a European Union which included Britain could develop into a more or less equal partner of the United States. While the U.S. gross national product would long remain greater, that of a United Europe might continue to grow at a faster rate. Such a Europe, moreover, would far outrank the United States in international trade. In this field, a bilateral partnership might operate effectively through the extension of mutual tariff reductions to other free nations by means of the most-favored-nation clause.

But militarily and strategically, it does not seem possible that a United Europe would be able to attain equality with the United States under any foreseeable conditions. Former Secretary of State Dean Acheson recently stated it this way:

> It is an illusion to believe that Europe can or will produce an independent nuclear deterrent within any time relevant to military planning, even if given the necessary technological help. Our European NATO allies spend annually on all defense about $15 billion. Secretary McNamara has told us that in the coming fiscal year the United States will spend $15 billion on nuclear weapons and delivery systems alone. The British nuclear effort over many years has strained available resources, reduced conventional forces to a minimum and produced a nuclear capability that may be, perhaps, 2 per cent of the nuclear striking power which the United States could now bring to bear in the NATO area.[1]

Furthermore, even if a United Europe should succeed in developing both the will and the capacity to match the U.S. nuclear effort at some future time, it would not become an equal partner of the United States in the field of defense. The reason is geographic, and therefore permanent: Western Europe lacks the space, which is available in the United States, for the dispersal of missiles and bombers to areas remote from cities. Missiles and planes deployed in congested Western Europe within a few hundred miles of the Soviet bloc will continue to be immeasurably more vulnerable to nuclear attack than those deployed in the western part of the United States. They will involve far greater

[1] "The Practice of Partnership," *Foreign Affairs,* January 1963.

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danger for cities and their people. Because of Western Europe's vulnerability, Western defense has been maintained on an Atlantic basis since the inception of NATO and is to be continued on that basis in the projected nuclear multilateral force.

Politically, a United Europe could not function as an equal partner of the United States until it had developed a governmental structure sufficiently integrated to conduct a single foreign policy. Until such a time, its political organs could take positions on major policy questions only after those positions had first been agreed to by the governments of its member nations.

The difficulty encountered by the existing European Economic Community in arriving at policies on economic questions has been clearly demonstrated in the preliminary negotiations for the "Kennedy Round." Although the EEC Commission is, in theory, solely responsible for negotiating with the United States on tariffs, U.S. representatives have repeatedly found the Commission hamstrung by divergent national viewpoints and have had to deal directly with EEC governments to reach agreement.

Another problem which alone might preclude the actual creation of a bilateral Atlantic Partnership is the question of Canada. The United States could not exclude Canada, our most intimate neighbor, which lies strategically in the heart of the Atlantic area. Yet it certainly would not be reasonable to expect Canada either to become a part of a United Europe or to cede to the U.S. government the power to speak for her in foreign and defense policy. Numerous discussions with officials in Washington have not yet elicited an answer to this problem.

Quite apart from the Canadian problem and from conditions which appear to preclude the attainment by a United Europe of full equality with the United States, there is the question whether such a bilateral partnership could actually function harmoniously. Between two more or less equal Powers there is always the possibility of disagreement and a resulting stalemate which will paralyze joint action or even lead to a serious split. Two roughly equal nations lack the capacity of a larger group of nations to provide a majority in support of one view which may enable the parties to reach a consensus. With the Soviet Union seeking always to sway the balance of power within the partnership, policy conflicts between the two partners might prove acutely dangerous to the future of the Atlantic world. Now that we have experienced the impact of the policies of De Gaulle since January 1963, the

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fear that a United Europe might develop into a "Third Force" in the conflict with communist imperialism appears more real than it did in 1962.

Everyone knows that there are no true parallels in history, but we have had a catastrophic lesson of what can happen when disagreement between two approximately equal Powers paralyzes concerted action. In the 1920's, with Germany defeated, the Soviet Union relatively weak and the United States withdrawn into isolation, Britain and France together wielded paramount influence in Europe. They both sought peace, but they disagreed on ways and means to maintain it and failed to work together. The direct result was the rise of Hitler's Germany with a military machine which subsequently overwhelmed their combined armies.

Finally, this "dumbbell" concept raises the problem of what the United States would do while waiting for Western Europe to become unified sufficiently to function as an effective partner. During this period, which even in 1962 was expected to last for a considerable number of years, would the United States merely mark time in Atlantic affairs? When the world is moving so fast, it surely would not be wise for the greatest Atlantic nation to depend upon others to develop the Atlantic relationship during an indefinite number of years.

III

The problems outlined above indicate the difficulties which would have been encountered, even under the most favorable conditions, in developing the concept of Atlantic Partnership put forward in 1962. Since January 14, 1963, the actions of De Gaulle have destroyed, at least for the near future, the basis of that concept. His exclusion of Britain from membership in his "Europe" prevents an Atlantic Partnership from being bilateral; we cannot have a "dumbbell" partnership unless we also are to exclude the British. By barring them, moreover, he has made it impossible for his "Europe" to approach even partial equality with the United States. Finally, by opposing and blocking supranational development within the Six, he has prevented his "Europe" from even beginning the progressive integration it must carry so far if Europe is to become a political unit capable of conducting a single foreign policy.

De Gaulle, of course, will not be with us always, but he has set in motion trends which cannot be quickly reversed. One of these

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may prove to be a reversal of British public opinion which in 1962 seemed to favor joining Europe; a large proportion of the British people have never felt that their country was a part of Europe and a great many more would prefer to participate in political integration on an Atlantic rather than a European basis.

Whether Britain and other EFTA countries will be included in the European Community by 1975 cannot now be foreseen. Even if such an expanded Europe becomes a fact, it would be unwise to count upon it developing by then, or even by 1985, the kind of supranational institutions essential for operating as a unit in world affairs. It should be remembered that the more nations the European Community includes, the more difficult this institutional development is likely to become.

During all these years, the Atlantic relationship will continue to evolve. It may do so in a direction quite different from that which would lead to a bilateral partnership. It may evolve toward the true Atlantic Community urged by the Atlantic Convention. Or its development may include a Europe without Britain or a Europe in which each national government continues to control its own foreign and military policies.

Under the changed conditions resulting from De Gaulle's *diktat* of January 1963, a new concept of Atlantic Partnership has become evident in the statements of responsible leaders.

President Kennedy seemed to bridge the gap between the old and the new concepts in his speech at Frankfurt, Germany, on June 25, 1963. He still held out hope for the eventual integration of Europe when he said: "We . . . look forward to a Europe united and strong—speaking with a common voice—acting with a common will—a world power capable of meeting world problems as a full and equal partner . . . a united Europe in an Atlantic Partnership —an entity of interdependent parts, sharing equally in both burdens and decisions." But he also referred to the role of individual European nations in the Atlantic relationship when he stated that "our nations are working together to strengthen NATO . . . and to build the Atlantic Community"; spoke of "developing a more closely unified Atlantic deterrent"; endorsed the proposed multilateral force which "would belong to all members, not one, with all participating on a basis of full equality"; and said that "in all the nations of the Alliance, we are called to a great new mission."

A week later, on July 2, President Kennedy declared at NATO

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Headquarters in Naples: "I return to the United States more firmly convinced than ever that common ideals have given us a common destiny, and that the Atlantic partnership is a growing reality." This statement appeared to imply that partnership was not solely a future goal but already existed.

This view was put in much more definite terms by President Lyndon B. Johnson in a speech which he delivered at Brussels on November 8, 1963 while he was still Vice President:

> We have a partnership—if we can keep it. Our challenge now is to keep what has been achieved and resume the momentum toward greater fulfillment.
>
> A partnership can survive face-to-face talk, however heated . . . we of the United States believe that greater use can be made of existing NATO organs for this purpose.
>
> The Atlantic partnership is not a dream, it is not a name—it is a fact.

That NATO is a means toward partnership had been suggested as early as April 30, 1963 by Senator J. William Fulbright, Chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, when he stated in his lectures at The Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy: "The single most useful step toward the strengthening of NATO as a meaningful instrument of Atlantic partnership would be the elevation of the NATO Council to the stature of a genuine organ of policy coordination."

President Johnson emphasized this point on December 16, 1963, in a message to the Ministerial Meeting of the North Atlantic Council, in which he said:

> In these fields . . . we must each assume responsibilities commensurate with our resources. That is what partnership in a vigorous Atlantic Community means and requires.
>
> To this end, we welcome the emergence of a Europe growing in unity and strength. For we know that only a uniting Europe can be a strong Europe, and only a strong Europe will be an effective partner.
>
> NATO is the enduring instrument for joining such a Europe and the United States in common programs to meet common military and political needs. On its success hinges, in large measure, the success of both European and American efforts to build the Atlantic partnership.

Since NATO includes Canada, Britain, Iceland and five other European countries as well as the United States and the European Community, this statement evidently envisages a partnership which is multilateral instead of bilateral.

This conclusion is reinforced by the following passage in the joint communiqué issued in Washington on February 13, 1964,

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by President Johnson and British Prime Minister Sir Alec Douglas-Home:

> It is within the Atlantic framework that the United States and the United Kingdom are conducting their examination of mutual defense problems. . . . Similarly, the widest possible political and economic cooperation in Europe within a broad Atlantic partnership remains a common aim of United States and British policy.

The statements of Presidents Kennedy and Johnson, made after De Gaulle's pronouncement of January 1963, portray a new concept of Atlantic Partnership which differs fundamentally from the earlier concept of 1962. The Partnership is no longer only a goal for the future; instead, it already exists and the goal is to develop it and make it more effective. The Partnership is no longer a bilateral relationship between two political entities; instead, it is now multilateral in character, comprising Britain and Canada as well as the United States and European countries. Finally, NATO is regarded as an instrument through which the Partnership can be developed.

Thus, if the Atlantic Partnership already exists, it is composed of individual nations, European as well as North American. The European Community has not yet created common institutions outside the economic field and it has a long and rough road to travel before it can evolve into a European Union which will speak "with a common voice" and act "with a common will."

And if this existing partnership is multilateral, then it comprises the NATO nations which, alone among Atlantic countries, have joined together for survival by adopting the far-reaching obligations of the North Atlantic Treaty and by creating a common defense. As NATO Secretary-General Dirk U. Stikker stated at the National Press Club in Washington on March 8, 1963: "The Atlantic Alliance is a partnership of free nations. . . . The whole structure of security and prosperity we have built up in the West rests on Western unity and on NATO, which gives that unity its practical expression."

This existing, multilateral partnership does not confront the problems implicit in the bilateral concept. There is no requirement for equality between the partners, which differ as greatly in size and power as the United States and Iceland. The question of the inclusion of Canada does not arise because Canada is one of the partners. The danger that disagreement between two approximately equal political entities might lead to a split

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between them or might paralyze joint action by them also disappears. And, of immediate importance, there is no reason or excuse for the United States or any other country to mark time in developing Atlantic relations while Europe is uniting. Any of the fifteen partners which desire to promote closer Atlantic unity —foremost among them the United States—can proceed with all possible speed to forge that unity through NATO and OECD and other collective means. Progress and development can continue within this partnership simultaneously on both the Atlantic and the European levels during all the years which must elapse before a closely united Europe can emerge.

In the years to come, perhaps after De Gaulle has relinquished power, we can hope that some effective form of European union will evolve. When such a union becomes sufficiently integrated to conduct a single foreign policy and defense, it could become a collective member of the Partnership instead of a group of national members. Under those conditions, the Atlantic Partnership would remain multilateral, but would comprise fewer partners. If Britain had become an integral part of the European Union, the Partnership would comprise that Union, the United States, Canada, Iceland, and any NATO countries in Europe which remained outside the Union. If Britain should remain apart from such a European Union, the Partnership would then comprise Britain in addition to the other members.

This Atlantic Partnership permits a progressive evolution of institutions and relationships to take place both within Europe and among the Atlantic nations as a whole. Seen in this light and in the light of the development of the Atlantic relationship during the last two decades, it becomes evident that the Atlantic Partnership envisaged now is actually another term for the Atlantic Community or, more precisely, the vital core of the Atlantic Community—the NATO nations. That Community of the peoples of North America and Western Europe will continue to evolve regardless of whether the principal countries of Western Europe eventually unite beneath one government or remain separate political entities.

IV

This conclusion will provoke dissent from some people on the grounds of terminology, which sometimes wields a surprising importance in political affairs. Dr. Walter Hallstein has on several occasions objected to the use of the phrase "Atlantic Community."

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In a speech to the NATO Parliamentarians' Conference on November 12, 1962, he said on this subject:

So far, I have spoken exclusively of an Atlantic Partnership, never of an "Atlantic Community." . . . my reason for rejecting the term "Atlantic Community" is . . . to avoid misunderstanding. In the sense that we are now accustomed to use it, the word "Community" implies an innovation, adopted to describe the fundamentally new organism established by the Treaties of Paris and Rome.

This argument is supported by many "Eurocrats" in Brussels and even by some American officials assigned there to deal with the European communities. The objection raised by Dr. Hallstein and the "Eurocrats" is understandable, for they have a vested interest in the word "Community" and naturally wish to restrict it to the new organism they serve. They are, moreover, accustomed to dealing in languages which are more precise than English.

Since semantics is involved on this point, it seems pertinent to refer to an authoritative definition. According to *Webster's New International Dictionary,* "Community" has a very broad meaning. It can be applied to "a body of people having common organization or interests," "society at large," "a commonwealth or state," or "the public or the people in general."

Speaking on this point at a Freedom Foundation dinner in New York on January 23, 1963, former Secretary of State Christian A. Herter took a position very different from Dr. Hallstein's and one with which most Americans would agree. He said:

Some of us in this country prefer to talk about the future in terms of an Atlantic Community. I know that our European friends shy away from this phrase because for them the word "community" has already acquired a clear and precise meaning—technical, economic and political—as the emerging structure of their continent. In short, they feel that the use of the word has already been pre-empted by Europe. . . .

At the same time, for many Americans, "community" is such a good word to describe relationships between people that I suspect some of us will continue to use it. I am a New Englander. In New England we say "community" when we are thinking about a society in which people live together as good neighbors, with a common recognition of the supremacy of law, and sharing the benefits of varied economic and political institutions while united by their common cultural heritage and by their feeling of a common destiny. It is in this sense that I speak of the Atlantic Community. . . .

It can be argued that it is somewhat presumptuous of the "Eurocrats" to try to pre-empt the word "community" for their own institutions when the term "Atlantic Community" was widely

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used long before these institutions were created. This view is reinforced by the fact that "Atlantic Community" is not only a popular phrase, but has been employed in official statements by every U.S. administration since the end of World War II. In terms of common heritage and civilization, this Community was already old when the United States first became a nation.

An analogy can perhaps be made here with the use of the word "commonwealth" which also has a wide variety of meanings. When the British Commonwealth came into being after World War I, this word gained another specific connotation. But the British, perhaps because they speak English, even if with a certain accent, did not insist that the Commonwealth of Massachusetts, which goes back to 1780, should change its name!

V

If the Atlantic Partnership now exists in a multilateral form and corresponds in reality to the NATO core of the Atlantic Community, we are faced today with essentially the same task we have confronted for fifteen years: finding ways of unifying this Community. The task remains, despite the recent economic resurgence of the countries of Continental Europe and the new attitudes it has awakened among their peoples.

It is possible that the earlier concept of a bilateral partnership has not been buried forever by De Gaulle. It may emerge at some future time with a consolidated European governmental structure in which the British are included and in which some arrangement has been made for the participation of Canada. But for the foreseeable future, we must deal with an Atlantic relationship based primarily upon the fifteen nations of NATO.

A concept far more applicable to this relationship than the now discredited "dumbbell theory" is that of "Two Concentric Circles," which goes back to the early 1950's. This envisaged the gradual creation of a closely-knit European Union within a looser Atlantic Community which would be developed adequately to contain that Union successfully.

This concept was reflected in these strong statements made by President Johnson, when Vice President, at the tenth anniversary of SHAPE on April 6, 1961:

> The United States is resolved to do everything within its power—and I emphasize the word "everything"—to enhance the strength and unity of the North Atlantic Community.

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Progress toward an integrated European community will help to . . . strengthen the Atlantic Community. A more cohesive and powerful Europe within a developing Atlantic Community is needed to undertake the large tasks which lie ahead. The essentially national and loosely coordinated efforts of the past will no longer suffice.

Our end goal . . . should be a true Atlantic Community in which common institutions will increasingly be developed to meet common problems.

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THE FOREIGN STUDENT IN AMERICA

by John F. Melby

IN almost any American community with an institution of higher learning the foreign student has become fashionable. So fashionable, indeed, that the demands upon his time all too frequently threaten to or actually do impair his academic performance which is, after all, the primary reason he came to the United States. Americans are paying court to the foreign student for several obvious reasons, and some not so obvious.

Americans are by nature a friendly people. Our whole national experience and the high mobility of our society have taught us at first hand what it means to be a stranger in a new community and how much difference a kind word can mean. Despite our seeming gregariousness, each of us knows the meaning of loneliness. Furthermore, Americans with their new and unsought world responsibilities have become painfully aware of how little they know about other peoples. The foreign student is one easy and usually pleasant way of making a dent in our ignorance.

If one suggests that foreign students have a direct relationship to U.S. foreign policy and that every American with whom they come in contact automatically plays some small role in the implementation of that foreign policy, the reaction of the "average" American is almost invariably one of immediate denial and even great embarrassment. How could anyone attribute to Americans such a "Machiavellian" motive for "playing host" to foreign students? In fact, however, can the foreign student escape from playing a significant role in international relations? And can the American who meets or knows him be other than a foreign policy "actor," for better or for worse? Let us first examine the American foreign student program that provokes this controversial question.

I

Although traditionally Americans studied in Europe—despite Mr. Jefferson's warning on the dangers of this practice—students in small numbers have always come to the United States as well. Perhaps the first one was Francisco de Miranda of Venezuela, one of the precursors of Latin American independence. And al-

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most a century ago an awakening Japan sent about fifty students to Rutgers, which has ever since maintained a special interest in that country. Still, the foreign student in America was something of a curiosity until the twentieth century. And the present flood of students is a phenomenon of the post-World War II period.

The official figures[1] for this year will probably show that there are approximately 75,000 foreign students in the United States. In all likelihood, the actual number will be closer to 100,000.[2] They come from literally every country and political subdivision of the globe, and there is not a subject taught in this country which some foreign student is not studying somewhere. They are enrolled in at least 1,400 of our 2,000 institutions of higher learning. (Just how they manage to discover some of the more obscure schools remains a mystery.) Thus it is an unusual community or college student who does not know or at least have the opportunity to know an educated man or woman from another country.

About one fifth of the foreign students are women; the average age is in the mid-twenties, and the length of stay in the United States is from one to four years. Ten per cent are on U.S. government scholarships, another 10 per cent on foreign government scholarships, almost 30 per cent on a combination of private scholarships and self-support, and more than half are entirely on their own resources. The overwhelming majority of them will be members of the elite groups in their own countries when they return home.

Why do they come here? Basically, they come to get an education. It must seem ironic to them that American cities must mount massive campaigns to reduce the number of school dropouts when literally millions of foreign students would have come to the United States if they had possessed the funds and if we had been able to accommodate them. The desperate hunger of the underdeveloped world for education can be understood only by those who have personally experienced it. The rest of the world has for years known something Americans are only tardily beginning to appreciate, namely, that the fundamental resource of the world is people: there can be no meaningful economic

[1] *Open Doors,* an annual publication of the Institute of International Education, gives foreign student statistics compiled on behalf of the U.S. Department of State.

[2] The smaller figure does not include several thousand trainees from the armed forces of other countries, many thousands of U.S. government short-term trainees, official short-term visitors, or high school students under the auspices of the American Field Service or the American Friends Service Committee.

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growth, no decent standards of living without developing people. This requires education. A recent United Nations study showed that the battle for literacy is falling behind the rate of population growth. It is no accident, for example, that the struggle of the Negro for his rightful place in American society focuses so largely on education without which he is severely handicapped.

More specifically, the foreign student comes here for three reasons: In the first place, he believes he can get the type of training that will enhance his professional status at home. Secondly, all except the completely self-centered individuals believe this training will be of direct benefit to their countries. Thirdly, although this motive may be present only in the subconscious of many, they come to learn about and, hopefully, to understand the United States. An examination of these three points will provide a basis for evaluating the foreign student program.

II

Are foreign students generally satisfied with their education in America? A study[3] done three years ago at the University of Pennsylvania showed that only 2 per cent were dissatisfied, while well over 90 per cent were quite satisfied. These figures are even more surprising in view of the large numbers of students from former European colonies who had been persuaded by their former masters of the basic inferiority of American education; many of them have come here only because they could not go to Europe and an American education was better than nothing. As the number of American-educated students returning home increases, this attitude is rapidly disappearing. Of the thousands of foreign students I have known, only one non-European with both an American and a European education thinks that the American variety is manifestly inferior—and he is a white South African of East European origin who plans to return to South Africa. There are many who quite rightly see advantages and disadvantages in both systems; this depends on the individual and the kind of training he wants.

It would be comforting if the question of academic satisfaction could be allowed to rest here. Unhappily, this is only the beginning of a troublesome and largely unsolved series of problems concerning the preferences of the students and the needs of

[3]John F. Melby and Elinor K. Wolf, *Looking Glass for Americans—A Study of the Foreign Students at the University of Pennsylvania* (Philadelphia: National Council on Asian Affairs, 1961).

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the underdeveloped countries. Many fortunate foreign students, before coming to the United States or before returning home, know exactly what they will be doing when school days are over. For them the terminal months in America are mixed with a certain sadness at the ending of the experience of a lifetime as well as the excitement of returning home to fruitful and productive work. For just as many, however, the final year is marred by a growing anxiety. They worry not only about what kind of work they can find, but in many instances about whether they will find a job at all or how long it will take to find one. In a world crying for literacy and for skills, it seems paradoxical that the foreign student should be anxious about finding a job.

III

The years of experience which Americans have had with economic aid programs have slowly and painfully impressed upon us and upon the developing countries the fact that the proper utilization of skills is a very complicated business. The earlier and facile assumption that in a country short on technology any skill can be used and be useful is not only false, but it also leads to waste and frustration. At any point in a country's economic development, only a certain number of highly skilled persons can be profitably employed. Whereas the United States will probably never have enough Ph.D.'s, India cannot give employment to more than a limited number of Ph.D.'s until it has enough master mechanics, carpenters, bricklayers and midwives to staff the base of the workforce pyramid. Thus, some foreign students, returning home with an advanced degree, will not be able to find a job requiring a high degree of professional competence.

Presumably a graduate engineer should be able to operate a lathe, or a brain surgeon deliver a baby, if that is the best available outlet they can find to occupy their time. But it is not necessarily as simple as that. Conceivably, they might not be very good at these less exacting tasks, although better than the untrained person. Furthermore, it can be irreparably damaging and demoralizing for a man to work at a level considerably below his capacity and training; and it is a serious misuse of educated manpower in a world which cannot afford to waste this scarce human resource.

The gnawing doubt is whether American technological training is what the underdeveloped countries really need most. Unfortunately, no comprehensive study on this subject has been

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made, but we do know that a substantial number of scientists and engineers from these countries go to great lengths to avoid returning home. Not all these expatriates are moved solely by higher wages and more comfortable living conditions, although some undoubtedly are. This group at least is using its skills—but not where these skills are most needed.

The doubt takes on a different kind of edge when we consider the other category of foreign students whose future is uncertain. Many foreign students are studying literature, music, art, archaeology or Sanskrit. Somehow, it is difficult to conceive of scholarship on Chaucer as having a very high priority among Ceylon's real needs, or the importance of a violin teacher for Korea. But what can one do about it?

There is probably no one solution. Rather it must come from a variety of self-restraints, each helping to ameliorate the problem. It should be emphasized at the outset that a nucleus of the finest skills must be available in each country, if for no other reason than to set local standards toward which others may aspire. Some governments with large needs and small resources regularly permit to go abroad only those students for whom there will be an important job and whose skills can be fully utilized. That a certain element of favoritism on occasion creeps into this selection is inevitable and, if within bounds, probably tolerable. Other governments, notably that of India for example, have taken the position that it is quintessential to a democracy that the individual should make his own choice—without interference from the state—as to what he will do with his life. This is a particularly difficult argument for an American to counter.

There is, in fact, probably no counter-argument except that the individual who enjoys the privileges of a free society has some responsibility to that society which makes his freedom possible. India, when faced with a Chinese invasion, found it necessary to limit foreign exchange for students; the decision was made to provide this assistance to those students pursuing the more "practical" courses of study. No one seriously questioned the decision, not even some of the Indian students in the United States who were cut off and found themselves in financial straits. So far as the future of the Indian state is concerned, is there any important difference—except in degree of immediacy and dramatic impact—between the Chinese invasion and the possibility that the Indian economic experiment may not succeed? Would

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it not be wise for India to take into account the latter stark reality—as it did the former—to establish stricter criteria, based on India's developmental needs, for its support of students abroad and thus to reduce the "waste" of its precious foreign exchange? These are hard decisions to make and some of them will be mistakes, but the price of economic failure could be much higher.

The burden of making these difficult decisions should not be placed entirely on the already overburdened shoulders of the developing countries. The United States, which is paying a large part of the bill for development (although Americans could contribute more without feeling a financial pinch), should bear some of the inevitable onus of telling some students they cannot have the kind of education they want or as much of it as they are capable of acquiring. Should this onus fall on public or private American shoulders? In view of the pattern of freewheeling individual frenzy that we call American private and voluntary civic action and that by and large works better than anyone might expect, one is tempted to suggest that American private colleges and universities should assume this responsibility and should practice a little more discrimination in the admission of foreign students than they usually do. The real reason for these loose admission practices, which have driven more than one interested and dedicated academic adviser to the brink of isolationism, is that colleges often do not understand the problem and still quite properly feel they have an obligation to help where they can; hence they lean over backward to admit foreign students with questionable academic and personal qualifications. Nor is there any realistic reason why they should understand. It is one thing for Harvard with its Nigeria program or Montana with its Afghan program to know about these individual countries, but how can Slippery Rock State Teachers College or even the University of Chicago with their first students from Honduras and Cambodia be expected to understand? The dilemma puts us back, unfortunately, in the lap of that old bogeyman and whipping boy, the federal government.

What other institution is in a position to make the studies necessary to evaluate the effectiveness of the foreign student program? Who else is in a position to evaluate foreign student credentials, on the basis of which colleges can make responsible decisions about admission? (Final decision to admit or reject must, of course, remain with the college.) Who else is in a posi-

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tion, by law, to discuss with other governments their real needs and resources? And who else has the legal authority to work out with other governments cooperative and self-restraining programs designed for the maximum benefit of all? The answer is that all these things are already being done and have had some effect, but they are done haphazardly, on too small a scale, and without an overall plan. The additional need could be met without anything really new or revolutionary; rather, by improving and coordinating existing practices.

IV

This brings us to the third, and strictly non-academic, reason why the foreign student comes here—to become better informed about America. It is for this reason that the foreign student is an important factor in U.S. foreign policy.

Almost all foreign students returning home after studying in America become members of their countries' growing elite groups. This is only natural, for they have received an education superior in most cases to that of their contemporaries who remained home; most of them must also have possessed greater initiative and energy to have ventured into a foreign land. The attitudes toward Americans which they take home will condition the attitudes of their fellow countrymen for many years to come, for they are the ones who have seen our country, lived with us, and formed firsthand opinions (however erroneous some may be) about America and Americans. In some instances, these opinions have already had a major impact. In some African countries where a president or cabinet minister over thirty-five is a rarity, many students were active in politics before they came to our shores; they report regularly to their leaders while they are here, and all will most assuredly be active in politics as soon as they return. A few illustrations will suffice to show that this phenomenon—the entrance into political affairs in their own country of those young people who have studied in the United States—is neither rare nor insignificant.

The puppet president of the Philippines during the Japanese occupation, José Laurel, never made any secret of the fact that his distaste for Americans and his willingness to collaborate with Japan stemmed from his student days at Yale: he was courting a young lady in New Haven until her father bodily ejected him from the house with an unprintable epithet about the color of

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his skin. Nor is there much reason to doubt that some of the unfavorable attitudes of President Nkrumah toward the United States are related to unpleasant experiences at the University of Pennsylvania and in Philadelphia, the City of Brotherly Love. Many foreign students today have serious reservations about American democracy when they not only witness but on occasion are directly affected by infringements of civil rights. If all these examples concern our race problem, it is only because this is the problem which most often leaves the greatest imprint on foreign students. But there are other shortcomings in American society —our slums, inadequate educational facilities, chaotic traffic, lack of urban renewal, and seeming irrationality in public life—which also amaze or disgust our student guests.

There is, of course, another side, much more representative of American society. The proverbial fondness and admiration of the Chinese for Americans before 1949 was based largely on personal friendships, mutual respect and warm human relationships, rather than attachment to the American dollar and commerce. Perhaps the single most important factor over the last 150 years in shaping American policy toward China has been the missionary movement. By the same token, it can be argued that the single most important factor in creating good-will among the Chinese toward the United States was also the American missionary, and he did it mainly by sending Chinese students to the United States. Thousands of them returned to become leaders in their country. In the latter years of the Nationalist regime it was difficult to find an American in China who did not know a Chinese alumnus of his own alma mater. These ties create personal relationships which should not be lightly dismissed.

It is worth recording here that the basic understanding of and friendliness toward Americans of men like the Governor General of Nigeria and the Foreign Minister of Pakistan can be traced, at least in part, to happy student experiences in the United States. These examples can be multiplied many times over. Even in the midst of our great civil rights debate of recent years, the American sense of fair play and the American social conscience have come to our rescue. Many foreign students witnessed the march of Negro and white Americans on Washington and the humiliation which most Americans felt when federal troops had to be used to enroll one Negro student at the University of Mississippi. Such evidences of social justice did much

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to counteract skepticism about the American protestation that the rights and duties of our society belong to all citizens.

These attitudes are formed through experiences and contacts outside the classroom and laboratory: relationships with American students and relationships with the community. There is probably no part of his extracurricular experience which the foreign student enjoys more than getting to know "average" Americans off campus. The idea of taking a stranger into your home is alien to most other peoples and the foreign student is often at first puzzled or surprised. Once convinced of the genuine sentiment behind this unique American institution, he enjoys it.

To innumerable foreign students this kind of contact has made the difference between loneliness and a sense of warm acceptance. There is hardly an American community which does not now have a home hospitality program, and any foreign student who does not have an "American family"—or frequently several—probably does not want one. The community response to this challenge has been remarkable and in the best American tradition. Philadelphia has long been a pioneer in this field. The International House of Philadelphia, which handles the program for the area colleges and universities, has introduced something new in the last year or so. As soon as a student is admitted to a college in the area he is assigned a host family who writes to him before he leaves home, arranges to meet him on arrival, and often takes him home for a few days before classes start to help him get settled and accustomed to our way of life. To the average foreign student who arrives hot, tired, hungry, dirty, confused and wanting nothing quite so much as to get on the next plane and go home, a friendly welcome can make all the difference in the world. Most of these host families (those with young children seem to work best) probably never think of it, but each of them is playing a role in foreign affairs, as well as adding a new dimension to its life.

Far less encouraging is the foreign student's relationship with American students, and nothing disturbs him more. He has heard that Americans are friendly, informal and approachable and he finds that this is true, but often the relationship ends there. Close friendship does not follow and he is puzzled and a little hurt. It is not that the American is hostile; he is simply apathetic and preoccupied with his own concerns. As much as the foreign stu-

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dent appreciates his off-campus contacts, he wants to have even more friends among his contemporaries and professional colleagues. The American student, although he is usually not aware of this, plays a role in foreign policy just as his off-campus fellow citizens. Many campus foreign student advisers are concerned that the American student, on the average, is not playing this role as well as he could.

There are currently two approaches to foreign student work. One says in effect that there are no foreign students on campus, only students. The college provides the required routine immigration and legal services and perhaps special personal counseling; after that it is up to the student to make his own way. This may be adequate in a small school with half a dozen foreign students, but increasingly those in foreign student work are convinced that it is not enough. Americans are simply too busy to take on this new task without guidance and leadership. The community program did not just happen; it was organized and promoted.

The second approach is based on this realization. It holds that the successful integration of the foreign student into campus life must be carefully planned, so that he participates with American students in all the things Americans do. Furthermore, the student program must be an integral part of the international activities in which the university participates. It will not achieve maximum effectiveness if separated from the other international programs, whether academic or extracurricular. It is worth noting that the most fruitful programs are at institutions which subscribe to this approach; and, for whatever significance may be attached to this fact, most of the outstandingly successful programs are at state universities, such as the Universities of Michigan, Illinois, Texas and California. But it would be unfair to the American student to drop the matter here. I know from personal experience that many American students have found friendship with foreign students to be among their most cherished college experiences. They only needed to gain awareness of the opportunity for and importance of these contacts, and then they pursued them with interest and zest.

V

The foreign student, by virtue of his presence in America, becomes a factor in U.S. foreign policy—a factor over which the

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average American can wield considerable influence. There is every reason to believe that the foreign student will continue to come in spiraling numbers to America. If Americans believe that they have something to offer the rest of the world which will make it a better place in which to live, there can be no more effective channel of communication than the tens of thousands of young people who come eagerly to the United States because they too believe we have something to offer. We will fulfill their expectations and serve our own interests if we have prepared mutually beneficial foreign student programs.

In our own lifetime the world has become a village, and every man is neighbor to every other man. The foreign student in our midst is a talented and interesting neighbor who will soon return to assume his place among the elite of his society. It behooves Americans to remember that his experience and treatment in America will have an important bearing on his attitudes and actions and eventually on the policies of his country and on our own security and welfare.

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Reviews

European Integration and the Anglo-Saxons*

by Robert L. Pfaltzgraff, Jr.

Since the Second World War, Europe has undergone a transformation which rivals in importance the changes that have swept the former colonial regions. Despite the disappearance of overseas possessions, Europeans have experienced an unprecedented level of prosperity. The age of mass production and consumption has come to Europe in the last generation. Moreover, at a time when nationalism was producing new states in Asia and Africa, Europeans began to experiment with a variety of techniques for resolving problems which lay beyond the individual capabilities of the older nations of Europe.

The success of Europeans in attaining high levels of economic growth, the progress of the Common Market toward the achievement of its objectives, and the growing British and U.S. interest in developments in Europe in the early sixties have served to produce numerous books about European integration. The four books herein examined focus upon such institutions as the Coal and Steel Community and the European Economic Community, while probing the causes of Europe's resurgence and analyzing British and U.S. policy toward the Continent.

Professor Max Beloff traces in considerable detail the evolution of U.S. policy toward European integration, while Professor Hans Schmitt devotes a part of his study to an examination of the impact of such U.S. programs as the Marshall Plan upon the movement toward unity in Europe. As Beloff suggests, Americans displayed a "relative indifference" to regional organization until the end of the war. It was the Soviet use of the veto in the UN Security Council, together with the eruption of the Cold War, which led U.S. policymakers to give greater emphasis to proposals for European integration. U.S. policy, during the years between 1945 and 1947, shifted gradually toward recognition of the necessity for Europeans, in a divided continent, to submerge their national differences first for the attainment of the objective of economic recovery and later to thwart communist expansion westward. Parallel with this change in U.S. policy, as Beloff and Schmitt each

**The United States and the Unity of Europe.* By Max Beloff. Washington: The Brookings Institution, 1963. 124 pp. $3.50.

The Path to European Union. By Hans A. Schmitt. Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1962. 272 pp. $6.00.

The Politics and Economics of European Integration. By U. W. Kitzinger. New York: Praeger, 1963. 256 pp. $5.50.

The New Europe Today—and Tomorrow. By George Lichtheim. New York: Praeger, 1963. 248 pp. $5.50.

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illustrate, came a reassessment of the postwar position of Germany in Europe.

Both authors agree, however, that the Marshall Plan represented a passive reaction to communist pressure rather than a deliberate U.S. effort to divide Europe. Beloff traces the process of policy formulation in the months preceding Secretary of State Marshall's famous address at Harvard University in June 1947. U.S. policymakers sought a means to reduce European exchange controls, to hasten a transition to currency convertibility and lower tariffs, and thus to promote economic recovery.

It was the Soviet refusal to participate in a program which would have required communist regimes, with their phobia about secrecy, to reveal economic and financial data which heightened the division between Eastern and Western Europe. However, in calling upon European states to collaborate in drawing up plans for economic recovery the United States provided a powerful stimulus to integration in Western Europe. In order to allocate U.S. aid, the Europeans created in 1948 the Organization for European Economic Cooperation (OEEC), which also facilitated the reduction of trade barriers. High European tariffs, together with other devices to restrict trade, had hampered European economic recovery. It was an American view that Europe had suffered from the absence of a mass market for her industries. If a market approximating in population that of the United States could be created in Europe, reasoned not a few Americans, the Old World could experience an unprecedented wave of prosperity. The steps taken in 1948 marked the beginning of a process which still unfolds in Western Europe, thanks to such organizations as OEEC, the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC) and the Common Market (EEC).

In his study, Schmitt examines in detail the development and operation of ECSC. He traces the negotiations for the creation of a common market for coal, iron and steel through the period between 1950 and 1952. He gives special emphasis to the various interest groups whose demands it was necessary to satisfy before national legislatures in the Six could approve ECSC. According to Schmitt, "industrial groups, labor unions, ministers of transport, economics and finance—in short, everybody who had something to lose, or thought he had—came with a bill of particulars which 'had' to be taken into account before the work [of drafting the ECSC Treaty] was finished." (p. 67.)

In parliamentary debates, Schmitt writes, socialists tended to oppose the Coal and Steel Community while Christian Democrats, by and large, supported its creation. In his book, U.W. Kitzinger, writing on the same subject, observes that the socialist parties of the Six "were the first to set up a well-organized party group, based on the International, with regular meetings, a permanent secretariat,

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their own rooms in the Assembly building, and an elected leader who spoke and put questions and proposed motions and amendments on behalf of French and German, Italian and Dutch, Belgian and Luxembourg socialists combined." (p. 79.) Undoubtedly, socialist leaders felt that only in such a manner could they assure an adequate hearing of their views in ECSC. In the last decade, however, socialist support in the Six for integration has risen. Interest groups which opposed ECSC have ranked themselves subsequently among its more ardent supporters. Thus sector integration has proved successful in arousing at least limited support among political leaders, trade unionists and individualists—those groups whose interests ECSC most immediately affects.

Although concerned primarily with the evolution of British policy, Kitzinger examines the nature of supranationality in Europe. Each of the European Communities (ECSC, EEC and EURATOM), it is suggested, embodies features of supranationality. According to Kitzinger, "supranationality only starts to come into play when a state agrees that it is willing to carry out decisions to which it is itself opposed." He then concludes that "such a situation arises when it has agreed to be outvoted if necessary by other states—either by a simple or by some weighted or qualified majority." (p. 61.) Yet such a criterion by itself does not serve to distinguish the Communities of Europe from the United Nations, where systems of majority voting also obtain.

The Coal and Steel Community differs from other international organizations in several respects. To be sure, it embodies voting procedures by weighted majorities. But the ECSC is endowed with the authority to deal directly with individuals, rather than with national governments. The Coal and Steel Community receives its revenues not from member governments, but from a levy upon producers of those commodities which fall within its charge. The ECSC possesses the authority, which it has exercised, to impose fines upon firms which do not comply with its regulations. Thus ECSC reflects in its structure the federalist logic: to remove authority gradually from the nation-state and place it instead in the hands of a supranational organization responsible ultimately to the citizenry of the Community.

As George Lichtheim suggests, the High Authority of the ECSC was vested with the "right to control prices, to channel investments, to raise loans and credits, to allocate steel and coal during periods of shortage, and to fix production if there was a surplus. Since the Authority financed its own administration by a levy on every ton of coal and steel produced in the Community, it was independent of the governments and thus virtually sovereign." (p. 46.) Thus in contrast to most other international organizations, the ECSC by-passes national governments. However, it is not, as Lichtheim admits, in-

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dependent of governmental influence, since the High Authority could hardly exist without the support of the nation-states whose coal, steel and iron production fall within its jurisdiction. ECSC is therefore but a pale image of the federal Europe envisaged by its founders.

The United States gave its support to ECSC as a device which might serve not only to promote European integration, but also to subject to European control the productive capacities of a reviving Germany. Moreover, American policymakers, as Beloff and Schmitt illustrate, saw in the Pleven Plan for the European Defense Community (EDC) a means for rearming Germany without building a German national army. A German contribution might strengthen Europe where the NATO shield was weakest.

Although few Europeans in the first half of the decade of the 1950's doubted the credibility of the U.S. nuclear guarantee, there were fears in Europe and the United States that American forces could not resist a communist invasion in Europe while troops were committed in Korea. Furthermore, EDC gained adherents in Washington as the Korean War gave way to protracted truce negotiations. Adoption of the Pleven Plan, it was thought, might lead to greater European contributions of conventional forces at a time when the Eisenhower Administration was tailoring its defense establishment to a doctrine of "massive retaliation," and thus relying increasingly upon nuclear weapons rather than conventional forces. Urgency for a German contribution to European defense, therefore, grew. Both the Schuman and Pleven plans had as one of their aims to subject German capabilities—military and economic—to European control and to the strengthening of the West.

As Beloff agrees, the United States saw in EDC a means for "getting the Europeans to accept a proper share of the burden of the common defense"—a problem which has preoccupied successive U.S. administrations. (p. 81.) The United States urged Europeans to adopt EDC with a fervor similar to the Kennedy Administration's support for British entry into the Common Market. In both cases Washington officials expressed dismay when French governments in the Fourth and Fifth Republics rejected successive U.S. conceptions of a "Grand Design" for European and North Atlantic unity.

Kitzinger and Lichtheim have considered in detail the evolution of British policy toward European integration since the Second World War. Both believe that Britain would have gained by membership in the Communities of the Six. The British economy would have been exposed to the competition of efficient rivals on the Continent. Markets closed to Britain would have been opened in Europe. Furthermore, Britain might have had greater opportunities for exercising political leadership in a united Europe at a time when her in-

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fluence in the Commonwealth was waning and the value of her "special relationship" with the United States appeared to be diminishing.

Kitzinger's study represents an expanded and updated version of a book first published in Britain in 1961 in order to set forth the author's case for British EEC membership. The latest edition contains sections on the breakdown of the Brussels negotiations, together with the author's suggestions for British policy in the aftermath of President de Gaulle's veto of Britain's Common Market application. The value of the study might have been enhanced, however, by the rewriting of sections from earlier editions which, in the light of Britain's exclusion from the EEC, now appear somewhat dated.

Nevertheless, Kitzinger provides the reader with cogent analyses not only of economic trends in Britain, but of the reasons which prompted the British government to apply for Common Market membership. Kitzinger, like Lichtheim, contrasts the laggard performance of Britain's economy with those of the Six. According to Lichtheim, Britain suffered during the 1950's from a twofold economic problem: Rates of economic growth were lower than on the Continent; moreover, slow growth was not balanced by price stability in Britain. Hence Britain combined the disadvantages of economic stagnation with those of inflation. Productive capacity failed to increase, while rising price levels helped to render British exports less competitive in world markets. At the same time, Britain's imports grew twice as fast as her exports, thus contributing to periodic balance of payments crises, one of which struck Britain in the summer of 1961, just before Prime Minister Macmillan announced that his government would apply for EEC membership.

Britain's lack of economic dynamism, as Kitzinger concedes, may have been obscured by her trade with other Commonwealth countries, even though British trade with the rest of the Commonwealth had declined considerably in the decade before she applied for Common Market membership. In fact, by 1962 British trade with other EFTA countries and the Six exceeded that with the overseas Commonwealth. Nevertheless, Commonwealth countries increased their commerce with third countries at a rate far greater than their decline in trade with Britain. Hence, while the trade of Commonwealth members grew markedly in the decade before 1961, former British colonies traded more and more with third countries, rather than with Britain. Kitzinger and Lichtheim refute the notion held by numerous Britons, i.e., that the EEC was "inward looking." By 1962 the volume of EEC trade with non-Western countries exceeded that of Britain, while the Six gave considerably more aid to developing countries than did the United Kingdom.

Undoubtedly, it is appropriate that Kitzinger attributes the British decision to opt for Common Market membership to such "objec-

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tive" factors as trade and the attempt of the Macmillan Government to assert British leadership in Europe as the basis for greater influence with the superpowers, rather than to popular pressures in Britain for such a course of action. Industrialists, newspaper editors, and some political officials favored entry into the Common Market. Before 1961, however, British public opinion, as Kitzinger suggests, did not join wholeheartedly in a campaign to urge EEC membership upon the Macmillan Cabinet. Instead, it appears to have been such factors as the success of the Common Market in comparison with Britain's unimpressive economic performance; a downward revision of Britain's estimate of the importance of the "special relationship" with the United States; and the failure of Britain to develop her own nuclear delivery system (as evidenced in the decision in 1960 to abandon the Blue-Streak rocket program) which contributed to a historic reversal of British policy in 1961.

Schmitt concludes his study of European integration with the formation of the Common Market in 1957. The other authors, however, consider the Brussels negotiations which ended in 1963. Kitzinger credits the Nassau Agreement, initialed by President Kennedy and Prime Minister Macmillan, with having convinced President de Gaulle that he must veto the British EEC application. De Gaulle may have contrasted the slowness of the Brussels negotiations with the alacrity with which the British agreed during the Kennedy-Macmillan talks of December 1962 to make available their nuclear capabilities, according to the Nassau communiqué, "for inclusion in a NATO multilateral nuclear force" (and hence, in de Gaulle's view, to place them under U.S. control). The British, De Gaulle may have reasoned, were prepared to haggle in Brussels about the tariff to be applied to canned kangaroo meat, while agreeing hastily to U.S. proposals for Britain's nuclear defense. Such action, in De Gaulle's estimation, hardly indicated that the British were wholeheartedly "European" in outlook. Thus De Gaulle, confirmed in his suspicions about *Albion perfide* and strengthened, incidentally, by the popular support for his policies evidenced in the French elections of 1962, could veto a British EEC application which appeared as a threat to eventual French pre-eminence in Europe.

The French had harbored misgivings about British entry into the Common Market from the beginning of the Brussels negotiations. In fact, French disenchantment with Britain was balanced by a *rapprochement* with the German Federal Republic in the years following the failure of EDC. In 1954, France had refused to participate in EDC because Britain would not join as a counter to the Germans. By 1963, however, the French relied upon their new partnership with the Germans not only as a means for restricting the entry of more members to the EEC, but as the cornerstone for

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a united Europe. Therefore, as Kitzinger suggests, the British claim that the EEC offered the prospect for British leadership of a united Europe could only have aroused French suspicions and resentment. This was precisely the role which President de Gaulle had reserved for France. Moreover, the French undoubtedly had noted the hardening division of opinion in Britain on the EEC question in the autumn of 1962. The Labour Party had rejected membership unless its terms for entry were met. Even if the Conservative Government had committed Britain to membership, it was conceivable that a future Labour government might repudiate the terms of entry. In fact, British public opinion polls, as Kitzinger points out, indicated an erosion of popular support for the governing Conservative Party during the summer and autumn of 1962. Some of those who opposed the terms of entry which emerged from Brussels called for a general election before Britain committed herself to EEC membership.

Kitzinger considers the course of the Brussels negotiations. As he properly suggests, when the talks for British entry into the Common Market ended on January 29, 1963, many important issues remained unresolved. To be sure, between May and August 1962 the Six had reached agreement upon an "outline package" of terms. The Common Market offered African and Caribbean Commonwealth members EEC associate status. The EEC agreed to conclude comprehensive trade arrangements by 1966 with India, Pakistan and Ceylon, in order to increase the foreign exchange earnings of these countries. The Six and Britain reached an accord about the necessity for the termination by 1970 of preferential entry into Britain for manufactures from Canada, Australia and New Zealand. However, the future relationship between an enlarged EEC and New Zealand remained in question. The problem of entry for other Commonwealth temperate-zone producers of agricultural products was still to be resolved. Nor had the conferees reached agreement upon the terms of EEC membership for other EFTA countries, whose interests Britain had pledged to protect at the beginning of the Brussels parley. In short, the British negotiators found themselves enmeshed in tedious discussions while domestic opposition to British EEC entry grew during the course of 1962.

Each of these studies charts achievements and setbacks in the movement toward European integration. Each assessses the accomplishments and failures of U.S. policy vis-à-vis unity in Europe. The United States emerges as a nation bent upon forwarding the supranational principle in Europe but failing to understand, and hence underestimating, the strength of groups in Europe whose "grand design" differs from that of Washington. The "Atlantic partnership" envisaged by the Kennedy Administration, which Beloff describes, represented but the latest American

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effort since the end of World War II to achieve an integrated Europe. Apparently, U.S. policymakers, subconsciously at least, had assumed in 1962 that the Europe of the Six would be increased in membership. This assumption and U.S. plans for an Atlantic partnership were based largely upon Jean Monnet's conception of a united Europe—a conception which differed from that of President de Gaulle. The elementary fact that de Gaulle, not Monnet, possessed a veto over the immediate course of events in Europe seems to have escaped U.S. policymakers.

In 1963, the Kennedy Administration, like the Eisenhower Administration in 1954 during the EDC debate, had little understanding of French policy and seemed oblivious of the fact that France occupies a pivotal position in schemes for European integration and Atlantic unity. The British, despite their longer acquaintance with European politics and their geographical proximity to the Continent, found themselves equally unprepared for the French EEC veto.

An examination of European integration since 1945 yields other conclusions of considerable importance for policymakers. The failure of one scheme for European unity led to the focusing of attention upon others. Less than a year after the failure of EDC, the Six met at Messina to consider the formation of a Common Market. In all cases, however, it was the Six, not larger groupings, which had the greatest success in achieving integration. Perhaps the time has come, as Kitzinger suggests, to examine new approaches to the unification of Europe. For the United States and its European allies, the success of such proposals will depend in no small measure upon the extent to which they profit from experiences recounted in these four studies of European integration.

Nationalism in the Hermit Kingdom*

by Tai Sung An

The people of the "Hermit Kingdom" called their country Choson, which means literally "Land of Morning Calm," but the political history of modern Korea has seldom been calm or peaceful. It has seldom been understood, either, in the West, for too little attention has been given to the study of modern Korean politics by Western political scientists and historians. The publication of *The Politics of Korean Nationalism* by Chong-Sik Lee, Assistant Professor of Political Science at the University of Pennsylvania, is therefore a timely scholarly contribution of considerable importance. The book is the first comprehensive, penetrating and authoritative study in English of Korean nationalism in the twentieth century.

Modern Korean history is characterized by an unending series of political crises at home and abroad. The Land of Morning Calm of

**The Politics of Korean Nationalism.* By Chong-Sik Lee. Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1963. 279 pp. $6.50.

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the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries became a devastated battleground as well as a pawn of power politics among major and often aggressive neighboring states. During that period, China, Japan and Russia waged a struggle for supremacy over the Korean Peninsula which resulted in two wars: the Sino-Japanese War of 1894-95 and the Russo-Japanese War of 1904-05. These culminated in Russo-Chinese recognition of the Japanese occupation of Korea in 1905. Annexation followed in 1910, and from then until her surrender to the Allied powers in August 1945, Japan exercised complete dominion over the political, economic and social life of Korea.

But Korean nationalism, which had emerged before 1910, increased in strength despite Japan's efforts to suppress all aspects of Korean culture. The national independence movement began on the day that Korea lost her sovereignty. Koreans continued to fight for national self-determination both in an organized nationalist movement and in religious (i.e. Christian) organizations until the day of liberation, August 15, 1945. Within the country there was an underground nationalist movement, but most of the nationalist leaders—notably Syngman Rhee and Kim Koo—lived in exile in China, the United States and elsewhere.

Professor Lee's book is essentially a description of the nationalist struggle for Korea's independence in chronological narrative. The book also analyzes the major problems and distinctive characteristics of the Korean nationalist movement: Korean nationalist values and ideology; interaction and conflict among Korean conservatism, progressive liberalism and radicalism (communism); the causes and consequences of factionalism; and the respective roles of the elite and the masses in the struggle for independence. The author makes abundant use of original documents and important secondary sources in Korean, Chinese and Japanese.

As a general rule, nationalism develops under colonial conditions. As Western colonialism stimulated the nationalisms of Asia and Africa, Korean nationalism was the product of the era of Japanese colonialism. The author correctly asserts that the beginning of Korean nationalism was signaled by the Tonghak rebellion of 1894-95. This was the first mass movement of the Korean people to exalt the national identity of Korea vis-à-vis China and Japan. Korean nationalism became full-fledged when the "March First Movement" was organized on March 1, 1919.

Inspired by the Wilsonian principle of the self-determination of peoples, and also determined to bring the case for Korean national independence before the Paris Peace Conference, Korean nationalists on this date held mass public demonstrations for national freedom and self-rule. In Lee's words the March First Movement was "an explosion of pent-up emotions against alien, authoritarian rule [of Japan] and at the same time a

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manifestation of growing nationalism in Korea." (p. viii.)

Although this bid for national independence was crushed ruthlessly by Japan, the March First Movement offered the symbols and battle-cries which served to stimulate nationalist tendencies among the Korean masses. In essence, the movement began as a restrained and moderate nationalist expression which relied primarily on spiritual, moralistic and rational persuasion without militant or aggressive popular participation. After the events of 1919 and the subsequent greater severity of Japanese rule, it was a natural consequence that a more militant, mass-oriented, and more aggressively organized movement emerged and was taken over by dedicated Korean nationalists residing abroad who made nationalist politics their full-time career.

The more aggressive Korean nationalist movement operated mainly in China, where Korean nationalists sought to establish a government-in-exile in Shanghai and also to unify the leadership of the movement for Korea's independence. Many Koreans also continued their stubborn anti-Japanese nationalist struggles in other lands, e.g., the United States, Manchuria and Siberia, as well as inside Korea, through propaganda and agitation. These activities, both at home and abroad, remained underground until the end of the Second World War.

No political movement operates in a vacuum. The modern historical experience of Asia and Africa indicates that the latent power of a traditional culture almost always leaves its mark upon the rising nationalist movements. Similarly, the traditional culture of Korea—the Yi Dynasty (1392-1910) which preceded the period of Japanese annexation — influenced both the values and the behavior of the Korean nationalists as well as their independence movement. It is important to remember that the Korean nationalist leaders were the product of the old conservative Korea and subject to the pull of the past. Lee therefore turns wisely in the first part of his book to a description of the social, political and philosophical structures of old Korea in order to determine their impact and consequences upon the Korean nationalist movement.

According to Lee, the most noticeable legacies of old Korea were: (1) "formalistic and ritualistic following of a dogma" or ideology; (2) the predominance of familial and personal ties at the expense of political principles or issues; (3) factionalism, and (4) provincialism (parochialism). These influences constantly plagued both the Korean nationalists and their independence movement. In particular, they were not able to eradicate the traits of factionalism and parochialism.

The problems confronting Korean nationalists were complicated by the inroads of communism in their movement. They not only had to struggle against the Japanese but to contend with the Korean communists as well. The rivalry be-

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tween rightists and leftists in the movement became more and more acute after 1940. Frequent attempts at coalition between the two factions ended in failure. Lee's vivid account of the quarrels and rivalries among the nationalists is perhaps the major contribution which his book makes to our understanding of modern Korean politics.

The author concludes his study of Korean nationalism with two important points. First, he maintains that although the Korean nationalist movement failed in the sense that Korean independence was not achieved by the nationalists, it was successful insofar as the efforts of the nationalists fostered a national consciousness among the Korean people and sustained a dedicated, single-minded resistance. The author then expresses his personal admiration of the Korean nationalist movement, asserting that "it is not a commonplace of history that an independence movement should last as long as that of the Koreans." (p. 279.)

Lee's other important contention is that the Korean revolutionary leaders, had they been left suddenly with the responsibility of governing a united and independent Korea after World War II, would not have been able to work together for the common purpose. (This falls into the category of "iffy" questions, for the United States and the Soviet Union partitioned postwar Korea into two occupation zones.) Postwar politics would have been simply the extension of prewar Korean politics in China, reflecting the failure of the Korean revolutionaries to form a united front. Lee believes that the two rival groups—the rightists and the leftists—would have competed ruthlessly for political power and influence among the masses, and would inevitably have resorted to violence if the balance of power had shifted more or less decisively to one side. Lee asserts that "the [Korean] revolutionaries demonstrated throughout four decades of struggle [against Japan] that they were not prone to compromise. . . . Nor would they concede defeat gracefully. The extreme and closed character of the legacy of the past fostered no tradition of compromise among the Koreans." (p. 232.) Without reservation, this reviewer agrees with the author on these two important points.

Divided Korea today faces many problems, and a more thorough understanding of them is needed. This study is commended to all who seek to understand Korea in the prewar, wartime and postwar periods.

Game Theory and Alliances*

by Benson David Adams

In his study, *The Theory of Political Coalitions,* William H. Riker has sought to develop a systematic theory describing the formation and decay of coalitions. Professor Riker, Chairman of the Department of Political Science at the University of Rochester, builds his theory upon the general theory of coalitions—an "n-person sum

**The Theory of Political Coalitions.* By William H. Riker. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1962. 300 pp. $6.00.

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game," which postulates a situation where the absolute gains of certain participants do not correspond equally to the absolute losses of the others. In such a situation, however, the losses are not unacceptable. Even though one participant is likely to receive a lesser reward, its value to him may be at least as great as the higher reward gained by his opponent. As an illustration, let us imagine a situation in which two persons have been offered a sum of money provided they can agree upon terms for its division between themselves. The game does not presuppose equal division of the sum involved. Thus one player may receive a lesser sum than the other. Nevertheless, the player who receives the smaller reward may be equally satisfied.

A game is composed of rules describing the formal structure of the competitive situation. A strategy is a set of directives on how to play the game in its entirety. Strategy in game theory presupposes that certain outcomes (rewards) are better or worse than other outcomes.

In their treatise, *Theory of Games and Economic Behavior*,[1] John von Neumann and Oskar Morgenstern state a condition for rationality which postulates that the "aim of all participants . . . is money. . . ." In this sense, money can be thought of as one type of many possible rewards. If the desire to achieve the highest or best reward becomes a criterion for rationality, then the person who does not choose the larger or largest pay-off is to be considered irrational.

As a first step in constructing his theory of coalitions, Riker, who takes exception to von Neumann's and Morgenstern's rationality criterion, revises it by defining a condition in which persons not seeking the largest pay-off are not considered to be irrational.

Secondly, Riker modifies the general theory of coalitions by reducing it to a zero-sum condition —a condition in which the gains of the winner must equal in absolute amount the losses of the losers. He imposes the zero-sum condition, "partially out of mathematical considerations and partially out of a desire to simplify the model." (p. 28.) Because he is concerned with a theory of coalition building, he illustrates his theory by historical examples such as wars and elections, i.e., contests in which victory is indivisible. The condition of indivisible victory is that of the zero-sum game.

The zero-sum condition is represented mathematically as follows: If $\Phi(1), \Phi(2), -\Phi(n)$ are the pay-offs to each of "n"-members (either losses or gains) then the zero-sum condition is as follows:

$$\sum_{i=1}^{j} \Phi(i) = -\sum_{i=j+1}^{n} \Phi(n).$$

Riker evolves from his analysis three principles: size, strategy and disequilibrium. In his analysis of the conditions conforming to the Size Principle he says, "In n-person, zero sum games, where side-payments are permitted, where players are rational, and where they

[1]Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1947.

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have perfect information, only minimum winning coalitions occur." (p. 32.) Hence, if a leader of a political coalition can acquire members by inducing them to join him, then these participants, acting rationally and with complete information about the other side's strategy, will create coalitions that are large enough to ensure winning, but no larger.

Riker's choice of words here seems awkward. He appears to mean an optimal size coalition rather than a "minimum winning coalition." Regardless of the semantic differences, Riker's conclusion is illustrative of the manner in which political scientists can utilize the tools of the physical sciences to derive empirically or systematically an intuitive fact.

Any organization, coalition or alliance must be composed of an optimum number of members if it is to function properly or fulfill its goals and objectives. Otherwise it becomes unwieldy or ineffective. Obviously, as first conceived as an alliance for mutual defense, the Brussels Pact was incapable of meeting its objectives. However, NATO's larger membership added strength to the original members of the Brussels Pact, and enabled European countries to achieve the goal of collective defense. Because of the original inclusion of Iceland and Portugal and the later addition of Greece and Turkey, the effectiveness of the coalition diminished with the increased possibility of intra-alliance disagreements, diversity of interests, and differences of opinion concerning the priority of threats. Military necessity dictated the inclusion of these countries in the coalition even though increased commitments and internal stresses weakened the effectiveness of the Alliance.

Riker seems to repose his faith in a mechanism which tends to reduce membership in order to create an optimal size coalition. The nature of this mechanism, however, is so vaguely described that we must look to historical examples which will explain its workings. The communist world is united by the tenets of Marxist-Leninist ideology. The interpretations of these writings are as numerous as the number of parties in the world movement. The Sino-Soviet rift is a result of the conflict over the "correct interpretation." At the same time the rift has created a situation in which the Chinese are attempting to gain followers and to construct a permanent effective coalition under their leadership. Thus, in a sense, the current rift in the world-wide communist movement, led by two powers (the Soviet Union and China), is illustrative of that mechanism which attempts to reduce membership to a more effective size.

Riker illustrates the workings of the Size Principle and the selective mechanism by citing three instances in American political history when "one of the two major parties substantially disappeared" (p. 56), thus leaving the remaining party in the enviable position of a "minimum winning coalition." However, the victorious party, unable to

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maintain its dominant position, subsequently split into factions, and a new and powerful opposition was restored. Unfortunately, these examples do little to confirm the validity of Riker's Size Principle: only three times in the history of American Presidential elections did a defeated opposition party vanish —1820, the "era of good feeling"; the period after 1852 when the Whig Party dissolved; and in 1872 when the Democratic Party disappeared temporarily from Presidential politics. Forty-one times the opposition survived.

In developing his model, Riker describes the steps leading to the formation of a final and winning coalition. His analysis begins with the leader's attempt to gain followers by offering rewards (side-payments). To this process of building a coalition, he assigns the term "proto-coalition." This "proto-coalition," once it gains sufficient members and moves into a dominant position, becomes a "minimum winning coalition." It now occupies a strategic position (the Strategic Principle) for forcing a favorable decision in its own behalf. This ability to force a decision Riker calls the Disequilibrium Principle.

Riker offers the "Corrupt Bargain" of 1825 as an illustration of a "proto-coalition," the effect of side-payments and the ultimate formation of a "minimum winning coalition." None of the four Presidential candidates, Jackson, Adams, Crawford and Clay, had been able to obtain a majority of electoral votes needed to win. Jackson had 99, Adams 84, Crawford 41, and Clay 37. The election was thrown into the House as the Twelfth Amendment provides.

Clay was out of the race, for the same amendment restricts the choice of the House to the three highest candidates on the list. Moreover, with the election in the House, some fundamental changes occur in the voting procedures: voting in the House for the President is done by states, each state casts one vote as decided by a plurality of its Representatives, and the voters are now Representatives, i.e. not the same persons as the electors. Clay, the powerful Speaker of the House, although unable to become President, was in a good position to decide which of his rivals should have the office. His choice was Adams.

When the returns from the election were counted, Jackson had won 11 states, Adams 7, and Crawford and Clay 3 each. By the time the session of Congress opened in 1825, Jackson retained the votes of only 7 states. For a number of reasons, not the least of which was Clay's ability to bring pressure to bear on his colleagues in the House, 2 states had swung to Adams, 1 to Crawford and another to Clay. This gave Clay 4 votes and Adams 9 votes. "This left for Clay only one reasonable course of action: alliance with Adams. This was the corrupt bargain, for Clay's price was the office of Secretary of State, which presumably put him next in succession. Adams apparently had no hesitation in paying it." (p. 154.)

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Jackson's weightier coalition was unable to obtain a favorable outcome, but two smaller coalitions were able to combine to gain the victory. Thus, according to Riker, the "Corrupt Bargain" shows that "proto-coalitions" of small size are in a more favorable strategic position than larger and weightier coalitions to obtain victory. For by allying themselves against the stronger, the smaller proto-coalitions gain a dominant and commanding position. One can notice here the similarity of this model to the classic balance of power theory.

Several of Riker's examples are drawn from international relations. However, most international situations are not reducible to that zero-sum condition which Riker postulates. Although his discussion of the coalitions of the Napoleonic Wars, the Triple Alliance and Entente of World War I, and the post-1945 international alignments make interesting reading, these real world phenomena do not fit neatly into his theoretical model.

Riker illustrates the operation of his three principles by reflecting upon the decline and fall of empires and great coalitions. He also seeks to apply his theories to past, contemporary and future American-Soviet relations. Reviewing the political-military events since 1945, Riker attempts to show that the losses of the Western Coalition coupled with the gains of the East were the result of "rational" behavior of the leaders of both coalitions and, therefore, were in accord with the Size Principle (achievement of optimum size). Riker asserts that we are now passing through the Age of Equalization in which the Western Coalition is diminishing in size (territory and members) and the Communist Coalition is expanding in accord with his model. Once both sides have achieved parity, the Age of Maneuver will begin. The main features of this period will be: (1) The price asked by neutrals or marginal members for their allegiance to one side or the other side will rise steadily. (2) Tensions will increase, for each decision will seem to invoke the entire future of each coalition. (3) The danger of general war will increase. (4) Finally, the two opposing powers will exhaust their resources in maintaining their respective alliances, and other nations will come to the fore as world leaders.

Riker reasons that during the Age of Maneuver the main strategic goal for both sides will be to prevent—or at least to delay—the fall from power of their respective coalitions. Riker concludes that coalition leaders tend to miscalculate the side-payments to potential allies and to pay more for winning than winning is "objectively" worth. The prevention of such a development should be a strategic goal of both the Soviet Union and the United States.

This book may well represent a useful application of the tools of physical science to political science and international relations analysis. However, the net result of Riker's labors is somewhat disappointing. Riker has hedged on certain aspects

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of his model. His examples are few and not always relevant. The rationale of his basic assumption, i.e., the zero-sum condition, is arbitrary. He does not supply qualitative answers to the questions he poses, e.g., when is the optimal size of a "minimum winning coalition" reached, how is it reached, and how does one know when it has been reached? This omission casts doubt upon the validity of his model. His failure to state clearly the advantages to be gained by systematically deducing conclusions which most political scientists or educated laymen will reach easily and safely by intuition, further detracts from the real value and purpose of his book. Unfortunately, these shortcomings are not compensated by Riker's lucid, simple and logical analysis. Praiseworthy as is his attempt to provide a methodological framework through the use of game theory, and rigorous as is his scientific approach, his theory is left nonetheless suspended in the thin air of speculative abstraction.

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Books Received

NOTE—By special arrangement with the Foreign Policy Association, readers of ORBIS may obtain from the FPA's Book Center any books listed below published in the United States (except paperbacks) at the publisher's regular list price. Post free for domestic orders only. Send orders with check or money order to Desk O, World Affairs Book Center, 345 East 46th Street, New York, N.Y. 10017. (This arrangement also applies to books reviewed in ORBIS.)

I. POLITICS, HISTORY, ECONOMICS

The Dollar in World Affairs: An Essay in International Financial Policy. By Henry G. Aubrey. New York: Harper & Row, 1964. 292 pp. $5.50.

Intended to increase the general public's understanding of financial policy in international relations, this study treats such crucial problems as stability, liquidity and growth, the U.S. position in world finance, the implications of the dollar as a basic currency, and the development of the United States into a financial center of the world.

East and West. By C. Northcote Parkinson. Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1963. 330 pp. $5.00.

Professor Parkinson's irreverent attitude toward institutions and authorities shows up again in this historical survey from Sumerian days to the present. He sets out to demonstrate that throughout history East and West have alternately been dominant, the periodic decline of one civilization creating a cultural, political and economic vacuum that was filled by the growing strength of the other. Parkinson believes this alternation has been a chief factor in material and technological progress. He finds the East renascent in the present era, about to take the offensive, and believes the burden of defense will fall on the Soviet Union, compelling Moscow to align herself with the West against the East.

The Human Dimension in International Relations. By Otto Klineberg. New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1964. 173 pp. $2.75 (paper).

Utilizing findings from studies in psychology, the author examines the causes of war, the myth of race, the nature of leadership in totalitarian societies, and the meaning of national character. Professor Klineberg, in concluding chapters, presents recommendations for achieving peace in the nuclear age.

International Business. By Howe Martyn. New York: Macmillan, 1964. 288 pp. $5.50.

A study of the activities of corporations with direct investments in foreign subsidiaries and of the social and economic factors which led them to establish overseas operations. The author describes personnel and hiring practices, the organization and control of subsidiaries, marketing and advertising strategies, and the role of U.S. private enterprise in spurring economic development in foreign countries.

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The International Civil Service. By Georges Langrod. Dobbs Ferry, New York: Oceana Publications, 1963. 358 pp. $13.00.

Covering the origin, nature and evolution of international administration from its pioneer period within the League of Nations to the present era of the United Nations, this work conveys the concept behind an international civil service system and the philosophy which makes it a *sine qua non* for world cooperation and peace.

Local Government in Developing Countries. By Harold F. Alderfer. New York: McGraw-Hill, 1964. 251 pp. $8.50.

This survey of local government in emerging nations ranges over such topics as the evolution of form and structure, local administrative and financial problems, and community development, and relates the whole problem of local government to the overall goal of national modernization.

The Millennium of Europe. By Oscar Halecki. Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 1963. 441 pp. $8.95.

An analysis of European history since 1000 A.D. by a Polish scholar who before World War II was Professor of History at the University of Warsaw and for the past two decades has taught at Fordham and Columbia universities. Professor Halecki probes deeply into the underlying values of Europe's Graeco-Roman and Christian heritage, attempts to account for the inhibition of freedom under 20th century nazism and communism, and brings into focus the major developments of these 1000 years—the Eastern schism, the intermittent search for European unity, the great political revolutions, the defense of Europe against the Muslims, the expansion of Europe, and the great wars. In an epilogue, he expresses faith in the durability of Christian values in Europe and examines the prospects for a united Europe and an Atlantic Community.

Nation-Building. Edited by Karl W. Deutsch and William J. Foltz. New York: Atherton Press, a Division of Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1963. 167 pp. $4.50.

A collection of nine essays on the problems and processes of nation-building in Europe, North and South America, Asia and Africa.

Neutralism. By Peter Lyon. Leicester, England: Leicester University Press, 1963. 215 pp. 25/-.

A scholarly study of the motives and policies of neutral states. The author relates neutralism to the major phases of the Cold War and to U.S. and Soviet attitudes and policies toward the neutrals; examines neutralism as a doctrine and lists five main precepts underlying neutralist behavior; divides neutrals into six categories—new state neutralism, pioneer neutralism, neutralization, buffer status, traditional neutrality, and erstwhile isolationism; treats briefly the foreign policies of India, Yugoslavia, Egypt, Switzerland, Sweden and Austria; and analyzes the proceedings and accomplishments of the Belgrade conference of neutrals in 1961.

The Ordeal of Coexistence. By Willy Brandt. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1963. 112 pp. $3.00.

In these Pollack Lectures, delivered at Harvard in October 1962, the West Berlin mayor urges Western governments to initiate efforts to promote new forms of exchange which could be of mutual benefit to participating states. He warns

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against any Western tendency to use the dynamic European institutions of integration as exclusive organizations whose outlook and aims might be harmful to the growth of the developing states.

Planning Economic Development. Edited by Everett E. Hagen. Homewood, Illinois: Richard D. Irwin (for the Center for International Studies, MIT), 1963. 380 pp. $10.00.

Nine studies of the organizational and procedural aspects of economic development planning in Burma, Pakistan, India, Japan, Mexico, Yugoslavia, Iran, Nigeria and Great Britain. In the last two chapters, the editor discusses the characteristics of a good plan, the machinery and procedures which this requires, some difficulties likely to be encountered and their possible remedies.

Political Science: An Introduction. By J. Roland Pennock and David G. Smith. New York: Macmillan, 1964. 707 pp. $7.50.

In this introductory text, the authors treat political science as a unified discipline and undertake to demonstrate the applicability of theories derived from sociology, psychology and history to political systems. The volume contains chapters on the institutions and governing processes of democratic, non-democratic, and semi-democratic governments, as well as the authors' analysis of international relations.

The Politics of Hysteria: The Sources of 20th Century Conflict. By Edmund Stillman and William Pfaff. New York: Harper & Row, 1964. 273 pp. $4.95.

An examination of the problems confronting U.S. foreign policy in a period of revolutionary change. Included are analyses of developments in newly independent countries, conflict in the communist world, and relations among the nations of the West.

Subversion of the Innocents. By Dan Kurzman. New York: Random House, 1963. 570 pp. $6.95.

The product of some fifteen years of study, travel and reporting in more than sixty countries of Afro-Asia and the Soviet Union, this book analyzes communist methods of infiltration and subversion in Africa, the Middle East and Asia, and appraises their success against the relevant historical and cultural backgrounds. Mr. Kurzman, a foreign correspondent by profession, describes the overall situation existing in these three areas, and then devotes separate chapters to the most important states.

What Is Conservatism? Edited by Frank S. Meyer. New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1964. 242 pp. $4.95.

Twelve proponents of conservatism outline their philosophy of politics, economics, freedom, education and international relations. The contributors evaluate areas of consensus, as well as elements of divergence, in conservative thought today. Included are essays by Russell Kirk, Willmoore Kendall, Wilhelm Ropke, F. A. Hayek, Stefan T. Possony, William F. Buckley, Jr., and others.

World History, 1914-1961. By David Thomson. New York: Oxford University Press, 1964. 154 pp. $1.50 (paper).

A short survey of recent history which examines the world on the eve of the First and Second World Wars, traces the course of both conflicts, and describes the peace-making efforts and the disintegration of the peace after both wars. The

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study treats of international organization, economic problems, the rise of one-party states, the growth of nationalism and socialism, and cultural disintegration after the wars.

II. Military Affairs, Arms Control, Technology

The Dawn of a New Age: Reflections on Science and Human Affairs. By Eugene Rabinowitch. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1963. 332 pp. $6.95.

The Editor of the *Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists* brings together thirty of his essays, written over a period of two decades, mostly as editorials in the *Bulletin,* on such subjects as changing military technology, deterrence, the world scientific dialogue and several comments, political and otherwise, which he groups under the heading of "heretical thoughts."

The Military in the Political Development of New Nations: An Essay in Comparative Analysis. By Morris Janowitz. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1964. 134 pp. $4.50.

A comparative analysis of the role of the armed forces in the political development of new nations. The author, Professor of Sociology at the University of Chicago, explores the characteristics of the military establishment of a new nation that facilitate its involvement in domestic politics, and evaluates the capacities of the military to supply effective political leadership for a new nation striving for rapid economic development and social modernization.

On the Prevention of War. By John Strachey. New York: St. Martin's Press, 1963. 334 pp. $5.95.

The late John Strachey, a former Labour Minister of War, tests the proposition that man can put an end to war. After examining the various types of deterrence, the reasons behind the failures of disarmament negotiations, the intentions and strength of the communist bloc and the Western alliance, and the role of the United Nations, the author identifies three forces of hope: the tendency for the economic and social systems of the advanced, industrialized nations to converge; the "sheer dread of nuclear war"; and the emergence of a "new attitude of mind . . . transcending both national and ideological loyalties . . . concerned to find a way in which the human race may hope to [survive]." He asserts that "if there is a way out it must lie in the evolution of an authority capable of preventing nuclear war and based upon . . . the stabilization of the collective nuclear monopoly of the existing superpowers (be they two or several)."

Science and History. By Ernest Cuneo. New York: Duell, Sloan and Pearce, 1963. 237 pp. $3.95.

A reinterpretation of history, government and war in terms of scientific laws of mass and velocity. Dr. Cuneo presents the past as science rather than as history, and thus suggests the idea that skillful use of science can lead man to a safe and sane future.

III. United States

The American Democratic Tradition: A History. By Arthur A. Ekirch, Jr. New York: Macmillan, 1963. 338 pp. $5.95; $2.50 (paper).

A survey of the theory and practice of democracy in the United States from the colonial period to the present. The author utilizes selections from original sources to evaluate the impact of such concepts as liberalism, reform, majority rule and public welfare upon political theory in the United States.

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The Americans: A New History of the People of the United States. By Oscar Handlin. Boston: Little, Brown, 1963. 434 pp. $6.95.

This history of the United States does not attempt to relate the deeds of great Americans or the succession of political and military events. Rather, Professor Handlin focuses upon the gradual unfolding of the American national character and the broad forces that shaped the whole society—in particular, the continuing process of settling a continent which was the central experience of the American people.

The Congressman: His Work as He Sees It. By Charles R. Clapp. Washington: The Brookings Institution, 1963. 452 pp. $6.00.

In this study of the Congressman's conception of his work, attention is devoted not only to his legislative duties but also to relationships with constituents, colleagues, and with the leaders of the House of Representatives. Perhaps the most informative chapters are those on committee assignments, the committee system and party leadership.

The Dollar Crisis. By Nasrollah S. Fatemi, Thibaut de Saint Phalle and Grace M. Keeffe. New York: Fairleigh Dickinson Press, 1964. 317 pp. $8.75.

In this study of the factors affecting the influx and outflow of dollar balances, the authors assess the impact of governmental policies upon the U.S. gold problem and suggest recommendations for effecting changes in the U.S. balance of payments.

The End of Alliance: America and the Future of Europe. By Ronald Steel. New York: The Viking Press, 1964. 148 pp. $3.75.

The author asserts that the conditions which made U.S. support of the defense of Western Europe valid in the late 1940's are not relevant in today's changed circumstances, and that the Soviet military threat to the West has disappeared due to internal pressures in the Soviet Union and to problems of dealing with increasingly independent or disaffected allies. He concludes, therefore, that the continued existence of NATO is detrimental to U.S. national interests, particularly since it blocks the settlement of the problem of German unity. A mutual withdrawal of troops would pave the way for a German settlement.

John F. Kennedy, President. By Hugh Sidey. New York: Atheneum, 1964. 434 pp. $6.95.

A White House correspondent traces the activities of the thirty-fourth President of the United States from his election to his tragic death. He portrays the President as he wrestled with the problems created by the Bay of Pigs invasion, the Berlin crisis, the Cuban missile confrontation, and such domestic issues as race relations and tax reductions.

Living Overseas. By Louise Winfield. Washington: Public Affairs Press, 1962. 237 pp. $4.50.

A guide on manners and social and cultural adjustments for Americans living abroad, especially those in government service.

Policy and Power: Two Centuries of American Foreign Relations. By Ruhl Bartlett. New York: Hill and Wang, 1963. 303 pp. $5.00.

Professor Bartlett, one of America's leading diplomatic historians, provides for the student and layman a basic survey and explanation of U.S. foreign policy

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from the War of Independence to the present. One-third of the volume is devoted to the last twenty-five years.

The Press and Foreign Policy. By Bernard C. Cohen. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1963. 288 pp. $6.00.

In what V. O. Key has called "a pioneer attempt to examine carefully and systematically the interaction between the press and government officials," Professor Cohen of the University of Wisconsin casts interesting light on the degree to which public officials try to influence and utilize news, even while depending upon the newspapers as sources of information and intelligence. The author has made a competent contribution to our knowledge of the foreign policy decision-making process.

The Triumph of Conservatism. By Gabriel Kolko. New York: The Free Press of Glencoe, 1963. 344 pp. $7.50.

A reinterpretation of the Progressive Era of American history, 1900-1916. Dr. Kolko sets out to show that the American economy during this period became increasingly competitive and decentralized—thus challenging the established view that Big Business held a monopoly over industry and finance in the early 1900's.

The United States and World War II. By A. Russell Buchanan. New York: Harper & Row, 1964. Two volumes, 635 pp. $6.00 each.

In a synthesis of memoirs, general histories and unpublished papers, Professor Buchanan traces U.S. military and diplomatic action in the Second World War. The study includes accounts about Congress during the administrations of Presidents Roosevelt and Truman, the problems of price control, labor-management disputes, and other aspects of domestic life in wartime America. The author recounts in detail the formulation of U.S. strategy and describes important battles.

IV. Western Europe

An Atlas of European Affairs. Text by Norman J. B. Pounds; maps by Robert C. Kingsbury. New York: Praeger, 1964. 135 pp. $4.00.

A collection of fifty-nine maps and accompanying texts relating to the major aspects of modern European politics and economics. In addition to a country-by-country survey of the factors that influence the policies of European nations today, the authors assess the characteristics of the continent as a whole—its climate, natural resources, languages, religions and population patterns. Current information is also provided on ECSC, EEC, OECD and NATO.

British Politics in the Suez Crisis. By Leon D. Epstein. Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1964. 220 pp. $5.00.

The author assesses the operation of British political parties, Parliament and executive administration under the stress of the Suez crisis. Included are studies of the role of the press, public opinion and constituency associations in the British political system. Intended primarily as a treatise in comparative government, this volume presents valuable insights into the relationship between international relations and domestic politics in Britain.

British Politics in Transition, 1945-63. By Francis Boyd. New York: Praeger, 1964. 253 pp. $5.00 (cloth); $1.95 (paper).

An examination of the factors which have altered Britain's place in world affairs since 1945: the effects of full employment upon Britain's economy, the

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growth of the welfare state, the nature of British international commitments, and the changing place of the Commonwealth in British policy. Included is a concise survey of the activities and philosophies of British political parties and an analysis of the strengths and weaknesses of parliamentary democracy today.

The Captive Press in the Third Reich. By Oron J. Hale. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1964. 353 pp. $6.50.

Drawing extensively upon unpublished sources and interviews, Professor Hale examines the means by which the Nazi Party achieved a near monopoly of newspaper publishing in Germany: the development of a small party press into mass-circulation newspapers and the forced transfer of ownership of key dailies to Nazi-controlled holding companies. The study considers the wartime operation of the Nazi press in Germany as well as in occupied countries.

Europe's Road to Potsdam. By Wenzel Jaksch; translated and edited by Kurt Glaser. New York: Praeger, 1963. 468 pp. $9.50.

The first English translation of a standard German work on modern Central European history. A prominent member of the Federal German Republic's Bundestag analyzes events in Central Europe during the century following the liberal revolutions of 1848. He traces efforts to resolve Europe's nationalities problem, to avert World War I, to redraw the map of Europe at the Paris Peace Conference, and to prevent the outbreak of the Second World War. Included are chapters on the rise of Hitler and the extension of Soviet influence in Europe during and immediately after World War II.

A History of the Weimar Republic from the Locarno Conference to Hitler's Seizure of Power. By Erich Eyck; translated by Harlan P. Hanson and Robert G. L. Waite. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1963. 535 pp. $12.00.

In this history of Germany between the world wars, a distinguished European scholar examines in detail the events surrounding the Locarno Conference, the subsequent German agreement with the Soviet Union and Germany's entry into the League of Nations. The narrative follows in detail Stresemann's diplomacy and domestic policies, as well as the worsening economic problems and the rise of Nazi influence in the latter years of the Weimar Republic.

Land and Power: British and Allied Policy on Germany's Frontiers. By Harold I. Nelson. Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1963. 402 pp. $8.25.

In an examination of the question of Germany's boundaries after World War I the author traces the evolution of British official thinking before the Paris Peace Conference of 1919. He contrasts British views with those of France and the United States, and assesses Britain's impact upon the formulation of provisions for German frontiers in the Treaty of Versailles.

The Political Dynamics of European Economic Integration. By Leon N. Lindberg. Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1963. 367 pp. $7.75.

An assessment of the role of the EEC in the process of international integration. Using as case studies the free trade area negotiations, the decision to accelerate the customs union, completion of the common external tariff ahead of schedule, and the establishment of a common agricultural policy, Professor Lindberg

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examines the means by which conflicts of interest among member states were resolved and evaluates the expansive potential of the Common Market.

Politics in England. By Richard Rose. Boston: Little, Brown, 1964. 266 pp. n.p. (paper).

Drawing upon political, social and psychological concepts recently developed for the study of comparative politics, Professor Rose analyzes the British political system. Included are chapters on political socialization, the role of interest groups, the work of political parties, and the position of Parliament, the Cabinet and the civil service in the governing of Britain.

Stresemann and the Politics of the Weimar Republic. By Henry Ashby Turner, Jr. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1963. 287 pp. $6.00.

Rather than emphasizing Stresemann's accomplishments as Germany's Foreign Minister, Professor Turner traces the domestic political career of this leading figure of the Weimar Republic. He analyzes the factors which transformed Stresemann from preserver of the monarchy to defender of the Republic, and his rise from member of the Reichstag to Chancellor of Germany. The relationship between Stresemann's domestic and foreign policies is also discussed.

Yugoslavia at the Paris Peace Conference: A Study in Frontiermaking. By Ivo J. Lederer. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1963. 351 pp. $8.00.

Using such previously unavailable documentary sources as the minutes of the Yugoslav delegation, the Trumbic Papers, and the archives of the Italian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the author probes Yugoslavia's objectives and tactics at the Paris Peace Conference. Professor Lederer traces Yugoslav efforts to achieve a satisfactory resolution of border problems with neighboring states in the period between 1918 and 1920.

V. Communist Bloc

The Battle for Stalingrad. By Marshal Vasili Ivanovich Chuikov; translated by Harold Silver. New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1964. 364 pp. $5.95.

The commander of the Soviet army responsible for Stalingrad's defense traces the course of this decisive battle. Marshal Chuikov describes Soviet military planning and strategy, and inquires into the causes for the defeat of Hitler's armies in this historic military encounter.

Comintern and World Revolution, 1928-1943: The Shaping of Doctrine. By Kermit E. McKenzie. New York: Columbia University Press, 1964. 368 pp. $6.50.

Published records of the Communist International form the basis for this study of the evolution of communist doctrine of world revolution during the years when Stalin dominated the Comintern.

Communism and Colonialism. By Walter Kolarz. New York: St. Martin's Press, 1964. 147 pp. $4.95.

A discussion of Soviet attitudes and policies toward colonial peoples, based on a series of scripts Mr. Kolarz wrote for the BBC European Service.

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Communism in Theory and Practice: A Book of Readings for High School Students. Edited by Howard D. Mehlinger. San Francisco: Chandler Publishing Company, 1964. 274 pp. $4.00; $2.76 (paper).

A collection of articles and documents on communist theory, its practice in the Soviet Union, communist activities in the United States, and the nature of the challenge posed by communism today. Containing many primary documents, articles and case studies, this book is designed to provide supplementary readings for high school students engaged in a study of communism.

Communist Strategy and Tactics in Czechoslovakia, 1918-48. By Paul E. Zinner. New York: Praeger, 1963. 264 pp. $6.50.

In this study of the communist coup d'état in Czechoslovakia in 1948, the author analyzes communist strategy and tactics, taking into account the continuous interaction between the Party and the social, political and economic environment in which it operates. A historical section on the nature of the First Czechoslovak Republic and the origin and development of the Communist Party from 1918-38 provides useful background information. Another section describes how the communists took advantage of the destruction of Czechoslovakia's political and legal fabric under German occupancy and demanded a drastic reorientation of domestic and foreign policies.

The Defeat of Communism. By D. G. Stewart-Smith. London: Ludgate Press, 1964. 482 pp. 35/—.

A comprehensive analysis of, and attack against, international communism. After discussing at length the ideological, historical and internal conflicts which weaken communism, the author considers the future of communism and the efforts of Britain, NATO and the UN to oppose it. He then offers his own criticisms of these efforts and his suggestions for a more effective defense—and offense —in the name of world peace.

The Future of Russia. By Harry Braverman. New York: Macmillan, 1963. 175 pp. $5.00.

Mr. Braverman presents the thesis that the Soviet Union can build an affluent society with a productive capacity greater than any capitalist economy. But the Soviet Union confronts a major obstacle in its attempt to create the good society —the absence of a tradition of humanism and democracy.

The Kronstadt Thesis. By E. Petrov-Skitaletz; translated from the Russian by John F. O'Conor. New York: Robert Speller and Sons, 1964. 134 pp. $5.00.

This brief work seeks to appeal to the present-day Soviet intelligentsia by means of a program drafted by the sailor-rebels at Kronstadt in 1921: "All power to the Soviets—but to free, democratic-socialist, non-communist-dominated Soviets." The author feels that a call for social-democratic rule would be heeded in Soviet Russia if it were couched in the language and ideology of those men who, in 1921, were the first to defy communism.

The Political Thought of Mao Tse-tung. By Stuart R. Schram. New York: Praeger, 1963. 319 pp. $7.00.

A useful collection of the writings of Mao Tse-tung, some of which are available in translation for the first time. The selections are grouped under ten topics,

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such as the glory of the Hans, Mao as a Marxist theoretician, relations between the peasantry and the working class, military principles, and China's relations with the underdeveloped countries, the Western nations and the communist bloc.

Soviet Foreign Propaganda. By Frederick C. Barghoorn. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1964. 329 pp. $6.00.

A scholarly analysis of the role of propaganda in Soviet foreign policy, this study by a noted Yale Sovietologist is especially revealing in its treatment of Soviet images of the West, the issues of war, peace and disarmament, the exploitation of nationalistic themes, and the utopian vision of what Soviet modernization means for the developing countries.

The Soviet History of World War II: Myths, Memories and Realities. By Matthew P. Gallagher. New York: Praeger, 1963. 205 pp. $1.95 (paper).

A chronicle of mythology and fact concerning the Homeric Era of World War II in the Soviet Union, this is a collection of stirring tales of heroism and valor tailored for the consumption of Russians today. The author has amassed a notable collection of Soviet views of the war designed by their propaganda artists to depict "The Great Patriotic War Against Fascism" in its most glowing terms and to perpetuate the myth of an innocent Mother Russia violated by an evil enemy.

Soviet Strategy for Economic Growth. By Nicolas Spulber. Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1964. 175 pp. $4.50.

Professor Spulber assesses the significance to current Kremlin policymakers of Soviet debates in the 1920's on strategies of development, rate of growth and efficiency, and planning theory and practice. He also investigates the extent to which earlier assumptions have been revised through Soviet practice and adapted to new purposes and programs, and examines current Soviet goals and concepts of economic development, views of the economy as a "going concern," and strategies for achieving goals.

VI. Middle East And Africa

The Arab World Today. By Morroe Berger. New York: Doubleday, 1964. 463 pp. $1.95 (paper).

In this study, Professor Berger attempts to "get away from the Arabs of the newspaper headlines and to see how they live, work, marry . . . how what they do makes them what they are." He investigates the social and psychological conditions of the Arabs and attempts to link these with the political and economic environment of the Arab world.

Five African States: Responses to Diversity. Edited by Gwendolen M. Carter. Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1963. 643 pp. $10.00.

A comprehensive study of the attempts by five African states to cope with the problems of diversity and centrifugal tendencies. The contributors, working from a common outline provided by the editor in order to facilitate comparisons, include Edouard Bustin on the Congo, Virginia Thompson on Dahomey, Victor T. Le Vine on the Cameroun Federal Republic, Herbert J. Spiro on the Rhodesias and Nyasaland, and Thomas Karis on South Africa. Although the historical heritage of each of these states differs greatly and the leaders have sought different

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answers to the problems of diversity, the authors attempt to make generalizations concerning the impact of federalism and other devices for achieving a semblance of unity.

Government and Politics in Northern Africa. By I. William Zartman. New York: Praeger, 1963. 205 pp. $5.00; $1.95 (paper).

A comparative study of the political evolution, societies and governmental systems in modern Morocco, Algeria, Tunisia, Libya, Egypt, Sudan, Ethiopia and Somalia. Mr. Zartman's primary purpose is to evaluate the attempts of these northern African governments to satisfy the demands of their societies within the framework of representative and constitutional democracies. He analyzes the strengths and weaknesses of the various political systems, the role of northern Africa in international politics, the implications of Arab nationalism, and the strategic importance of the area as a whole.

The Middle East and the West. By Bernard Lewis. Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1964. 160 pp. $3.75.

The theme of these six public lectures, given by the author at Indiana University in 1963, is the relationship between the Middle East and the West. The author treats of the political and intellectual movements in the Middle East, dividing them into three main groups—liberal and socialist, patriotic and nationalist, and Islamic. The last chapter deals with the role of these nations in international affairs and considers some of the factors influencing Western policy toward them.

Nigerian Political Parties: Power in an Emergent African Nation. By Richard L. Sklar. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1963. 578 pp. $12.50.

A valuable contribution to the study of the problems of political development in the new African states. The author traces the development of Nigerian political parties under British colonial rule and examines the social composition and leadership of the major nationalist parties of independent Nigeria. The underlying theme is the political convergence of the thrust of nationalism, the persistence of cultural particularism, and the crystallization of emergent class interests. Case studies of party competition and intraparty conflict at both the local and national levels reveal the conditions and strategies of political action in Nigeria.

The Rise of the South African Reich. By Brian Bunting. Baltimore: Penguin Books, 1964. 332 pp. $1.25 (paper).

The author compares events in the Republic of South Africa with the policies of Nazi Germany. The study traces the development of the ruling Nationalist Party, examines legislation designed to enforce Apartheid, and evaluates governmental policies toward trade unions, political opposition and economic problems in South Africa.

Russia's South Flank. By Günther Nollau and Hans Jürgen Wiehe. New York: Praeger, 1963. 171 pp. $4.50.

An account of the communist threat to the independence of Iran, Turkey and Afghanistan. The authors conclude that Islam and the traditional way of life of the peoples of these three countries, together with widespread mistrust of Soviet policies and intentions, both past and present, combine to make them hostile to communism and thus a bastion on Russia's south flank.

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VII. East Asia

The Asians: Their Heritage and Their Destiny. By Thomas Welty. Philadelphia: J. B. Lippincott, 1963. 344 pp. $4.95.

An introductory text on the Asian political, economic, social and cultural environment, written for the high school or freshman college student.

China. By Ping-Chia Kuo. London: Oxford University Press, The Modern World Series, 1963. 128 pp. $1.25 (paper).

A concise guide to the history of China. In his final chapter, the author predicts that Communist China will continue to strive in the coming decade to become the leading power of Asia. "Whether she will break through her difficulties with the United States and Russia may well be determined by the new strength she acquires internally, in South-East Asia, and among other friendly nations."

China and the Helping Hand, 1937-1945. By Arthur N. Young. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1963. 502 pp. $10.00.

As a financial adviser to China during the crucial years 1929 to 1947, the author is well qualified to describe China's struggle against Japan and the role of foreign aid. He believes that in order to appraise objectively the victory of the communists over the Kuomintang, one must seek its causes in the war years. China's problems in 1945 were so complex that economic and financial assistance alone proved insufficient to counter the internal communist threat. Unfortunately, the United States did not undertake the broad effort on the social, political and military levels which might have enabled Nationalist China to emerge victorious.

The China-Indian Border: The Origins of the Disputed Boundaries. By Alastair Lamb. London: Oxford University Press (for the Royal Institute of International Affairs), 1964. 192 pp. 12/6.

Dr. Lamb has made use of unpublished documentary sources to trace the history of the Sino-Indian boundary in the Himalayan and Karakoram mountains during the rule of Britain in the Indian subcontinent. He shows how the boundary dispute arose and describes the boundary at the time India and Pakistan achieved independence in 1947.

Court and Constitution in Japan. By John M. Maki. Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1964. 445 pp. $9.50.

The social, cultural, economic and political development of post-World War Two Japan is conveyed through selected constitutional decisions of the Japanese Supreme Court. These decisions, handed down since constitutional democratic government was established in 1947, illuminate the problems created by the transformation of a traditionalist, authoritarian Eastern culture into a Western egalitarian democracy.

A History of Japan, 1615-1867. By George Sansom. Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1963. 258 pp. $7.50.

This study concludes a three-volume history of Japan by a distinguished Western scholar of Japanese history and culture. This volume is primarily concerned with political and social affairs and is largely descriptive and factual; nevertheless, the author offers interpretations and suggests comparisons with the history of other peoples.

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The Modern History of Japan. By W. G. Beasley. New York: Praeger, 1963. 352 pp. $7.50.

A new history of Japan from the early 19th century to 1962 by a Professor of the History of the Far East at the School of Oriental and African Studies, University of London. A social and economic as well as a political study, this book treats Japanese history chronologically and is divided almost equally between the 19th and 20th centuries.

Modern Political Systems: Asia. Edited by Robert E. Ward and Roy C. Macridis. Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey: Prentice-Hall, 1963. 482 pp. $8.50.

A companion volume to *Modern Political Systems: Europe,* this undergraduate text is a by-product of an attempt by the several authors at theory-building in the field of comparative politics. The authors are Robert E. Ward on Japan; Allen S. Whiting on China; Richard L. Park on India; Lucian W. Pye on Southeast Asia; and Dankwart A. Rustow on Southwest Asia. While retaining the country approach, the authors have tried to utilize a common framework of exposition and analysis. They conceive of politics as a system for the identification and posing of problems and the making and administering of decisions in public affairs. A special effort has been made to place politics and government in their appropriate historical, social, economic and ideological settings.

South Vietnam: Nation Under Stress. By Robert Scigliano. Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1963. 227 pp. $1.95 (paper).

This study provides background information on political developments in South Vietnam from independence in 1954 to early 1963, before the coup which overthrew President Diem.

Toward Economic Cooperation in Asia: The United Nations Economic Commission for Asia and the Far East. By David Wightman. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1963. 400 pp. $7.50.

An analysis of the purposes, structure, functions and problems of ECAFE by a senior lecturer in international economic history at the University of Birmingham, England. The major part of the book provides a survey of regional economic cooperation, programs and obstacles in such fields as statistics and planning, industrialization, natural resources, inland transport, trade and social welfare. The Mekong River project is given thorough coverage.

Monographs and Reports Received

Brazil's Developing Northeast: A Study of Regional Planning and Foreign Aid. By Stefan H. Robock. Washington: The Brookings Institution, 1963. 213 pp. $2.00.

A Canada-U.S. Free Trade Arrangement: Survey of Possible Characteristics. By a Canadian-American Committee, sponsored by the National Planning Association (U.S.) and the Private Planning Association of Canada, October 1963. 115 pp. $2.00.

Communist Ideology in China. By Benjamin Schwartz. Santa Barbara, California: General Electric Company, December 1962. 33 pp. n.p.

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Europe's Northern Cap and the Soviet Union. By Nils Orvik. Cambridge: Harvard University, Center for International Affairs, No. 6 in Occasional Papers in International Affairs, 1963.

Impact of the Commune on the Chinese Family. By Lucy Jen Huang. Santa Barbara, California: General Electric Company, December 1962. 56 pp. n.p.

International Organizations and Space Cooperation. By Leonard E. Schwartz. Durham: Duke University, World Rule of Law Center, 1962. 108 pp. $5.00.

Invisible Trade Barriers Between Canada and the United States. By a Canadian-American Committee, sponsored by the National Planning Association (U.S.) and the Private Planning Association of Canada, September 1963. 73 pp. $1.50.

Japan and Communist China in the Next Decade. By Marius B. Jansen. Santa Barbara, California: General Electric Company, December 1962. 50 pp. n.p.

Political Modernization: The Single-Party System. By Rupert Emerson. Denver: University of Denver, 1963. 30 pp. $1.00.

Recent Canadian and U.S. Government Actions Affecting U.S. Investment in Canada. By a Canadian-American Committee, sponsored by the National Planning Association (U.S.) and the Private Planning Association of Canada, 1964. 27 pp. $1.00.

Socialist Theory of International Law. By Bernard A. Ramundo, with the assistance of Armins Rusis. Washington: George Washington University, Institute for Sino-Soviet Studies, January 1964. 109 pp. $1.75.

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